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RE-VISIONING THE FUTURE OF THE THIRD WORLD: An Ecological Perspective on Development

By EDWARD J. WOODHOUSE

UNTIL recently, the commonly accepted notion of human social development held that static "traditional" societies passed through a dynamic transitional period and came to rest again as "modern" industrial societies.[1] Such simplistic stage and linear development theories have now been formally superseded by Huntington's formulation of development and decay as concurrent processes with no necessary end-state.[2] There remains, however, an implicit assumption that highly populated, urban-industrial societies with continuously growing economies are the proper *goal* of development, and that the current internal political and economic processes of third-world nations are the proper *subject* of study.[3] Neither assumption seems to be valid.

In virtually all contemporary studies of political development there is an implicit assumption that development will be facilitated in the long run by continuing economic growth, although the process itself may be destabilizing. Effective political institutions require the largely uncoerced support of a nation's citizens, and this grant of legitimacy is more likely to occur when citizens are receiving what they want in life than when they are not. The assumption is that, if a government is ef-

* An earlier version of this essay was accepted by the Yale Political Science Department as a Ph.D. qualifying exam. I am grateful to Peggy Goodman, Conrad Morrow, and Alfred Stepan for encouragement when I needed it most.

[1] Such a view was held by most of the great evolutionary theorists, and the assumptions of American scholars did not diverge much from this paradigm in the 1950's, as almost any article in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960) will demonstrate. The work of the SSRC led to greater recognition of obstacles to development and to attempts at identifying explicitly political development. A review of these conceptual struggles is in Lucian Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLVIII (March 1965), 1-13. In order to shorten a long article, references to the standard literature of development will be infrequent.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

[3] An analytic review of the post-Huntington paradigm of development is in A. E. Keir Nash, "Pollution, Population, and the Cowboy Economy: Anomalies in the Developmentalist Paradigm and Samuel Huntington," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, II (May 1970), 109-28.

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fectively providing citizens with important values, over time this "may give legitimacy to a political system. In the modern world, *such effectiveness means primarily constant economic development. . . .* Those nations which have adapted most successfully to the requirements of an industrial system have the fewest internal political strains."[4] Consequently most social scientists have accepted industrialization and GNP growth as desirable goals for political systems;[5] it might even be said that economic growth has become such an important vehicle for political problem-solving that it now constitutes the basis of modern social order. So, in spite of the battering the traditional-to-modern paradigm has undergone, it probably remains, for lack of a more viable model, the point of departure for most work on development.

Political parties, elite attitudes, group conflicts, the strains of economic growth, military intervention in politics, and many other *internal* aspects of politics in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have been intensively studied by social scientists; but the *external* influences emanating from nations that are already "developed" have not generally been incorporated into theories or research. "Students of comparative politics tend to take the international environment for granted, as if national systems were immune to external influences and had full control over their own destinies."[6] I shall argue to the contrary, that the international system —dominated by the rich industrial nations—has a critical influence over future internal development in the poorer nations. External factors are likely to constrain the range of the possible so tightly that many third-world governments will never be able to meet the economic demands of their citizens. The maintenance of legitimacy and development of effective political institutions will become even more difficult than at present.

This assessment is made on the basis of evidence that has been ac-

[4] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y. 1960), 50; emphasis added.

In Richard Merelman's six-stage learning paradigm of legitimacy formation, material inducements from government to population are the primary stimulus in the reinforcement process: "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LX (June 1966), 548-61.

[5] David Apter, in *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965), makes an important conceptual distinction between modernization, which he believes to be almost inevitable, and industrialization, which he believes to be a long way off in many poor nations. Joseph LaPalombara recognizes the dim likelihood of successful industrialization in many nations: "Distribution: A Crisis in Resource Management," in Leonard Binder and others, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton 1971), 233-82.

[6] James Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York 1969), 2. In this volume, see especially Douglas Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics," 67-93.

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cumulating in a variety of fields; it now seems important that it be brought to bear in considering the overall direction of human social development. The discussion below will center around four problems generated by industrial technology which either are now or will soon become crucial for development in the Third World: (1) The environmental consequences of high-consumption societies; (2) Resource depletion caused by high standards of living and poor rates of reclamation; (3) Population growth induced by the use of modern health measures without corresponding changes in other socioeconomic dynamics; and (4) The economic and cultural domination of the world by the wealthier nations.

In my view, these factors will constitute the central parameters of world politics in the foreseeable future. The products of the Industrial Revolution have affected all political systems in much the same way: politics has been overwhelmed as man's inventive ability has unleashed forces that have proven to be almost impossible to control. It now appears that the mass-consumption society is not a permanently viable form of human organization, and can certainly not be extended to the poorer nations with their swelling populations. Whether or not this view is completely accepted, it should at least become clear that an understanding of the politics of development requires that the internal processes of third-world nations be studied in the historical (past *and* future), physical, and international context within which human social development and decay are occurring.[7]

I. Modernity and the Environment

The political systems we generally term "developed" have adapted to, created, or borrowed high levels of technological organization which have given them enormous powers to alter the physical conditions of life. Many of the individual changes have enhanced the welfare of their citizens; but as a whole there appear to be sufficiently serious second- and third-order consequences to raise the question of whether secularization, rationality, complexity, modernization, and other commonly utilized indicators of political development are in

[7] Historical, physical, and international are the qualities that I understand by the broader term, "ecological." Ecology is the study of the relation of an organism (or a group of organisms) to the system of which it is a part. The recent use of the term for problems that were once called "environmental" should not narrow the meaning in this essay. Recent work by political scientists which is in essential agreement with the thrust of this essay includes Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York 1971); Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival* (New York 1971); Donella H. Meadows and others, *The Limits of Growth* (New York 1972).

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fact the most appropriate concepts. It now seems that pre-modern social systems were more functional for adapting the species to its environment, and it is not clear that "developed" is an appropriate label for a culture whose leading scientists assert that "the risk is very great that we shall overshoot in our environmental demands . . . leading to cumulative collapse of our civilization. It seems obvious that before the end of the century we must accomplish basic changes in our relations with ourselves and with nature."[8]

Whether such changes will be possible in time to prevent great human suffering and sociopolitical disintegration remains to be seen, for industrial man's present maladaptation to the physical world is deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian faith in perpetual progress. This faith springs from a highly anthropocentric view of man that is likely to resist rapid change. "Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions (except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends."[9] Though few of them might claim much allegiance to Christianity, political theorists and political activists of virtually all varieties would probably unite around a definition of "modernity" by Samuel Huntington which owes much to this tradition: "Modernity begins when men develop a sense of their own competence, when they begin to think first that they *understand nature* and society, and then that they can *control nature* and society for their own purposes."[10] But, if the ecologists are correct in asserting that man in no sense dominates nature, then our conception of modernity and our belief in the desirability of spreading it to the poorer nations may be as purely ideological and unscientific as earlier beliefs that are now rejected as superstitions.

Underlying human existence is a complex web of biochemical relationships that tends to be very diverse and complex—and very stable. Organized into smaller and smaller ecosystems, waste from one process is turned into raw materials for another. No molecule is produced without enzymes capable of breaking it down; everything is recycled. Life processes are highly organized into self-regulating systems: if one part gets out of line (e.g., a difficult winter depletes food supplies) others will operate to bring the system back to stability (other food may be-

[8] Report of the MIT Study of Critical Environmental Problems, *Man's Impact on the Global Environment: Assessment and Recommendations for Action* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970) [hereafter cited as SCEP].

[9] Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science*, CLV (March 10, 1967), 1203-07.

[10] *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), 99; emphasis added.

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come available or the population of the species will be reduced until food is again abundant). Throughout most of their existence, human societies behaved as an integral part of the ecosphere, obeying the same laws as other living things. But the development of agriculture and industry set man apart; he became an *intervenor* rather than an organic part, de-stabilizing ecosystems and adding waste in increasing amounts.

The question is, how much intervening can be done without doing permanent damage to life processes—as has already been done to Lake Erie?[11] It would be convenient to have an index that would give tolerance levels for the stability of ecosystems, but their complexity, synergisms, and the lag time between cause and effect prevent it. There are rough methods of calculating the load man places on systems, however, such as Gross Domestic Product (population × material standard of living). This doubles every 13.5 years and at current rates would increase by a factor of 32 in the next 67 years, worldwide.

One example of this increase and its de-stabilizing consequences is the use of inorganic phosphate and nitrate fertilizers, which have become a mainstay of the mechanized, monocultural agriculture on which urban civilization is based. They maintain high crop yields, but natural soil fertility is gradually destroyed, and farmers become "hooked on nitrates like a junkie is hooked on heroin":[12] both generate a need for ever-increasing doses. At current rates, use of fertilizer in the United States will increase by 1000 per cent by the end of the century. If this occurs, there will be a possibly irreversible problem of water pollution, for nitrates are carried off by groundwater and end up in lakes, altering the nutrient balance and allowing certain forms of algae to "bloom," foul beaches, and then die. The process of bacterial decay consumes oxygen; so fish die, and the lake becomes incapable of supporting its once complex ecosystem. Moreover, a type of digestive-tract bacteria can convert harmless nitrates from chemical-rich food and water into extremely toxic nitrites capable of altering blood hemoglobin and causing death by suffocation. Already infants in some agricultural sections of California are given only bottled water. The "developed" countries

[11] The summary of some major environmental effects of technology which follows is too short to do justice to the topic. My intention is primarily to point out that a great many competent scientists believe that man has the ability rapidly to terminate the earth's life-support system, and that this factor is of central importance to development theory.

[12] Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, *Population, Resources, Environment* (San Francisco 1970), 188; see also 127, 128, and 185-89 for a discussion of water pollution. Much of the Ehrlichs' work provides an excellent text for this discussion, although their interpretations may at times be more alarmist than the facts warrant. My analysis is based largely on Barry Commoner, *Science and Survival* (New York 1967).

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are in the process of sharing this modern miracle with the less developed nations.

This dangerously misleading belief in man's ability to control ecological processes has also led to increasing reliance on synthetic chemical pesticides. They destroy natural biological control mechanisms and create more serious pest problems in the long run than those they are intended to alleviate. Because of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (energy is lost in every transfer), food chains have a pyramidal shape; there are fewer members of each subsequent higher predator species. Consequently, there are fewer carnivorous insects than their herbivorous prey (the "pests" against which insecticides are directed), and therefore there is lower genetic variability to evolve a defense against new chemicals. There are now approximately 250 varieties of insects which have become essentially immune to available pesticides,[13] and most of their natural predators have been killed off by consuming poisoned "pests." There is no technological "solution" to this ecological problem; it is not a matter of improving pesticides, but of understanding the limitations on man's use of chemicals. The recent MIT report on the Study of Critical Environmental Problems recommended that industrial nations phase out their mistaken use of pesticides; instead, production is being increased for export to third-world nations.[14]

The insidious global dispersion of chemicals such as pesticides leads some biologists to fear that the entire life-support system of the earth could be destroyed. The chlorinated hydrocarbons (e.g., DDT) are the most dangerous of the synthetic chemicals because of their mobility, chemical stability, biological potency, and tendency to concentrate in living organisms.[15] They have been dispersed throughout the world; among the wide variety of their effects are reproductive difficulties leading to the extinction of bird and fish species,[16] and reduction of photo-

[13] "Blueprint for Survival," *The Ecologist*, 1 (January 1972), reprinted in the *Congressional Record* (January 24, 1972), H210-H232; it is a competent although extreme assessment of the response Britain should make to environmental destruction. Written by the editors, the forty thousand-word statement was signed by thirty-three leading scientists.

[14] See SCEP (fn. 8), on "Pesticide Addiction," 136, 158-59.

[15] The special properties of chlorinated hydrocarbons are explained in Ehrlich and Ehrlich (fn. 12), 168-70. For an overall view, see Robert L. Rudd, *Pesticides and the Living Landscape* (Madison 1964), or G. M. Woodwell, "Toxic Substances and Ecological Cycles," *Scientific American*, CCXVI (March 1967), 24-31.

[16] The lag time in detection of effects (so that by the time negative consequences are proven, it may be too late for a reversal to be possible) can be seen from the recency of this evidence: one of the first convincing studies was D. A. Ratcliffe, "Decrease in Eggshell Weight in Certain Birds of Prey," *Nature*, CCXV (July 8, 1967), 208-10.

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synthesis in marine phytoplankton[17]—the basis for all life in the sea. Almost every month a new species is added to the "endangered" list, and there is little reason to believe that humans are invulnerable. Known carcinogens and mutagens are being produced and released into the biosphere by the ton, and it now seems clear that the increasing frequency of cancer in affluent nations is not simply due to better detection.[18] Mercury, lead, cadmium, and other heavy metals used by industry are being discovered in a variety of sources where they are potentially dangerous to humans. They are cumulative poisons of near-permanence once introduced into the environment, and have caused severe contamination in Japan, Sweden, and the United States.[19] To a considerable extent, chemical pollution is an accompanying feature of great affluence. Although some of the effects can be muted by more careful controls on industrial pollution and research on less toxic chemicals, the long-term effects are unknown. What has been observed is likely to be the top of an iceberg.

Levels of carbon monoxide, sulfur compounds, hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and particulates are increasing almost everywhere measurements are taken. Killer smogs like that of London in 1952, which caused four thousand deaths, will probably remain rare, but a recent study found a linear relationship between levels of air pollution and deaths from respiratory and heart diseases in New York City between 1962 and 1965.[20] Members of the UCLA medical faculty recently warned the public that "air pollution has now become a major health hazard to most of this community . . . anyone who does not have compelling reasons to remain [should] move out of the smoggy portions of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Riverside counties to avoid chronic respiratory diseases. . . ."[21] These local effects are unpleasant indications that some nations (or areas) may have passed the point at which an extra

[17] Charles F. Wurster, "DDT Reduces Photosynthesis by Marine Phytoplankton," *Science*, CLIX (March 29, 1968), 1474-75. SCEP (fn. 8), 126-36, doubts that DDT will reach concentrations dangerous to plankton in the open oceans, but may in surface oil film and coastal environments important as breeding grounds for fish. Yields of marine food fish are already declining, and oceanologist Jacques Cousteau foresees potentially irreversible damage to the oceans from the pollutants of technological civilization.

[18] Cancer in children, for instance, may well be a consequence of industrial civilization. A summary of the literature on chemical mutagens is in Howard J. Sanders, "Chemical Mutagens," *Chemical and Engineering News*, XXXXVII (May 19, 1969), 50-65ff.; *ibid.* (June 2, 1969), 54-68.

[19] See SCEP (fn. 8), 137-38, 260-63.

[20] Thomas A. Hodgson, "Short-Term Effects of Air Pollution on Mortality in New York City," *Environmental Science and Technology*, IV (July 1970), 589-97.

[21] Quoted in Ehrlich and Ehrlich (fn. 12), 119.

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unit of GNP brings a positive marginal value to the consumer,[22] but the implications may be broader: a 1968 UNESCO study found that portions of the earth would start to become uninhabitable by man if current trends persisted for another twenty years.[23]

Another limit on man's ability to transform the physical world is set by the ability of the earth to radiate heat. Local thermal pollution from industry and from electrical generating plants kills aquatic life, contributes to the outbreak and spread of parasitic diseases, and works synergistically with other forms of pollution to alter the ecology of lakes and rivers. Even more serious is the danger to the global climate. At present rates of increasing energy use (7 per cent annually), the earth's mean temperature would have to double in the next 130 years to radiate the additional energy.[24] Some physical or social process will prevent this from occurring (the polar icecaps would melt first and inundate the energy-producing population centers), and the calculation is a mechanistic extrapolation from present trends and technology, but it serves to illustrate the potential capacity of man to alter the fundamental physical parameters of his environment detrimentally. In addition, particulate pollution, jet contrails in the stratosphere, and the rising level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels all have weather-modification potential that lies beyond meteorology's current abilities of prediction.

These problems are only a sample of the environmental consequences of highly populated modern societies with high rates of consumption.[25] But is it conceivable that even higher levels of consumption are possible if scientists learn how to regulate ecosystems, and technology can be improved? It has been calculated that if 80 per cent of current pollution

[22] This point is made in Herman E. Daly, "Toward A Stationary Economy," in John Harte and Robert H. Socolow, eds., *The Patient Earth* (New York 1971), 226-44. On a different method of calculating GNP so that costs of pollution would be subtracted rather than added, see Kenneth Boulding, "Fun and Games with the Gross National Product: The Role of Misleading Indicators in Social Policy," in Harold Helfrich, ed., *The Environmental Crisis: Man's Struggle to Live with Himself* (New Haven 1970), 157-70.

[23] Ehrlich and Ehrlich (fn. 12), 118.

[24] Lamont C. Cole, "Thermal Pollution," *Bioscience*, XIX (November 1969), 989-92, and corrected calculations in *ibid.*, XX (January 15, 1970), 72. A similar estimate is made in Claude M. Summers, "The Conversion of Energy," *Scientific American*, CCXXV (September 1971), 148-63.

[25] Unwanted sounds are doubling, at least, every decade, and everyone in an urban environment suffers some hearing loss; see John Navarra, *Our Noisy World* (Garden City, N.Y. 1969). Urban sewage systems are generally overloaded and the water is impure; treatment plants are *designed* to produce an effluent rich in inorganic nitrates and phosphates which creates problems similar to those caused by inorganic fertilizers; see Ehrlich and Ehrlich (fn. 12), 187-89. On food additives, see Melvin A. Benarde, *The Chemicals We Eat* (New York 1971). On the deterioration of soil in Britain, see Neiton Pilpel, "Structure of the Soil Under Stress," *The Ecologist*, I (December 1971), 20-23.

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could be eliminated by such changes, economic and demographic growth would recreate present conditions in about thirty-five years.[26] Consequently, few ecologists believe that technological improvement is the primary answer. At any rate, research and development of such technological processes would require a prior commitment in terms of financing; there are barriers to the formation of such a commitment ranging from individual ignorance, to corporate vested interests, to the internal structure of the United States Congress, which gives control of the Environmental Affairs Agency budget to arch-conservative Jamie Whitten's appropriations subcommittee. The political system of the United States, therefore, is probably no more capable of generating a coalition to act effectively on the problem of technology than India is of solving a population problem, Israel a boundary problem, and Nigeria a tribal problem. If a "developed" political system is defined as one that is capable of handling problems in a way that is satisfactory to those affected by them, it is by no means obvious which of these polities is the most developed.

If the magnitude of the problem is of the order alleged by the leading British scientists who signed the "Blueprint for Survival" in January, 1972, the "underdeveloped" behavior of the wealthier nations becomes particularly evident. "If current trends are allowed to persist, the breakdown of society and the irreversible disruption of the life-support systems on this planet . . . within the lifetimes of our children are inevitable."[27] Among the steps required for survival, the "Blueprint" specifies de-urbanization, reduced population, and especially reduced consumption—in short, movement away from the type of society which currently dominates thinking about "modernity" and "development." While some of the fruits of technology (e.g., chemical means of preventing births) are indisputably needed by every third-world nation to raise living standards to an acceptable level, it now seems extremely doubtful that the unlimited urbanization, industrialization, and GNP growth seen as desirable (if distant) goals by most social scientists and political leaders are in fact possible or worthy any longer. A third-world society striving to become developed should not try to copy the high-consumption economies which the rich nations must now rapidly modify if the predicted catastrophes are to be avoided.[28]

[26] Based on a 5% annual rate of growth in ecological demand: "Blueprint for Survival" (fn. 13), H214.

[27] *Ibid.*, H210.

[28] Some of the environmental consequences of the misuse of technology in the poorer nations are reviewed in American Museum of Natural History, "The Unforeseen International Ecologic Boomerang," *Natural History*, LXXVIII (February 1969), Supplement.

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II. Resource Depletion

The environmental consequences of industrialization are not likely to deter aspiring political leaders of third-world nations from attempting to gain the material rewards which currently accrue only to industrial nations. Regardless of the desires of political and economic elites, however, the asymptotic exhaustion of mineral resources vital to industrialization may prevent much of the world from ever achieving mass-consumption economies. The consequences of this process will vary widely among countries, depending on resource endowments and stage of industrial development, but widespread political conflict seems inevitable when the consequences of depletion become clear.

A recent review of attempts to estimate world petroleum reserves concludes that 90 per cent of the U.S. supply of crude oil (outside Alaska) will have been consumed by 1999; the world's total estimated reserves will be equally low by 2019–2032. Oil shale and tar sands will provide some additional leeway, but "the time required to exhaust the middle 80 per cent of the ultimate resources . . . of the petroleum family . . . will probably be only about a century," if these substances continue to supply the bulk of the world's energy requirements.[29] A report by the National Academy of Sciences concludes that under these assumptions, there is little probability of "significantly improving the standard of living by industrialization of the so-called underdeveloped regions."[30] Moreover, the costs of fossil fuels will rise as supplies diminish and demand grows, and developing nations may be priced out of the energy market of the world unless some form of international subsidy is developed.

It is widely assumed that atomic energy will replace the fossil fuels, but the present generation of fission reactors would use up the best sources of uranium very quickly, and it has been said that "the entire episode of nuclear energy would probably be short-lived."[31] It now seems that a new generation of breeder reactors may extend the supply of energy for many centuries,[32] but the safety record of pilot programs

[29] M. King Hubbert, "Energy Resources," in Committee on Resources and Man, of the National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, *Resources and Man* (San Francisco 1969), 157-239; quote from 205. [Hereafter cited as *Resources and Man*.]

[30] *Energy Resources*, A Report to the Committee on Natural Resources, National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council (Washington, D.C. 1962), 132.

[31] Hubbert (fn. 29), 226.

[32] If controlled nuclear fusion ever becomes practical—it is now possible for fractions of a second in laboratories—fuel problems will be radically altered, since fusion can produce energy from ordinary water. The possibilities and limits of the process are discussed in Walter G. Peter III, "Controlled Fusion: A Multifaceted Approach to Solving Environmental Degradation," *Bioscience*, xx (June 15, 1970), 717-19, and in William C. Gough and Bernard J. Eastlund, "The Prospects of Fusion Power," *Scientific American*, ccxxiv (February 1971), 50-64.

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has been poor, all atomic installations have some leakage and waste, and there may be no such thing as a "safe" level of radioactivity. Energy is becoming a political issue in the United States, and may become more visible. "As the nuclear reactor program expands, its wastes will also increase, and the burden of radioactivity in our surroundings will rise, and go on rising. At some point the deleterious effects of this radiation will become unacceptable even to a nation which is able to tolerate 50,000 deaths on its roads each year."[33] As the nation becomes dependent on atomic power, however, the political battle necessary to reverse such a commitment will escalate.

In addition to the serious environmental and mutagenic hazards, a major drawback of atomic energy is that its principal value lies in the production of electricity. The richest countries can presumably pay for the tremendous conversion effort that will be necessary (only 20 per cent of the energy currently consumed in the U.S. is electrical), but the possibility of being able to do so seems remote for a state that is just starting to industrialize. Moreover, the introduction of atomic technology throughout the world could increase the scope of both intra- and inter-nation conflicts.

There is considerable disagreement about other resource limits that may exist. "Cornucopian" economists believe that, given sufficient funding and incentive, technologies can be developed for the solution of all resource scarcities. It is difficult to argue, from historical evidence, with the notion that "the definition of resources changes drastically and unpredictably over time."[34] Scholars familiar with political attitude formation will be sympathetic to an engineer's assertion that it is more difficult to change attitudes about resources and environment than to develop the technology to compensate for the destructive actions of man.[35] In answer to the dictum that "the notion of an absolute limit

[33] Sheldon Novick, "Radiation Damage," in Sheridan Blau and John von Rodenbeck, eds., *The House We Live In: An Environmental Reader* (New York 1971), 137-50; quote from 150. See also his longer work, *The Careless Atom* (Boston 1969), and Richard Curtis and Elizabeth Hogan, *Perils of the Peaceful Atom: The Myth of Safe Nuclear Plants* (Garden City, N.Y. 1969).

[34] Harold J. Barnett and C. Morse, *Scarcity and Growth* (Baltimore 1963), 7. For a short summary of the optimists' position, see Harold J. Barnett, "The Myth of Our Vanishing Resources," *Transaction*, IV (June 1967), 7-10.

[35] Alvin M. Weinberg, an engineer, asks "Can Technology Replace Social Engineering?" and answers in the affirmative, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXII (December 1966), 4-8. Garrett Hardin, a biologist, argues that the public-goods problems of population and environment can only be solved by collective political agreement not to allow certain behavior: "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science*, CLXII (December 13, 1968), 1243-48. B. L. Crowe, a political scientist, asserts that neither social nor technological solutions are likely to come about: "The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited," *Science*, CLXVI (November 28, 1969), 1103-07.

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on natural resource availability is untenable,"[36] one geologist asks, "why do intelligent men of good faith seem to assure us that there is nothing to be alarmed about? It can only be because they visualize a completely nongeological solution to the problem, or because they take a very short-range view of it, or because they are compulsive optimists. . . ."[37] He then presents calculated exhaustion dates of some important fuels and metals.



LIFETIMES OF ESTIMATED RECOVERABLE RESERVES OF MINERAL RESOURCES. POPULATION AND CONSUMPTION RATES AS OF 1964. KNOWN DEPOSITS THAT ARE AT PRESENT FEASIBLE TO MINE COMMERCIALLY.[38]

[36] Barnett and Morse (fn. 34), 7.

[37] Preston E. Cloud, Jr., "Realities of Mineral Distribution," *Texas Quarterly*, XI (Summer 1968), 103-26; quote from 107. See also John D. Chapman, "Interactions Between Man and His Resources," in *Resources and Man* (fn. 29), 31-42. For a more optimistic view, but generally based on projections only for the U.S. and only to the year 2000, see Hans H. Landsberg, Leonard L. Fischman, and Joseph L. Fisher, *Resources in America's Future; Patterns of Requirements and Availabilities, 1960–2000* (Baltimore 1963).

[38] From Cloud (fn. 37), 123, based on data in P. T. Flawn, *Mineral Resources* (Chicago 1966).

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The reality-simplifying assumptions necessary to allow calculation may prove his estimates incorrect. Population and consumption rates will speed up exhaustion, while new discoveries and improvements in extraction technology will delay it. The general trend seems inexorable, however, and changes in consumption patterns will be necessary in the relatively near future.

The amount of metal currently being consumed by each generation, at present rates of increase in population and demand, approximates all the metal that has been used previously.[39] Although some metals are quite abundant, others are relatively scarce and may rise in price, so that they cannot be used by newly industrializing nations. While this is occurring, the wealthier nations will be spending increasing amounts on laboratory research for substitutes (much easier for nonmetallic than for metallic resources) and on the development of technological processes that use energy in place of raw materials. Prospects for the rapid industrialization of much of the Third World are so poor for a variety of reasons that the most serious depletion-induced problems are many years away. In the absence of major changes in the process of redistributing wealth in the international economic system, the cost of industrialization will ultimately be very high for the poorer nations, and they may accept technologies unsuited to their needs. If the resource problem is as serious as it seems, the cost may well be *too high* for sizable portions of the Third World.

All discussions of resource depletion suffer from lack of adequate data in the sense that technological changes that are unforeseeable at present are certain to occur (although there is some evidence that the rate of technological innovation is declining).[40] It seems unlikely, however, that the consequences of a finite resource base can be ignored by those seeking to evaluate the developmental paths that are being chosen. Even if new technologies are developed in the wealthier nations, the poorer ones will still suffer. Many economies now depend on the export of primary resources as a means of acquiring the foreign exchange necessary for importing industrial machinery. Present evidence indicates that Chilean copper, Venezuelan and Egyptian oil, and a wide

[39] T. S. Lovering, "Mineral Resources from the Land," in *Resources and Man* (fn. 29), 109-34, contains both empirical data and a theoretical discussion of estimation procedures which tend to support Cloud (fn. 37) and a pessimistic position on mineral scarcity.

[40] See Irving L. Horowitz, "Engineering and Sociological Perspectives on Development: Inter-Disciplinary Constraints in Social Forecasting," *International Social Science Journal*, XXI, No. 4 (1969), 545-56.

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variety of minerals in other countries will run out long before their growing populations have a comfortable standard of living. National budgets that depend on income from primary exports for financing social welfare programs and capital investment projects will be in desperate condition unless plans are made to deal with the coming crisis on a worldwide cooperative basis.

At best, export revenues from primary minerals will drop and import requirements will increase, decreasing foreign exchange balances as well as a government's ability to manage the economy and moderate conflicting demands. Increasingly capital-intensive technologies, unsuited to their stages of industrialization, will be forced on nations of the Third World as a consequence of the depletion of natural resources that is caused primarily by the wealthier countries. At worst, economist Kenneth Boulding may be proven correct in his judgment that

> in all probability the presently underdeveloped countries are not going to develop. There is not enough of anything. There is not enough copper. There is not enough of an enormous number of elements which are essential to the developed economy. . . .
>
> Economic development is the process by which the evil day is brought closer when everything will be gone.[41]

Yet under current international conditions, such "development" is an imperative on third-world political leaders. The years since World War II

> have witnessed the passing of traditional society from every continent. No area of the world has resisted the attractions, despite the increasingly evident risks, of modernization. The emerging nations have hastened to become new states and emulate the ways of modern societies.
>
> Haste has made waste; the risks have turned into losses. The "want: get ratio" has been upset—since people have learned to want more than they can get. . . .[42]

This section has suggested that the "get" side of that relationship may have some very definite physical limits. But within those limits, the international system can have effects both on what is desired by the people of the poorer nations and on what they are likely to be able to achieve. "From the West came the stimuli which undermined tradi-

[41] Boulding (fn. 22), 166.

[42] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York 1964), vii. It is instructive to compare the preface of the 1964 edition, stressing the obstacles to development, with the generally optimistic tone of the original (1958) edition.

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tional society,"[43] yet implicit in most development literature is the assumption that what remains of the undermined society is supposed to pull itself together. It seems more likely that an excess of internationally-stimulated demand for material goods will lead many societies to pull themselves apart.

III. Population

The environmental consequences may make high-level industrialization an undesirable policy, and resource depletion may render it impossible for many nations of the Third World. Nevertheless, rapid population growth seems to make industrialization imperative in order to provide jobs and a decent existence for yet unborn billions. Until recently, scholars studying the politics of development have ignored population growth, treated it as a parameter, or assumed it to be just another part of the "late modernizers' crisis load." In fact, population may be one of the central political problems of the world. If politics is "the authoritative allocation of societal values,"[44] the beds and sleeping mats of the world are centers of political activity, for no decisions made by governments constrain future individual and collective decision-making as tightly as a multiplying population. Differences range as widely as the population decline that might be appropriate for India and the moderate increase Tanzania could usefully absorb, but it is certain that almost every country will be overpopulated if present trends are not modified.

Both the absolute increase in the population of the world and the rate of that increase have been rising. Not until 1650 did it reach one-half a billion people; but it took only two hundred years more to reach one billion, and just another eighty (to 1930) to double again. The four-billion mark will be reached by about 1975, and current doubling time is less than thirty-five years.[45] Mechanical projection from current trends will probably prove inaccurate, but errors are as likely to be on the low side as on the high, judging from projections in the 1940's and 1950's which have already been exceeded.[46] As the table below indicates, most

[43] *Ibid.*, 47.

[44] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953) introduced this widely cited definition. Authoritative (in the sense of unquestioned or conclusive) decisions having great impact on people's lives are often made in largely non-governmental ways, and have been ignored by political scientists. Multinational corporations are an obvious example, as is the basic structure of modern technocratic society.

[45] Ehrlich and Ehrlich (fn. 12), 6.

[46] Goran Ohlin reviews many population estimates in *Population Control and Economic Development* (Paris 1967). Underestimation of South Asian population is discussed in Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York 1968), Vol. II, 1390-91, 1448-59.

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of the predicted future growth will be accounted for by the less developed nations.

ESTIMATED POPULATION (IN BILLIONS), 1960-2000[47]

	1960	*1969*	*2000 (Low)*	*2000 (Medium)*	*2000 (High)*	*Constant Fertility*
World Total	3.0	3.6	5.4	6.1	7.0	7.5
"Developed" Regions	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6
"Less Developed" Regions	2.0	2.5	4.2	4.7	5.4	5.9

Current exponential rates of increase will not continue. Brazil will not have a population of one billion by 2050; tiny Uganda's 9 million-plus will not outnumber Americans within a century. The question is only whether planned sociopolitical controls will be successful in time to prevent the worst possible Malthusian consequences. There is some evidence that birth rates have peaked in a number of smaller countries, including Mauritius, Ceylon, Costa Rica, and Chile, and are now declining.[48] The situation in the more crucial larger nations is not yet clear. But even if current birth rates were halved throughout the poorer nations, population would continue to increase at a politically destabilizing pace. And even "if replacement is achieved in the developed world by 2000 and in the developing world by 2040, then the world's population will stabilize at nearly 15.5 billion"[49] a century later.

The most elementary problem raised by these prospects is whether mass starvation can be averted. This is partly a matter of definition, for about 40 per cent of those currently living already suffer from chronic malnutrition; many of them have literally been deprived of their humanity by impaired psychological development from protein deficiency. It is estimated that up to twenty million deaths a year could be prevented by an adequate diet.[50] Although fears of outright famine have diminished—largely due to the new "miracle" grains[51]—most ecologists

[47] Data are drawn from the Statistical Office of the U.N., *World Population Prospects*, Population Studies No. 41 (New York 1966).

[48] Dudley Kirk, "A New Demographic Transition?" in National Academy of Sciences, *Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications* (Baltimore 1971), 123-47; and Harald Frederiksen, "Feedbacks in Economic and Demographic Transition," *Science*, CLXVI (November 14, 1969), 837-47.

[49] The Population Council, *Annual Report of 1970*, quoted in "Blueprint for Survival" (fn. 13), H216.

[50] The nutrition estimate is that of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Panel on the World Food Supply, *The World Food Problem* (Washington, D.C. 1967). Other estimates such as Rene Dumont and Bernard Rosier, *The Hungry Future* (New York 1969) and previous U.N. figures discussed in Ohlin (fn. 46) are in basic agreement. The figure of 20 million is from Paul R. Ehrlich, "Famine 1975: Fact or Fallacy?" in Helfrich (fn. 22), 47-64.

[51] Another possible panacea, in the opinion of some, is growing food in the oceans. For a critique of the "unlimited riches of the sea" theory, see William E. Ricker, "Food from the Sea," in *Resources and Man* (fn. 29), 87-108.

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see the problem as having only been delayed, and probably exacerbated, by unwarranted optimism. The rapid dissemination of a few strains of grain over vast areas of Asia is courting ecological disaster; their genetic variability is low, and a new plant disease could destroy an entire crop. A bad growing season, together with continued population increase, could well cause a widespread famine within the next few decades.[52]

But even if such a catastrophe is averted, more subtle effects of population growth are certain to inhibit political and economic development. The "green revolution" itself will cause great internal strains in non-socialist countries. The growth requirements of the new cereals favor dry (but irrigated) regions and large, modern, commercially-oriented farms capable of adapting to technological innovation, particularly large-scale use of artificial fertilizer (27 times the amount needed for ordinary grain). As a result of greatly increased yields, farm prices may fall (at least until population catches up again), and "farmers in the less favored regions may . . . be forced back on subsistence farming. . . . Large numbers of poverty-stricken and unskilled countrymen will be driven out, either to cities and towns or to the more favored agricultural regions, where most of them will become landless laborers. . . . The larger landowning farmers will gradually take over from the smaller ones and from tenants. This situation will increase still further the proportion of landless laborers and will aggravate inequities in income distribution."[53] What the lives of those driven off the land in the name of "progress" will be like is not difficult to imagine, and the economic and political consequences of spurious urbanization are well known. Given the environmental consequences of inorganic fertilizers and the sociopolitical costs of capital-intensive agriculture, the "Blueprint for Survival" has recommended that reliance be placed on food shipments instead of miracle grain.[54] But international transfers of the necessary magnitude seem unlikely at present; in any case, they would bring unwanted new residents to port cities. No matter what course is chosen, the task of feeding growing populations seems certain to make many of the poorer nations increasingly ungovernable.[55]

Concerning the more specifically economic effects of population growth, it has been suggested that "perhaps the whole Industrial Revo-

[52] See William Paddock, "How Green Is the Green Revolution?" *Bioscience*, xx (August 15, 1970), 897-902; and Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" *Foreign Affairs*, xxxxvii (April 1969), 464-76.

[53] National Academy of Sciences (fn. 48), 74.

[54] "Blueprint for Survival" (fn. 13), H213.

[55] Growing populations may, however, turn third-world governments away from the delusive concentration on industrialization which has symbolized "modernity" at the expense of a stable foundation. On the need for attention to the agricultural sector, see Theodore W. Schultz, *Economic Growth and Agriculture* (New York 1968).

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lution of the last two hundred years . . . [was] largely induced by the unparalleled rise in population."[56] Strong population pressure caused differentiation of occupational roles, raised the efficiency of agricultural labor, led to rises in production, and provided a large internal market for specialized products.[57] But it can be very misleading to compare the experience of nations that modernized early with contemporary third-world countries.[58] Most European countries benefitted from sending large numbers of people to the American frontier; the magnitude of population growth rates is much higher now; and the international economic environment is *very* different. Even if the relationship (between population growth and economic growth) still held in *rates*, we must now be concerned with *absolute* levels of consumption, which are obviously increased by population growth.

Consider how difficult it would be for a rich country such as the United States to duplicate all its schools, roads, sewage facilities, housing, food production, doctors, and jobs in the twenty to thirty years it takes for the population to double in many of the poorer countries. The drag this exerts on per capita improvement in social and economic conditions has received considerable attention. Using a number of assumptions about savings rates, marginal productivity of labor, and demographic stratification, Coale and Hoover estimate that a 50 per cent decline in fertility over a twenty-five-year period would lead to a 100 per cent increase in per capita income over a fifty-year period. Using actual data from India and Mexico, the same authors estimate that, at that rate, these two countries would increase per capita income by 600 per cent in 150 years in comparison with constant rates of fertility.[59] Using a somewhat different approach, investment in birth control pro-

[56] J. R. Hicks, quoted in Ohlin (fn. 46), 54.

[57] See Ester Boserup, *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure* (London 1965). Although Albert Hirschman calls it a cruel solution, he believes that "the qualities of imagination and organization developed in . . . maintaining standards of living in the face of population pressures are very similar to those that are needed to *increase* per capita income." *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven 1958), 177.

[58] A fascination with universal models and theories in modern social science has often led to a failure to recognize that relationships that were valid at one time may not hold at another. Historical experiences and cross-sectional comparisons obviously yield some insights, but "lessons" often become mind-sets. A critique of this tendency is Thomas L. Thorson, *Biopolitics* (New York 1970). In my view, there is no such thing as a general theory of economic or political development, because different collectivities will need different developmental paths in accord with their cultures, human and physical resources, and the changing international environment.

[59] See Ansley J. Coale, "Population and Economic Development," in Philip Hauser, ed., *The Population Dilemma* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), 46-69. The theoretical data are presented more fully in Coale and Edgar Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries* (Princeton 1958).

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grams has been calculated to be 100 to 170 times more effective in raising living standards than direct investment in economic infrastructures or capital equipment.[60] Myrdal has criticized attempts to attach exact coefficients to birth control benefits,[61] but many different methods of calculation have reached similar conclusions. They at least illustrate the general magnitude of what could be expected.

However, what is good for the nation in the long term may be at odds with short-term individual desires and needs. For instance, the Asian street peddler or small businessman may use his children to economic advantage. And, although the marginal productivity of labor in parts of China and rural Bangladesh may be so low that reduced family size might not be unattractive, it may make very good sense for peasants elsewhere to have many children to support parents in their old age. Presumably, attempts by governments to pressure citizens into acting against their perceived self-interest will meet resistance, generate support for a political opposition, and require power beyond the capabilities of weak governments. Thus, both population growth and efforts to halt it are likely to undermine orderly governmental processes. Social scientists interested in predictive theory might do well to assess the magnitude of potential conflicts over population policy that can be expected from the socioeconomic complexion and demographic change rates in various nations.[62] Presumably, subcultural differences would be one predictive indicator of increasing conflict and decreasing governmental effectiveness (e.g., fears in India that higher Moslem fertility will increase that minority's political power; Malay preferences for children and leisure leading to the creation of an expanding lower class in Singapore).

[60] Stephen Enke, "The Economic Aspects of Slowing Population Growth," *Economic Journal*, LXXVI (March 1966), 46; Ohlin (fn. 46), 117. For other calculations, see Enke, "The Gains to India from Population Control: Some Money Measures and Incentive Schemes," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXXXII (May 1960), 175-81; and Paul Demeny, "Investment Allocation and Population Control," *Demography*, II (1965), 203-32.

[61] Myrdal (fn. 46), Vol. III, "A Note on Inadequate Approaches to the Economic Effects of Population Changes," 2063-76; also Ohlin (fn. 46), 113-16.

[62] Such work is now beginning. John D. Montgomery has developed five typologies which form an index for pegging probable political and administrative consequences of demographic increase in "Effects of Rapid Population Growth on Government Administration," paper presented to the U.S. Department of State Conference on Effects of Rapid Population Growth on Political Change in LDC's, February 17, 1972. Also, Myron Weiner, "Political Demography: An Inquiry into the Political Consequences of Population Change," in National Academy of Sciences (fn. 48), 567-617.

An inter-nation focus is found in Robert C. North and Nazli Choucri's *Nations in Conflict: Prelude to World War I* (forthcoming), which finds statistical relationships between population growth and belligerent behavior leading to war; see also their

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The attitude-set stimulated by industrialization was a central factor in the decline of birthrates in the wealthier nations. But if many poor countries are not able to industrialize—partly because of high birthrates—there is need for an alternative method of imparting the desire for smaller families. The present message of family-planning programs is generally that smaller families will bring better material conditions. This appeal, however, is primarily suitable only for the tiny minority of achievers who are moving into the middle class. For most peasants, "the idea that sexual technique can prevent conception is incredible; but even less credible to them is the idea that such techniques will produce personal affluence. Both claims seem to invoke magic."[63] It may be that unpopular governments will find it very difficult to overcome this barrier, and that population stabilization will be possible only through mass sterilization techniques within the present political and social context. For,

> to educate effectively, [authoritarian] governments would be promoting their own subversion through sudden and widespread adult education.
>
> People who freely decide to control their own fertility have new motivations or aspirations to political control. It is clear that responsible parenthood cannot be separated from the quest for power in politics. Programs that aim at such goals are unwelcome under the military governments prevailing in South America, and such programs are not the kind usually financed by the United States.[64]

Whether or not this proves to be correct, population control is obviously more than a technical problem that can be taken care of by money and planners. Some Latin American Communists oppose birth control because they foresee the development of a revolutionary situation: as the masses increase in numbers, the extent of reform necessary to satisfy their needs increases; and as the stakes of the conflict mount, so do the incentives for elites to oppose major change. Efforts at international population control are viewed as another imperialist scheme by the United States to maintain the status quo—with some justification.[65] Populist leaders may therefore find it difficult to push birth control to the extent required unless they are simultaneously able to offer a pro-

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"Population, Technology, and Resources in the Future International System," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXV (Autumn 1971).

[63] Ivan D. Illich, "Sexual Power and Political Potency," in *Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y. 1970), 137-55; quote from 143.

[64] *Ibid.*, 142, 144.

[65] For a discussion of attitudes toward birth-control programs in Latin America, see J. Mayone Stycos, "Politics and Population Control in Latin America," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 66-82; see also his *Human Fertility in Latin America* (Ithaca 1968).

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gram for restructuring the socioeconomic system. To be successful, such programs would probably require international backing and a willingness of the wealthier nations to support socialist movements in third-world countries.

Population growth clearly illustrates the international character of development problems and the impossibility of analyzing such problems without a historical and international perspective. Rapid population growth was largely stimulated by the introduction of western medicine without accompanying changes in "underdeveloped" socioeconomic structures and attitudes that would lead to a demographic transition. Outright opposition to population limitation comes from the Catholic Church and from leftists who are reacting to a hostile international environment. Entrenched western-oriented elites who benefit from inegalitarian societies are unlikely to adopt the social changes necessary to give programs of population control a real chance among the lower classes. And, whatever their professed intentions, the governments of "developed" countries supply the arms which keep such elites in power, and discourage the radical economic and political changes that might lead to successful changes in mass consciousness in third-world nations.

IV. International Economic Relationships

Another variable that has not been adequately incorporated into the mainstream of development theory is the domination of the world economy by the industrial nations.[66] In this section I will consider some of the ways in which the international economic environment interferes with the successful development of third-world nations, and will suggest some possible revisions in the conceptualization of the development process.

The world's wealth is highly stratified and presently shows no trend toward redistribution. Since 1950, the affluent nations have averaged annual increases in per capita incomes of about 4 per cent; the increments are spread out among populations who, in general, are able to control the size of their families. The less affluent nations show greater disparity; as a group they have averaged only about 3 per cent annual per capita growth, and the benefits have been less well dis-

[66] Non-Americans and Marxists have been more aware of the effects of dominance. A classic starting point is Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York 1957). Myrdal (fn. 46), Celso Furtado, *Obstacles to Development in Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y. 1970), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina* (Lima 1967), offer good contemporary interpretations.

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tributed. The absolute gap is increasing much faster than the relative one, and is probably more important in terms of political impact. Russett uses the example of a poor nation with an annual per capita income of $100, growing at 3 per cent per year, reaching a maximum of $275 by the year 2000. He estimates that about half of the world's population would fall in this category. On the other hand, about 20 per cent of the world's population live in nations with average annual per capita incomes of $2000. Growing at a rate of 3 per cent, they will reach a per capita income of $5500 in the same period of time. Moreover, the gap between the richest and the poorest nations will amount to nearly $11,000 per capita.[67] While cross-country differences in buying power, internal income distribution, and defects in GNP as an index of living standards reduce the accuracy of these estimates,[68] the income gap and its probable future seem to offer little hope to billions of individuals and to political systems unable to meet rising demands.

The causes of these trends are complex at one level. Clearly, there are cultural differences that make one nation (e.g., Japan) more capable of adapting to "modern" economic organization than another. Value systems that do not emphasize material improvement, stratification systems that allow too little social mobility, the "waste" of valuable skills out of deference to age, low levels of group consciousness and solidarity, and similar cultural factors have been used to explain lags in economic development.[69] Concentration on such *internal* factors during the *post*-colonial period of the poorer nations can be misleading, however, for it masks another level of analysis. If one looks at the process in historical perspective and on a world scale, it is clear that differential social evolution led to the development of particular cognitive skills and technical applications in a small segment of the world; the fruits of early European industrialization then facilitated control of larger segments of the world via colonialism. This process insured the perpetuation of the in-

[67] See Bruce M. Russett, "Rich and Poor in 2000 A.D.: The Great Gulf," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXXXIV (Spring 1968), 182-98. Also Boulding (fn. 22), 167-68. Thomas E. Weisskopf calculates per capita growth somewhat lower, 2.2% for non-socialist poor countries, and 3.0% for non-socialist rich ones from 1950–1967, based on growth indices in the *Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968*. Weisskopf, "Capitalism, Underdevelopment, and the Future of the Poor Countries," *The Review of Radical Political Economics*, IV (Spring 1972), 1-35.

[68] For instance, how much better off, in terms of transportation, are the people of Los Angeles with all their automobiles than those of Mexico City with its new subway? See also fn. 22.

[69] For example, Eliezer B. Ayal, "Value Systems and Economic Development in Japan and Thailand," *Journal of Social Issues*, XIX (January 1963), 35-51; and Philip M. Hauser, "Cultural and Personal Obstacles to Economic Development in the Less Developed Areas," *Human Organization*, XVIII (Summer 1959), 78-84.

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equality which is now becoming so grimly apparent. Only further social evolution, beyond the current social Darwinist international system, is likely to alter these trends.

Although outright political and economic control has now been relinquished, the legacy of colonialism remains, and with it the structure of dependence it created. The consequences of colonialism include: (1) Truncated social orders largely stripped of their previous leaders; (2) Pluralistic societies with unassimilated immigrants and a plethora of indigenous cultural groupings; (3) Over-urbanization due to non-indigenous economic activity and the disruption caused by World War II; (4) Resurgent nationalism as an over-reaction to years of imperial domination; (5) Mass disillusionment wherever independence did not bring the anticipated economic progress;[70] and (6) National economies at the mercy of the international system dominated by the wealthier nations. Such factors pose major obstacles to internally-directed development.

In Brazil and Argentina, for instance, industrialization in the face of an unsupportive international environment has led to the exhaustion of import substitution, service charges on a growing external debt, and general balance-of-payments problems (slow expansion of exports, rapid growth of capital imports). To break through this exchange bottleneck, a government would institute sharp monetary and fiscal controls, devaluations, and related economic measures. Widespread unemployment and severe recession would follow, yet inflation would continue. Not surprisingly, social tension expressed itself in violent protests, threatening the stability of an already shaky government. An attempt to reduce pressures by relaxation of the tight policies led to even greater inflation, new balance-of-payments problems, and the "stop-go" cycle would start again.[71] No government could be expected to cope successfully with problems of this magnitude. The international economic system, as it operates at present, is virtually certain to cause such internal political instability. The cases of Brazil and Argentina may be only the forerunners of many other permanently underdeveloped, politically unstable, middle-level industrial nations with sizable sectors of the population living in very poor material conditions.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] For Brazil, see Nathaniel H. Leff, *Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil 1947–1964* (New York 1968); for Argentina, Gilbert Merkx, *Politics and Social Change in Argentina*, unpubl. Ph.D. diss. (Yale 1967). For the role of foreign capital, including early boost effects and subsequent growing dependence, see Albert Hirschman, "How to Divest in Latin America, and Why," Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 76 (November 1969).

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Perhaps because charges of "imperialist exploitation" have sometimes been overly simplistic and easily dismissed, the mainstream of development literature has not yet satisfactorily dealt with the obvious negative influences which the international system exerts on many third-world nations. It is simple to demonstrate the large outflow of capital from Latin America to the United States and the rapidly increasing value of foreign investments in poor nations;[72] many economists have explained it as normal economic interdependence (gains from trade, comparative advantage) involving costs and benefits to both trading partners. But, increasingly, such theories seem unsatisfactory. Decisions of imperial administrators largely "determined the controlled territories' tastes, technology, and factor endowments which underlay their international offer curves. . . . a systematically biased development of the international economy is the consequence."[73] While the form of imperialism has changed and muted, the essence of the relationship remains. Dos Santos' formulation of the process is that colonial dependence, based on a trade monopoly and metropolitan control of land, mines, and manpower, became financial-industrial dependence, based on the expansion abroad of big capital through investment in the production of raw materials and agricultural products for consumption in the hegemonic centers. This, in turn, is evolving into technological-industrial dependence, based on multinational corporations producing for internal markets in the poorer countries.[74] The wealthier nations currently have diversified economies, many external links, efficient production methods, and strong internal markets; consequently, they are able to absorb international commodity price fluctuations, import competition, and other potentially destabilizing influences.

The failure to incorporate these aspects of political economy into development theory has been matched by another instance of the separation of politics from economics: the concentration on aggregate GNP growth as a prime measure of economic development. Partly encouraged by western theories, the government of Pakistan, in the late 1950's and the 1960's, promoted policies that biased the distribution of income

[72] From 1946 to 1967, for instance, profit remittances to the U.S. were $9.4 billion more than new investment; Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review*, LX (May 1970), 231-36. Harry A. Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York 1969) develops this thesis in great detail. See also Weisskopf (fn. 67).

[73] Richard D. Wolff, "Modern Imperialism: The View from the Metropolis," *American Economic Review*, LX (May 1970), 225-30; quote from 229. For an excellent unintended application, see R. Szereszewski, *Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana 1891–1911* (London 1965).

[74] Dos Santos (fn. 72).

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in favor of a tiny wealthy elite, gave entrepreneurs protection from competition, and made inexpensive capital readily available. Instead of saving a high proportion of their incomes, as the theories had predicted,[75] the elite, induced by exposure to Western affluence, spent it on luxury housing and other forms of conspicuous consumption. As a result, 75 to 80 per cent of the population are now either worse or no better off than twenty years ago, in spite of a 25 per cent increase in per capita output. And, "although discontent may be widespread and may occasionally break out in random acts of violence, all real socio-economic interests that might have acted as countervailing forces have been undermined. . . . [The government's policy] has succeeded in creating a small class of wealthy, privileged monopolists who are now in a virtually unassailable position—freed by that very policy from the pressures of business competition, organized labor movement or political opposition, and with no strong interest in efficiency, change or even . . . in development itself."[76] This outcome has been the result of internal and external policies, and would have been much less likely to occur if the international environment had been different. International "aid" agencies and governments of "developed" countries provided funds and advisors;[77] western economists championed the individualistic, materialist model that failed; high-consumption societies (particularly the capitalist ones) provided the enticement; and international corporations cooperated with indigenous entrepreneurs in the over-invoicing of capital goods imports and in other methods of avoiding government attempts to guide development in socially productive channels.

These problems suggest the need for revising development models that emphasize the growth of aggregate GNP. One attempt at a more qualitative, politically relevant measure that incorporates population as

[75] W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (Homewood, Ill. 1955), 379-80 is one of many who have warned that income redistribution might have negative effects on capital formation. Ironically, Richard Bird has found that the private sector in Colombia saves poorly because of the high marginal propensity of the upper classes to consume: "Income Redistribution and Tax Policy in Colombia," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XVIII (July 1970), 519-35.

[76] Timothy Nulty and Leslie Nulty, "Pakistan: The Busy Bee Route to Development," *Transaction*, VII (February 1971), 18-26; quote from 24. See also Arthur MacEwan, "Contradictions in Capitalist Development: The Case of Pakistan," *The Review of Radical Political Economics*, III (Spring 1971), 40-57.

[77] It is discouraging to see how little has been learned from experience. The Pearson Commission report asks for more of the same type of aid: *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York 1969). Assessments and critiques of the liberal assumptions are in the *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIV (Autumn 1970). A conservative criticism is in Samuel Huntington, "Foreign Aid for What and for Whom," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1970–71), 161-89.

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a crucial element is Herman Daly's Marxian-Malthusian approach.[78] As shown in the diagram, populations are cross-classified in terms of income source and use of birth control; this yields a set of classes into

FAMILY OWNS PROPERTY (CONTROLS MEANS OF PRODUCTION)	FAMILY CONTROLS ITS SIZE: YES	FAMILY CONTROLS ITS SIZE: NO
YES	1 Upper Class (Stable Bourgeoisie)	2 Middle Class (Catholic Capitalists or Transitional Bourgeoisie)
NO	3 Middle Class (Neo-Malthusian Laborers or Transitional Proletariat)	4 Lower Class (Stable Proletariat)

A Marxian-Malthusian View of Development
(Constructed from Daly [fn. 78])

which national per capita income can be disaggregated. True development involves *both* increasing per capita incomes within each class *and* movement of individuals from class 4 toward class 1. This is clearly a far more fundamental process—with substantially greater political implications—than the usual idea of economic development as increasing aggregate GNP with some redistribution to the lower classes through social welfare measures and trickle-down effects. The process Daly outlines would change the underlying social forces which generate inequalities of class income.

The applicability of this method of approaching economic development can be demonstrated by the case of Northeast Brazil.[79] By the conventional criteria of development the region has been a great success: GNP growing at 6.5 per cent annually, population at 3.1 per cent, per capita income at 3.4 per cent. The region is essentially stratified into just two classes, however: upper-class families have an average of four children (doubling over a generation), and lower-class families have an average of eight children (quadrupling over a generation). At a growth rate of 6.5 per cent, family income doubles every eleven years; in a twenty-five-year generation, it would increase by a factor of 4.8. Upper-class income would increase by a factor of 2.4 (4.8/2), but lower-class income would increase by only 1.2 (4.8/4). Even this meager 20 per

[78] Herman E. Daly, "A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty and Development," *Population Studies*, xxv (March 1971), 25-38.

[79] Herman E. Daly, "The Population Question in Northeast Brazil: Its Economic and Ideological Dimensions," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, xviii (July 1970), 536-74.

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cent increase is probably illusory, for it is unlikely that such a g
rate will be maintained, and very unlikely that income increment
be divided equally among the population. Thus, what is usually lab
"economic development" is actually more like "swelling" because "it appears extremely likely that the per capita income of the proletariat does not increase at all, while that of the bourgeoisie increases very rapidly indeed. The bourgeoisie becomes richer and relatively fewer; the proletariat remains equally poor, and becomes both absolutely and relatively more numerous."[80]

Attention to aggregate GNP growth is misleading also because underdevelopment is not merely an objective state indicated by low GNP. Underdevelopment is also a state of mind, a state of felt relative deprivation that "occurs when mass needs are converted to the demand for new brands of packaged solutions which are forever beyond the reach of the majority. Underdevelopment in this sense is rising rapidly even in countries where the supply of classrooms, calories, cars, and clinics is also rising. The ruling groups in these countries build up services which have been designed for an affluent culture; once they have monopolized demand in this way, they can never satisfy majority needs."[81] Non-industrial nations cannot reproduce what has occurred in the rich countries, and are destroying their cultures and people by trying. Karachi's seventeen soft drink bottling companies are obviously out of place, but so are most of the "socially beneficial" institutions of affluent societies that have become symbols of development. Safe drinking water is needed more than soda pop, and can be achieved at a fraction of the cost. The same is true of many other goods and services: paramedical workers for the masses instead of heart specialists and hospitals for the urban elite; buses instead of private automobiles; community freezers instead of private refrigerators; home learning supplies and one or two months of practical schooling annually instead of new school buildings and western-style educational systems; durable, spartan agricultural vehicles designed for slow transportation on rough terrain instead of high-speed trucks with electric wipers and built-in obsolescence, designed for the American market.

The technologically-trained mind rebels at the claim that the majority of the world's people may never have the cultural artifacts which are so much a part of affluent societies, for we "hate to recognize the

[80] Herman E. Daly, "A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty and Development," Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 80 (February 1970), 40-41.

[81] Illich (fn. 63), "Planned Poverty: The End Result of Technical Assistance," 149-66; quote from 165-66.

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corner into which our imagination has been pushed."[82] Even without the limits posed by the environment and the available resources, population growth and international economic constraints insure that in many nations of the Third World a continued attempt to imitate affluent economies will bring much less than the greatest good for the greatest number. Nor, as we have seen, is this fact simply a reflection of the need for more "aid" from the rich nations, for there are very sharp limits on the amount of capital and advanced technology that can be absorbed without grave sociocultural damage. So long as social scientists, policy makers in the affluent nations and the U.N., and governing elites in poor nations perceive development in terms of a mass-consumption economy, sharply increased monetary transfers could prove more harmful than helpful—as in the case of Pakistan. Although it hardly seems impending, "This population expansion and decrease of consumption threaten the industrialized nations, who may . . . convert their defense budgets to the economic pacification of poor nations. And this in turn could produce irreversible despair, because the plows of the rich can do as much harm as their swords. . . . Once the Third World has become a mass market for the goods, products, and processes which are designed by the rich for themselves, the discrepancy between demand . . . and the supply will increase indefinitely."[83]

Given the apparent dead end of development that is oriented this way, there would seem to remain two major possibilities. (1) Third-world nations could try to keep out external influences (foreign movies, luxury goods) that create relative deprivation and encourage misallocation of the society's scarce resources. Tanzania, for instance, has recently banned the importation of automobiles for private use. However, such a route presupposes a passive international environment, a highly effective political system, and unselfish, farsighted elites—all of which are currently in short supply. (2) The industrial nations could slow down their domestic economies toward zero growth levels and promote policies aimed at low-consumption, controlled-birth, modern societies in the Third World. Barring these two unlikely occurrences, the Latin American pattern seems certain to spread: inefficient industries producing inappropriate goods for monopoly prices behind high protective tariffs, with entrenched elites preventing fundamental change,

[82] *Ibid.*, 160.

[83] *Ibid.*, 159. For the view of an African scholar who is more optimistic about avoiding permanent damage from aid, see Samir Amin, "Development and Structural Change: The African Experience, 1950–1970," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIV (Autumn 1970), 203-23.

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and sizable segments of the population existing under de-humanizing material conditions.

In the foregoing discussion of international economic relationships I have been arguing that the mainstream of contemporary social science has lost sight of a goal (human welfare) and become enamored with a means (growth of GNP). Obviously, much of the world needs a higher standard of living. It is equally obvious, however, that individual satisfaction and support for a political system do not primarily involve the level of material possessions, but the way in which material resources are utilized in an overall cultural context. A transfer of the institutional solutions of affluent cultures (universities, Coca-Cola, automobiles, competing political parties) to the poorer ones is likely to result in cultural breakdown and permanent underdevelopment. In all probability this will continue to occur; but the dismal outcome of such a course is sufficiently predictable for social scientists to avoid advocating it in theoretical formulations.

V. The Prospects for Development

The increasing functional integration of the international system may be making the concept of *national* development outmoded. In the long run, it seems likely that "developed" nations will be negatively affected by the "underdeveloped" international system. For instance, Russett has speculated that growing disparities between rich and poor might lead to international guerrillas detonating stolen tactical nuclear weapons in the population centers of the wealthier nations.[84] Interest in controlling the spread and use of nuclear weapons and the nature of environmental and resource problems would seem to offer powerful incentives for the rich nations eventually to initiate the formation of an international organization with more than token enforcement powers. Such an organization would probably involve concessions by the rich minority to the poor majority, as well as some form of substantial taxation.

So long as development is perceived in terms of movement toward a mass-consumption society, however, even such a utopian hope for world organization and the redistribution of wealth may well produce as much harm as good by raising expectations in the wrong direction. As I have suggested, the highly populated, urban-industrial society with a continuously growing economy is not the most "developed" collectivity ever organized, but it is the one most dangerous to the perpetuation of the

[84] Russett (fn. 67).

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species. By the time this can be "proven," it will be irrelevant. The evidence reviewed above strongly suggests that the rich nations should move rapidly toward non-growing (even diminishing) economies and populations, reduce their usage of resources to a minimum through lower consumption and recycling,[85] and de-urbanize to cut the ecological demand placed on the earth's ecosystem.[86]

The poor nations, rather than seeking to emulate the rich, need to redefine development so that it does not involve great affluence which can probably never be achieved—and certainly not before population size has been drastically reduced and many years of sociocultural evolution have passed. Nations would of course adopt different paths, depending on current socioeconomic composition and available alternatives, but in general it seems doubtful that the less developed societies have much chance to achieve anything that could be called "development," unless popular leaders emphasize collective effort, population limitation, and egalitarianism while discouraging individualism and material acquisition. Western theories to the contrary have been discredited by the ecological perspective that has now become essential in the study of third-world politics.[87]

What this would imply for relationships among nations is debatable. One might argue that the political and economic power of the wealthy nations should be used to manipulate leaders of poor nations (who would not do so otherwise) to act in the interests of the peasants and workers or else face international intervention. On the other hand, the low probability of non-nationals intervening successfully perhaps im-

[85] Kenneth Boulding has long argued that GNP should be minimized; it doesn't represent the level of welfare, but the *cost* of maintaining a given level of welfare. Subject to environmental and social restraints, what should be maximized is individual utility. This can be done with a large *stock* of very durable goods and a small annual *flow*. Flow represents turning resources into garbage and should be minimized. See "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth," in Henry Jarrett, ed., *Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy* (Baltimore 1966), 3-14. Daly (fn. 78), argues that concentration on flow is ideologically convenient for economists, because income is more susceptible to improvement than is wealth. Wealth is more important in determining living standards, but it is a "political" question which doesn't conveniently fit economic models or liberal views of society.

[86] Such changes might well constitute the most desirable path of human social development even if no physical requirements existed. An increasing number of affluent Americans might judge life in an African village or a Tibetan monastery to be preferable to life in New York City. See Murray Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Berkeley 1971), for a thoughtful presentation of the possibilities of a decentralized life style.

[87] The probability of many rich or poor nations following the paths prescribed without massive upheaval may be close to zero, but that has no bearing on whether the paths are valid descriptions of what would constitute development. In social science there is a tendency to compare nations and people with each other rather than against standards drawn from an analysis of "the good" or "the possible." This has the virtue of "objectivity," but also often the fault of irrelevance to important human problems.

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plies that the best thing industrial societies can do is to stop making development more difficult than it intrinsically is. In this view, the greatest service the rich nations could give to the poor would be to create a supportive international environment in which material improvement to a minimum standard would be possible after the necessary internal political conflicts have been resolved.

All of this leaves out the process by which an industrial society would stop growth. The first barrier is perceptual: our socialization has been so effective that most scholars are only beginning to realize that technology is a *political* question. Even many radicals are opposed only to the way the technocracy is being operated, and not to its essence. Consequently, "The technocracy grows without resistance . . . primarily because its potential critics continue trying to cope with these breakdowns in terms of antiquated categories. This or that disaster is blamed by Republicans on Democrats, . . . by socialists on capitalists. . . . The angry debates of conservative and liberal, radical and reactionary touch everything except the technocracy, because the technocracy is not generally perceived as a political phenomenon in our advanced industrial societies. It holds the place, rather, of a grand cultural imperative which is beyond question, beyond discussion."[88]

This grand imperative has been partially unmasked by the American "counter-culture," and may be under increasing challenge from materially satisfied groups seeking qualitative improvements in their lives, and a re-ordering of national and international socioeconomic relationships. The sweeping changes that are needed would require a reversal of more assumptions and motivations than seems possible, even if wise and farsighted national leaders were advocating radical change. One of the crises of modern society is precisely the *lack* of such authority; at the center of the normative structure of the modern state—particularly the United States—is a moral vacuum. "The system works, not because recognizable human authority is in charge, but because its basic ends and its procedural assumptions are taken for granted and programmed into men and machines."[89] With no one in authority, it is difficult to see how re-programming would occur. Slater has written that the United States has traditionally handled the problem of change and

[88] Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter-Culture: Notes on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, N.Y. 1969), 8-9.

[89] John Schaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, *Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science* (New York 1969), 276-327. His thesis is that legitimate authority is declining in modern states because of some of the basic, defining orientations of modernity itself: rationality, the cult of efficiency and power, ethical relativism, and equalitarianism.

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stability "by giving completely free rein to technological change and opposing the most formidable obstacles to social change. Since, however, technological change in fact forces social change upon us, this has had the effect of abdicating all control over our social environment to a kind of whimsical deity. . . . Our relation to change is entirely passive."[90]

When it is no longer possible to solve political problems by means of a growing economy, both rich and poor societies are likely to experience crises. The United States first utilized the frontier, and subsequently overseas markets, to insure expansion.[91] The economic system, as presently structured, would probably collapse without growth. Recent attitude research in Singapore found that ethnic compatibility and system legitimacy were maximized when both the Chinese and the Malays perceived rapid economic progress for both groups, with the Malays improving at a somewhat faster rate. The differences in political attitudes of subjects with different perceptions of the economic situation were so striking that one could expect a race war or major loss of system legitimacy to occur as the result of a cessation of economic growth.[92] A substantial portion of social scientists' and citizens' indifference to income distribution derives from the assumption that things will be getting better for everyone. When it becomes clear that this assumption no longer holds, either egalitarian norms or inegalitarian practices will come under pressure both within and among polities. Ideological changes, the sharpening of cleavages, and substantially increased conflict then seem virtually inevitable.[93]

Reflecting on the type of data reviewed in this essay, Robert Heilbroner concluded that "If by 'progress' we mean a fundamental elevation in the human estate, a noticeable movement of society in the direction of the ideals of Western humanism, a qualitative as well as a quantitative betterment of the condition of man, it is plain that we must put away our ideas of progress over the foreseeable vista of the historic future. . . . to hope for the best in a situation where every indication leads us to expect a worsening, is hardly the way to fortify ourselves

[90] Philip Slater, *The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point* (Boston 1970), 44.

[91] On the place of the frontier and decision-making in America, see Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 106-09. William A. Williams argues that when the frontier was gone, Americans substituted overseas markets, and that the same process continues today: *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York 1962).

[92] Peter A. Busch, *Political Unity and Ethnic Diversity: A Case Study of Singapore*, unpubl. Ph.D. diss. (Yale 1972).

[93] Huntington (fn. 10), 278-83; Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XI (September 1967), 264-80.

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against the future."[94] I am reluctantly in agreement with that assessment. There seems every reason to believe that 3.7 billion rapidly multiplying human beings are about to collide with an unprecedented evolutionary barrier. The growth of the brain which gave man the intellectual powers to develop a great civilization has not been matched by a proportionate increase in wisdom.[95] Scholars in many fields are beginning to conclude that man's lack of adaptive social and political mechanisms portends "a progressively degraded future for most of mankind, and the somber possibility of irreversible catastrophe for all."[96]

Research may be useful on how to avoid the conflict that is likely in the gradually approaching zero-sum situation, but only a fundamental change in the perceptions and behavior of millions of individuals (on the order of a lasting experience of religious conversion) seems likely to prevent massive violence during the transition to an economically and demographically stable world society.[97] Admittedly, a perceptual change of such magnitude would be more likely to *result* from such widespread conflicts than to *prevent* them, however. But whatever marginal contribution scholars of development can make to the process of transition will be enhanced by greater attention, in research and theories, to the ecological context in which human social decay and development are occurring.

[94] Robert Heilbroner, *The Future as History* (New York 1960), 204, 178.

[95] Arthur Koestler, *The Ghost in the Machine* (New York 1967) suggests that the rapid growth of the human brain resulted in a faulty connection between ancient and recent brain structures, creating a pathological split between emotion and reason, instinct and intellect. He proposes research toward a psychopharmacological adaptive mechanism to bridge the rift, along the lines of current research into the chemical treatment of schizophrenia. More *pessimistic* interpretations find support in Lloyd Etheredge, "Hypnosis and Order: The Psychology of Habitual Compliance," mimeo, Yale University (October 1971), and P. D. Ouspensky, *The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution* (New York 1954).

[96] Sprout and Sprout (fn. 7), 15.

[97] Edward Woodhouse, "Beyond Elections and Revolutions: Individual and Collective Change in the Post-Industrial U.S.," mimeo, Yale University (May 1972), and *Human Consciousness and Social Change*, dissertation in progress, Yale University. Both papers examine the potential for such a revolutionary shift in human nature.

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ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF CHILEAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT

By ROBERT L. AYRES

THE recent presidential election in Chile and the subsequent installation of Salvador Allende as "the first popularly elected Marxist president in the Western Hemisphere" have once again brought that isolated republic to the attention of the academic community, journalistic commentators, and the public at large. This is not the first time that Chile has experienced such world-wide interest in its domestic political affairs: the emergence of the so-called "Socialist Republic" in 1932, the Popular Front experience of 1938–41, and the 1964 election of the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei marked other occasions when interest in Latin American politics has shifted to Chile. But perhaps never before has so much interest been lavished on the country as following the events of September, 1970.

This article deals with some underlying features of the Chilean economy, society, and political system which have constituted the "raw data" for the elaboration of a particular kind of Chilean developmentalist ideology. We shall attempt to present quantitative data on fundamental aspects of the Chilean economy and on some of their social implications. We also aim at a brief elaboration of certain fundamental characteristics of Chilean politics—particularly since the inception of the current presidential system in 1925—which should be taken into account in any assessment of the emergence and prospects for the new regime. We argue that these kinds of data have been woven by the elites of Unidad Popular (Popular Unity—the name given to the coalition which Allende heads) into a national ideology of development which has considerable resonance in the Chilean mass public. This ideology we call

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"the political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment" in order to emphasize its admixture of the economic and the political. We consider the major precepts of this ideology to be those of "structuralism," "dependency," and "stalemate-breakthrough," and shall elaborate on these three in an effort to offer a series of system-level generalizations about Chile that aim at giving contextual meaning to the emergence and prospects of the Allende government.

The Nature of the "Objective Conditions"

We begin by calling attention to the disappointing record of Chilean economic performance, the "dependent variable" in the Unidad Popular analysis. It is important to emphasize Chile's economic stagnation because such a fundamental datum of Chilean life is often slighted or dismissed with the general assertion that Chile is one of the "most developed" of the Latin American countries. Admittedly, per capita gross national product in 1967 was $563, placing Chile third among the countries of the region, exceeded only by Venezuela and Argentina.[1] But considerably more important for an understanding of the emergence of a Marxist regime in Chile is the country's manifestly unsatisfactory record of economic growth.

This unsatisfactory record is reflected in the per capita average annual rate of growth of the gross domestic product (at factor cost) from 1960 to 1969, a rate of 2.0 per cent. This not only fell short of the Alliance for Progress goal of 2.5 per cent, but was also below the Latin American average for the region as a whole (2.2 per cent). The growth of *total* product during this period was also disappointingly small. The average annual rate of growth of total product (at factor cost), 1960–69, was only 4.5 per cent. Among the countries of continental South America, only Uruguay and Argentina had worse records (—0.6 and 1.9 per cent respectively).[2]

This general record of economic stagnation was accompanied by a pronounced sluggishness in key sectors of the economy. Copper production is of course vital to Chilean development: throughout recent years copper exports have accounted for approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of the total value of Chilean exports. Yet the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) recently reported that the rate of growth of Chile's copper production in the period 1960–69 was

[1] U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), *Economic Data Book: Latin America, 1968* (Washington, D.C. 1968), 8.

[2] All growth data come from Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969*, Part One, mimeo version (Santiago 1970), 7.

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only 2.8 per cent annually. Moreover, Chile's share of world production has declined in recent years. ECLA reports that, at the end of the 1940's, Chilean production accounted for 17.2 per cent of world output, a proportion which shrank to an estimated 12.7 per cent in 1969.[3]

Another crucial sector whose development has been stagnant in Chile is agriculture. If agricultural production per inhabitant for the triennium of 1951 to 1953 is assigned an index value of 100, the comparable index for a recent year (1965) was only 94.8.[4] One economic consequence of the country's dismal agricultural performance has been an increasing tendency to rely upon imports for the supply of basic foodstuffs. The cumulative net balance of agricultural trade for the period 1949–63, for example, was a deficit of $996.9 million.[5]

These aspects of economic stagnation have been accompanied by several other conspicuous features of the Chilean economy. Chief among these is the notorious Chilean inflation. For some representative years of the 1960's, the Chilean Central Bank reported annual percentage increases in countrywide consumer prices of 29.6 in 1962, 40.4 in 1963, 44.0 in 1964, 32.7 in 1965, and 23.6 in 1966.[6] The reported cost-of-living increase was 21.9 per cent for 1967, 27.9 for 1968, and 29.3 for 1969.[7]

The effects of economic stagnation have also been accentuated by some trends in the distribution of income. For the better part of thirty years, trends in Chilean income distribution have gone against the working class. For 1960, the per capita income of the upper 5 per cent of income-earners was about $2,300 while that of the lower 50 per cent was only $140.[8] It has been alleged that the two social institutions—the social security system and the tax system—which might be looked to for counteracting these unfavorable figures have done little to correct the situation. Both systems have been deemed fundamentally regressive.[9]

[3] ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969*, Part Two, mimeo version (Santiago 1970), II-204, II-201.

[4] Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA), *Chile: tenencia de la tierra y desarrollo socio-económico del sector agrícola* (Santiago 1966), 204. Although figures for 1966–70 are hard to come by, it is our estimate that the index was still below 100 as late as 1969.

[5] *Ibid.*, 23.

[6] Embassy of Chile, *Statistical Profile of Chile* (Washington, D.C. 1967), 11.

[7] The 1967 figure is taken from ECLA, *Estudio económico de América Latina* (New York 1968), 163. The 1968 figure is taken from Ministerio de Hacienda, *Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda pública* (Santiago 1969), 129. The 1969 figure is taken from ECLA (fn. 3), II-191.

[8] Data cited in Atilio A. Boron, "Political Mobilization and Political Crisis in Chile, 1920-1970" (Santiago, undated mimeo), 28.

[9] Aníbal Pinto Santa Cruz, *Chile: un caso de desarrollo frustrado* (Santiago 1958), 189-98.

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Finally, it should be noted that the persistent record of economic stagnation in Chile has resisted efforts at solution by successive governments of diverse ideological hues—the "populist" government of Carlos Ibañez del Campo (1952–58), the "liberal" government of Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez (1958–64), and the recent Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–70). Many of its prominent features had resisted Radical party solutions prior to 1952.

Social Consequences of Economic Stagnation

Chilean economic stagnation has resulted in some costly social consequences. The country's rate of infant mortality, for example, is a distressing health indicator. A preliminary estimate for 1967 gave a rate of 99.7 deaths per 1,000 live births. This rate was down from the pre-Frei rate of 113, but was still alarmingly high. According to the 1967 estimate, Chile had a higher infant mortality rate than any other Latin American country, Haiti excepted.[10] The housing census of 1960 identified dwellings "which should be replaced because they are in a bad state of conservation." The housing deficit, thus defined, was over 25 per cent in ten of the country's twenty-five provinces.[11] In terms of *nivel de vida* ("level of living"), the 1960 national census also revealed that the percentage of homes with running water was 53.0; with electricity, 64.5; with bathrooms, 40.9.[12]

The important point for the demonstration of the social consequences of Chile's economic stagnation, however, does not lie so much in these overall figures as it does in some of the intra-country variations which are obscured by these figures. In the case of health and housing, we can point to the existence of glaring worker–non-worker contrasts. In the case of *nivel de vida*, we can point to similarly glaring urban-rural contrasts.

Regarding health, we have data which, although for the year 1957, present a picture probably not unlike that prevailing in 1970. This is a comparison of infant mortality among *obreros* (workers, wage-earners) and *no-obreros* (non-wage-earners, salaried, and self-employed). Among the latter, in 1957, the infant mortality rate was 67 per 1,000 live births. Among the working stratum the comparable rate was 126.[13] With regard to housing, an analysis of the 1960 data reveals the greatly disadvantaged situation of *obreros*. Urban Santiago province may be taken as illustrative of a country-wide phenomenon. Among *empleados*

[10] The 1967 data are from the Pan American Union, *Statistical Compendium of the Americas* (Washington, D.C. 1969), 10. The figure for 1962–63 is from Armand Mattelart, *Integración nacional y marginalidad* (Santiago 1965), 112.

[11] *Ibid.*, 154. [12] *Ibid.*, 39. [13] *Ibid.*, 115.

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("employees," e.g., salaried personnel) in the industrial sector, 8.5 per cent had homes in need of replacement. Among *obreros* in the industrial sector, the comparable figure was 30.3 per cent. In the service sector, only 8.8 per cent of *empleados*, but 35.9 per cent of *obreros*, had homes in need of replacement.[14]

The total national figures overlook another dimension of high political relevance in Chile—the urban-rural dimension. Whereas 73.0 per cent of urban dwellings had running water in 1960, only 3.8 per cent of rural homes possessed it. There was electricity in 82.9 per cent of urban dwellings, but only in 19.4 per cent of rural dwellings. Bathrooms were installed in 54.5 per cent of urban dwellings, but only in 7.6 per cent of rural homes.[15] Our own analysis of communal census data reveals the following correlates with the percentage of the total population classified as "rural": percentage of homes with running water, —.86; percentage of homes with electricity, —.81; percentage of homes with bathrooms, —.79. Thus, beneath the figures indicative of overall Chilean underdevelopment lies an urban-rural dichotomy with historically important political implications.[16]

The Interpretation of Objective Conditions: The Emergence of the Political Ideology of Chilean Underdevelopment

The above data on the "objective conditions" of Chilean underdevelopment will facilitate our understanding of the emergence of a Marxist regime in Chile. We do not, however, mean to imply by the foregoing that the emergence of such a regime is somehow explained solely by the sorry record of Chilean economic development and its social consequences. Such a simple "explanation" would create grave problems from the standpoint of the comparative analysis of Latin American economic and political development. Economic stagnation has, after all, been the recent lot of many other Latin American countries besides Chile. Clearly, we do not wish to argue that the economic and social factors we have been discussing "caused" the emergence of the Allende regime, any more than they might have "caused" the emergence of the Uruguayan urban guerrilla movement as a response to Uruguayan economic stagnation, or Argentine military intervention

[14] *Ibid.*, 154.

[15] *Ibid.*, 150 (urban areas), 139 (rural areas).

[16] Such urban-rural differences have been *interpreted* by means of a coherent political ideology. Herein may reside the principal difference between Chile and many other Latin American countries, where urban-rural differences along the dimensions we have presented are of course also notorious.

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as a response to the economic aspect of Argentina's contemporary dilemmas.

Rather, what is important—indeed crucial—to grasp is how substantial sectors of the Chilean political elite, intellectual elite, and mass public have chosen to interpret these data of the Chilean situation.[17] What, then, are the principal elements of the political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment? Three separate notions are involved: (1) structuralism, with its emphasis on the necessity of altering basic economic relationships; (2) dependency, a term intended to avoid the emotive content of "imperialism" but nevertheless stressing the pernicious consequences of the operation of the international capitalist economic system and its creation of "dependent" or "clientele" social classes in developing countries; and (3) the theory of enduring political stalemate and its concomitant, the post-1925 operational style of Chilean politics. The political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment, therefore, is a complex and relatively sophisticated analysis of the interplay between the operation of the domestic economic system, the operation of the international economic system, *and* the operation of the Chilean political system.

(1) STRUCTURALISM. Like many analyses of Chilean social reality, the development of the analysis known as structuralism has been facilitated by progressive attempts to deal with excessive inflation and insufficient growth.[18] The structuralists make a basic distinction between the "structural" and the "propagating" factors of inflation. As summarized by Hirschman, the basic structural factors conducive to Chilean inflation were identified as: (a) low agricultural productivity and the lack of response to economic incentives, due to the *latifundio* pattern of ownership; (b) the deterioration in the terms of trade, resulting in a tendency for the prices of imported goods to rise; and (c) the uneven distribu-

[17] It is important to note that the Chileans have responded more to the absolute as opposed to the comparative or relative nature of their economic and social condition. What appears increasingly salient is Chilean awareness of the untenable nature of the country's economic and social development in absolute terms, regardless, for example, of the fact that Chile might rate higher than Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, or Peru on almost all measures of such development.

[18] It is manifestly impossible to summarize here all the salient relationships in Chilean "structuralist" theorizing or to cite all the important references. For a discussion of structuralism as it has been applied to the effort to resolve the problem of inflation in Chile, see Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York 1963), 212 ff. Also see the papers by Roberto Oliveira Campos, David Felix, and Joseph Grunwald in Hirschman, ed., *Latin American Issues* (New York 1961). Prominently associated with the structuralist viewpoint are the Chilean economists Aníbal Pinto and Osvaldo Sunkel. See Pinto (fn. 9), 125 ff., and Sunkel, "La inflación chilena; un enfoque heterodoxo," *El Trimestre Económico*, XXV (October-December 1958), 570-99.

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tion of income, leading to pressures against the shortage areas of food consumption and foreign exchange.[19] Seers demonstrated some of the structural causes of inflation during the process of import-substituting industrialization, itself a response to the lag in exports as growth occurs. He concluded that import substitutes were almost certain to be more expensive than the goods they replaced.[20] Briefly, then, the structuralists sketched out a series of relationships between inflation and "structural" features of the economy, economic growth and such features, and the behavior of the foreign sector and such features.

Gradually the structural analysis was extended to encompass the explanation of other aspects of the Chilean economy. The basic thrust of the analysis came to be that the most salient problems of the economy could not be resolved by "monetarist" palliatives but called for *fundamental structural changes in the ordering of basic economic relationships*. Thus, agricultural stagnation was related to the need to alter drastically the patterns of land tenure and social relations in the agricultural sector. In recent years, the recognition of the necessity for structural changes in agriculture has been increasingly coupled with an emphasis upon the structure of industrial production. Owing in part to the nature of post-1930 Chilean policies of import substitution, a structure of production has emerged which is allegedly monopolistic, inefficient, and uncompetitive. This is thought to have had important adverse consequences on the overall annual rate of growth of domestic product, on prices of industrial goods, on the failure to stimulate exports of manufactured goods, and ultimately on the distribution of income. Among numerous other structuralist arguments, we should mention the growing contention that important economic decision-making bodies, including semi-autonomous corporations, have been controlled by restricted segments of the agricultural, commercial, and industrial elite. Such private control has allegedly resulted in an inequitable and unproductive operation of credit mechanisms, the diversion of much credit for sumptuary purposes, and the frequent frustration of state intervention intended to further both developmentalist and redistributionist goals. What is important to note, therefore, is the extent to which the structural analysis has not only contributed to the discussion of economic stagnation and inflation in Chile, but has also opened up for criticism many long-standing features of the Chilean economy.

The policy implications of the structuralist package may be sum-

[19] Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (fn. 18), 214.

[20] Dudley Seers, "A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-developed Economies Based on the Experience of Latin America," *Oxford Economic Papers*, XIV (June 1962), 179.

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marized as: a profound reordering of economic relationships in the agricultural sector, involving significant changes in the patterns of land tenure and in the politization of the peasant population; the breaking up of private monopolistic power through such devices as increasing state ownership of important industrial producers or the introduction of "workers' control" schemes in enterprises remaining in private hands; the large-scale transferral to state direction of all major economic decision-making bodies, particularly the Central Bank and all of the private banking system; and, more generally, the introduction of conscious attempts at economic planning, both at the national inter-sectoral level and at the regional level.

In the light of the importance of the structural analysis, the following quantitative data may serve as empirical corroboration of some of the above arguments.

(A) *Agricultural sector*. Data on land tenure in Chile are available from the agricultural censuses of 1955 and 1965. From the 1955 figures we find that 9.7 per cent of agricultural holdings contained 86 per cent of agricultural land. Holdings from 1 to 49 hectares (a total of 95,311 holdings) represented 74.6 per cent of total holdings, but only 5.2 per cent of the agricultural surface.[21] We have engaged in some rudimentary processing of data from the 1965 census, and this reveals the continued presence of land concentration. While at one end of the landholding scale 20,547 individual proprietors owned an average of 0.3 hectares (less than one acre), at the other end 419 possessed an average of 15,338 hectares (33,744 acres).[22]

An examination of the more recent figures also indicates the opportunity for expropriations under the Frei administration's agrarian reform statute. Our very conservative estimate for the 1965 data places at approximately 19,000 the number of proprietors who were subject to expropriation (and who owned 15.1 million hectares of land). Although exact figures are still difficult to obtain, it is apparent that the Frei administration expropriated only a relatively small percentage of the land owned by these proprietors. From 1965 through June, 1970, a total of 1,319 holdings were expropriated. In total hectares this amounted to 3.4 million, of which only 280,000 were irrigated. The Agrarian Reform Corporation estimated the number of families who benefitted by these expropriations at a maximum of 36,363. This contrasts with the approximately 350,000 Chilean families who are virtually landless.[23]

[21] Data cited in Pinto (fn. 9), 164.
[22] *IV Censo Nacional Agropecuario* (Santiago 1965), 10.
[23] Data on the Frei achievements are taken from Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (CORA), *Reforma Agraria Chilena, 1965–1970* (Santiago 1970), 35-39.

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Beyond the pattern of land concentration, there are other significant characteristics of the agricultural sector. Concerning agricultural production, for example, it is instructive to note that the largest farms in the census division contributed only 43.0 per cent of the total value of agricultural production (while comprising 58.6 per cent of arable land).[24] Concerning agricultural income compared to that of other sectors, we note that average income in agriculture was only 696 escudos in 1960 (in escudos of that year); the comparable figure for the mining sector was 2,863; for manufacturing industry, 1,549; and for the tertiary sector, 2,000.[25] Data for 1960 show that, *within* the agricultural population, *trabajadores y pequeños productores* (laborers and small-scale producers), representing 70.7 per cent of all agricultural families, received only 33.4 per cent of agricultural income. "*Productores grandes*" (large-scale producers), representing 3.0 per cent of all agricultural families, received 36.7 per cent of agricultural income.[26]

(B) *Industrial sector.* Criticism of domestic monopolists and their concentration of industrial production constitutes the second strand of recent and contemporary structuralist thinking. Industrial concentration appears most marked in the production of paper and paper products, tobacco, and rubber. It appears somewhat less noticeable, but still high, in the production of beverages, furniture, leather and leather goods, non-metallic minerals, basic metals, and electrical machinery. In the first group, one firm produced over 75 per cent of the gross value of output in the respective branches. In the second group, fewer than ten firms produced over half the gross value of output in the respective branches. Concentration is less marked in other branches of production, but we should note that such important branches as food and textiles operate at relatively high levels of concentration.[27]

The above data should not be taken as totally convincing evidence of extensive concentration in industrial production. To document such concentration more completely, we would have to know more about

[24] CIDA (fn. 4), 206. [25] *Ibid.*, 19. [26] *Ibid.*, 181.

[27] The data in this paragraph are cited in Victor Brodersohn, "Consideraciones sobre el carácter dependiente de la burguesía industrial chilena" (Santiago, Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos 1970), 11. The data were in turn taken from Ricardo Lagos Escobar, *La industria en Chile: antecedentes estructurales* (Santiago 1966). Although originally published in 1966, the data refer to 1957. We have attempted in vain to locate more recent data on industrial concentration. It is our distinct impression, derived from such work as that of Caputo and Pizarro, that, if anything, such concentration has actually increased in the intervening years. They argue, for example, that there has been increasing concentration in the automotive, petrochemical, textile, and food industries. Orlando Caputo and Roberto Pizarro, "Dependencia e inversión extranjera en Chile," (Santiago, Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos 1970).

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the patterns of industrial ownership as well as about the concentrated nature of the gross value of output. (Lagos, writing in 1961, argued that 4.2 per cent of the national *sociedades anónimas*—roughly, corporations—controlled 60.6 per cent of the capital invested in all such corporations.)[28] We should also note some data concerning *la pequeña industria y la artesanía* (small-scale industry and artisanry). According to estimates of the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO), this sector is responsible for approximately 38 per cent of all industrial production and employs more than half of the industrial work force. There exist in Chile more than 80,000 *pequeñas industrias* and more than 50,000 *talleres artesanales* (artisans' workshops).[29] Any thorough consideration of the extent of concentration in the Chilean industrial sector must therefore differentiate between the apparent monopolies in such branches as paper products and the micro-firms spread throughout the sector of the *pequeña industria.* Nevertheless, although empirical reality may not be as corroborative of the perception of concentration as it is in the case of the agricultural sector, many of the data regarding industrial concentration have been used in the formulation of another strand of structuralist thinking in Chile.

(C) *Other structuralist data.* Perhaps the most important portion of such data relates to control of the private banking sector. (The concentration of control in this sector was an important political issue in the first months of the Allende regime.) The most thorough study of the matter was conducted by Lagos; although his data are for 1958, the situation had not changed substantially by 1970. Lagos ascertained the existence of twenty-eight private banks, national and foreign. Seven banks together possessed 26.2 million escudos (in escudos of 1958), or 74.7 per cent of the total bank capital. Of the eleven groups that were deemed to constitute the nucleus of the Chilean economy, eight were organized around just one of the principal banks.[30]

Structuralist attention has also been directed to the "decentralized agencies"—agencies whose decisions are crucial for the operation of the economy. Flores attempted to ascertain the pattern of representation in key economic decision-making boards and concluded that "hardly ever do the representatives of the groups with private economic interests constitute less than a third of the votes" on these boards. Government representation on the board of directors of the Central Bank, for exam-

[28] Ricardo Lagos Escobar, *La concentración del poder económico* (Santiago 1961), 101.
[29] Data from CORFO are contained in the "Plan Chonchol," a Christian Democratic party document published in *Política, Economía, Cultura* (PEC), No. 239 (July 28, 1967), xvii.
[30] Lagos (fn. 28), 115-16.

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ple, was only five of twelve members, while that of the groups with economic interests was seven, of whom only one corresponded to the labor sector. In the case of the board of the CORFO Agricultural Department, four of the ten representatives corresponded to the government; the other six were representatives of the agricultural associations of which only the large landholders were members.[31]

Although slighting other relevant aspects of Chilean economic structure incorporated into structuralist theorizing, the data cited here should be sufficient to make the major point: the ordering of fundamental economic relationships in Chile provides an argument for the construction of a structuralist theory of the economy, emphasizing the necessity for profound changes in precisely those fundamental relationships. In similar fashion, the data on dependency serve in the construction of a dependency theory of the Chilean economy and society.

(2) DEPENDENCY. The basic point of departure for the dependency model is a circumstance that is alleged to have conditioned the development of Latin America since its colonial experience; i.e., that Latin America has always played a subordinate role in the international capitalist economic system or in the political economy of one or another dominant capitalist nation. The basic features of the Latin American economies have been shaped by the global expansion and consolidation of the capitalist system and by their own integration into that system.[32] The concept of Latin American dependency thus denotes a certain type of external relations within the context of the international capitalist economic system—relations initially characterized by Latin America's role as an exporter of primary products and industrial raw materials and an importer of the developed world's manufactured goods.

It is fruitful to conceptualize these relations in terms of the concerns of writers on "linkage politics" or national-international linkages.[33] Thus, Hart argued that dependency is characterized by *strong asymmetries* in relations or links between dependent and dominant countries, *lack of control* over the nature and consequences of such links, and

[31] Gilberto Flores, "Bureaucracy and Political Stability: The Chilean Case" (unpubl. M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley 1968), 24, 26.

[32] This argument may be found in a host of recent publications. See, for example, Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York 1967); Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," *NACLA Newsletter*, IV (May-June 1970), 18-27; Theotonio Dos Santos, "Dependencia económica y alternativas de cambio en América Latina" (Santiago, Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos 1970).

[33] See, for example, James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York 1969).

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weak or asymmetrical links between the dependent countries themselves.[34] One of the strengths of such a conceptualization is that it differentiates between lack of self-sufficiency and dependency. Furthermore, it differentiates, as we do below, between aspects of dependency that are related to international structure and those that are related to internal structure. It also helps to clarify the reciprocal relations between the two. Typical asymmetries in international structure include asymmetries of trade, investment, technical assistance, and military relations. The most obvious asymmetries in internal structure are urban-rural in nature.

The asymmetries in Latin America's external economic relations have not been essentially altered by import-substituting industrialization. Indeed, it is a central argument of the new dependency theorists that Latin America's slow shifts away from the almost exclusive production of raw materials and agricultural commodities toward some kinds of industrialization (e.g., the production of consumers' durables) have not fundamentally altered the conditions of dependency but instead have given rise to new forms (e.g., technological dependency), that reveal the bankruptcy of the development model associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America which is increasingly coming to be stigmatized as the model of dependent industrial development.

More broadly, Latin America's historical pattern of external linkages, some of which could be subsumed under the heading of dependency, could be treated as independent variables with pronounced effects on Latin American political structure and political behavior. We might suggest the following: the greater a country's international dependency, (1) the less the capability of the system to regulate the actors within the system; (2) the less the legitimacy or stability of existing decision-making procedures; (3) the greater the domestic inequalities of power among groups in the social structure; (4) the less the likelihood of political institutionalization; and (5) the less unified and distinctive the national culture.[35]

Dependency, therefore, is not only characterized by a certain kind of *external* relations. It is also, and just as importantly, characterized by a certain pattern of *internal* economic, political, and social relations structurally necessitated by the pattern of external relations. This internal

[34] Jeffrey Hart (unpubl., University of California, Berkeley 1971).

[35] Although not stated there precisely in "dependency" terms or in the form of testable hypotheses, many of these suggestions stem from Douglas A. Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics," in Rosenau (fn. 33), 67-93.

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pattern is what Bodenheimer has called "the infrastructure of dependency." The crucial elements in the infrastructure are "clientele social classes," which are defined as "those which have a vested interest in and profit from the structure of the international system."[36] Brodersohn has argued that "the structural conditions in which industrialization took place in Chile inhibited the emergence of a social nucleus which could be called a 'national bourgeoisie.' "[37]

Other institutions and processes in Latin America are seen to partake of "dependent" characteristics. Thus, according to Morse, urbanization in Latin America came to have a basically undynamic character as the great urban centers served principally as *entrepôts* within the international economic system.[38] The dependency system did not encourage what we today call national integration. Nor did it stimulate the domestic elaboration of peculiarly Latin American models of development. Increasing emphasis is also placed on cultural or intellectual dependency. Control of the mass media by foreign interests and the penetration of "foreign capitalist values" are alleged to have had serious adverse effects on the elaboration of national values and a national culture. In short, Latin America's historical pattern of external dependency with its attendant pattern of the infrastructure of dependency is alleged to have permeated virtually all important spheres of social interaction.[39]

In the case of Chile, we have sought data on a number of indicators primarily with respect to the external economic patterns of dependency (leaving the more elusive concept of the infrastructure of dependency for a later investigation). These include: (a) data on foreign investment, foreign "aid," and items associated with them; (b) data on foreign participation in domestic enterprises; and (c) data on the geographical concentration of foreign trade. Our investigation is by no means exhaustive; it is meant simply to give the flavor of the kinds of dependency arguments recently advanced in the Chilean case.

Data on both foreign investment and foreign aid may be presented jointly since they have been used together to make one general argument, i.e., that Chile's payments to the exterior have recently exceeded

[36] Bodenheimer (fn. 32), 20.

[37] Brodersohn (fn. 27), 1.

[38] Richard Morse, "Latin American Cities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IV (July 1962), 473-93.

[39] As it has been formulated in recent years, the dependency theory appears to suffer from a number of problems. Definitions of dependency are neither precise nor readily operational. The theory has placed an over-reliance on a monocausal explanation of Latin American reality. There is usually a lack of specification of the policy implications of the theory. Finally, there is the absence of empirical material in many discussions of dependency.

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her receipts from the exterior, and that this situation is leading to the increasing "decapitalization" or "denationalization" of the Chilean economy. What do the data show with regard to these kinds of arguments? A grouping of items ordinarily considered in such a balance sheet recently led some investigators to the conclusion that the exit of funds represented "an extraordinarily significant quantity," and that in the years 1963, 1964, and 1965 these payments to the exterior constituted more than half of the total current account income of Chile in each year.[40] Looking at some figures in more detail, we find that profit remittances, dividends on direct investment, and interest on loans equalled 17.5 per cent of current account income in 1950 and 20.0 per cent in 1967. For amortization and depreciation, payments to the exterior increased from $25 million in 1950 to $272 million in 1963, $284 million in 1965, and declined in 1966 and 1967 to $258 million and $188 million respectively as a consequence of the renegotiation of the foreign debt. Thus the amortization and depreciation of foreign capital, which in 1950 represented only 7.6 per cent of current account income, reached the staggering sum of 47.8 per cent in 1963. On the specific matter of foreign *loans*, Chile received $1.7 billion between 1950 and 1967. In amortizations, the country had to cancel an amount close to $900 million. If we consider, in addition, the amounts paid out in interest, the effective amount received is again substantially reduced—since total interest on all loans in this period was approximately $506 million. The necessity of loan repayment has also had important effects upon the country's foreign debt: On December 31, 1969, the foreign debt of Chile reached $2.1 billion.[41]

Another important question that has increasingly been asked in Chile concerns the sectoral distribution of foreign investment. Trend data indicate some recent changes in the sectoral distributions. Direct foreign investment by the United States in the Chilean mining sector fell from 70.0 per cent in 1960 to 60.8 per cent in 1968; manufacturing increased its share from 3.0 to 7.2 per cent; and commerce increased its share from 1.7 to 4.0 per cent. Focussing on the industrial sector, we find that the "book value" of direct American investment increased from $22 million in 1960 to $68 million in 1968. In the commercial sector it increased from $12 million to $39 million. According to Caputo and Pizarro, "this new orientation of foreign investment is manifested in Chile only beginning in the last decade and with great intensity only beginning in 1966."[42]

[40] Caputo and Pizarro (fn. 27), 3. [41] *Ibid.*, 7. [42] *Ibid.*, 9, 11.

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Direct quantitative evidence on the subject of foreign participation in domestic enterprises is not easy to find. It has been estimated that close to 80 per cent of the Chilean enterprises which have received foreign capital under the terms of the principal statute regulating such capital are controlled from abroad. This control from abroad is thought to be increasing as a consequence of the exemptions and other favorable treatments accorded foreign investors by this and other decree-laws.[43] An industry such as the automobile industry is a fairly clear example of the process. Of twenty-four automobile enterprises formed in the period 1962–67, only twelve were still functioning in 1969; of these, seven were foreign enterprises, with foreign participation greater than 50 per cent. There may also be some evidence for increasing participation of foreign interests in the banking system of the country.[44]

Observers differ, however, on the extent of foreign participation in Chilean enterprises. Brodersohn, after having examined the sectoral distribution of foreign investment, concludes with a statement about "the small importance which foreign support has had in the total industrial structure." He notes, however, that "it is possible that this situation has suffered modifications in the most recent years. The rapid development of certain branches of production . . . suggests a process of the greater association between local and foreign capital. . . ."[45]

Further data on the sources of Chilean imports and the destinations of Chilean exports for the years 1958 (the first year of Jorge Alessandri's administration) and 1966 (the second year of Eduardo Frei's administration) throw some light on trends in commercial aspects of Chilean dependency. They indicate some striking changes with regard to the geographical diversification of Chilean imports and exports. The share of the United States in both categories fell sharply: from 51 per cent of imports in 1958 to 39 per cent in 1966, and from 40 per cent of exports in 1958 to 25 per cent in 1966. The percentage of Chilean imports from nineteen other Latin American countries virtually doubled in the period under consideration. Perhaps the most dramatic changes in this aspect of the structure of Chilean foreign trade concern the export side and the increasing importance of Italy, other Western European countries, and particularly Japan as destinations of Chilean exports. The percentage share of exports to Japan was twenty times greater in 1966 than the percentage share in 1958. Also worthy of note is the extremely small importance of the Communist areas on either the im-

[43] This is the view of Caputo and Pizarro, *ibid.*, 20.
[44] On both the automobile and banking industries, see *ibid.*, 20, 9.
[45] Brodersohn (fn. 27), 17, 19, 20.

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port or the export side. As sources of Chilean imports, the Communist countries constituted only 0.5 per cent in 1958 and 0.6 per cent in 1966. On the export side, these areas rose substantially in importance from a miniscule amount in 1958, but in 1966 still constituted only 0.7 per cent of the total value of Chilean exports.[46]

From a consideration of all of the above data, it is perhaps difficult to come to a definite conclusion on whether Chilean dependency (in the economic sense) has been increasing or decreasing in recent years. In the areas of foreign investment, foreign ownership in the industrial sector, and foreign aid, there appear to be grounds for arguing that dependency has increased in important respects. (In terms of data on the structure of Chilean foreign trade, however, there are at least some grounds for arguing that commercial dependency on the United States has been rather dramatically decreasing in recent years.) Undoubtedly other factors would have to be included in a full assessment, but if we were compelled to offer some sort of balance sheet, we would be obliged to argue that in general there has been increasing Chilean dependency on the Western capitalist world, and particularly on the United States, in the recent period of Chilean development (i.e., at least since 1950).

The theory of dependency, like the theory of structuralism, has its policy implications. The policy implications of the dependency school are in general two. One is *romper la dependencia* (break with dependency), i.e., sever as much as possible the economic relations with the allegedly exploitative international capitalist economic system. This involves the oft-ballyhooed but little-analyzed measures of expropriation, nationalization, annulment of reciprocal treaties, default on international obligations, the possible emphasis upon an autarkic or quasi-autarkic development policy, and an often overriding concern with industrialization—as well as measures to combat cultural dependency that have as their ultimate aim the creation of some sort of "new socialist man." Thus, appeals to break with dependency seem to imply measures tending toward some degree of both isolation and internal diversification of Latin American economies.

An alternative policy implication may in general terms be referred to as the international diversification of dependency. At a minimum, this would involve the diversification of trade flows, foreign investment sources, other sorts of commercial interchanges, technical assistance, and so forth. It is not the aim of this approach to sever entirely (or almost

[46] These percentages have been computed from the absolute total of imports and exports (in value). The absolute totals were obtained in AID (fn. 1), 20-21.

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entirely) Chile's links with the international system of capitalist economic relations. Nor is the aim to court dependence on the international system's socialist variant. It is, rather, simply not to put oneself in a dependent position vis-à-vis one super-dominant country, particularly the United States. The result would be an increase in the number of dominant powers with which the country has asymmetrical linkages, with the understanding that the dominant powers will try to compete with each other to maintain the linkages.[47]

(3) STALEMATE-BREAKTHROUGH. It now remains for us to explore the third strand in the political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment—a discussion which takes us closer to the explicitly political, and which will elaborate on a general statement concerning the dynamics of Chilean politics in the post-1925 period. We call this strand of the ideology the "institutionalized stalemate" and its policy implication "the need for a breakthrough."

A number of the characteristics of Chilean politics since 1925 stand out in particular. One principal observation is that Chilean politics since 1925 can be characterized by the phrase "enduring political stalemate." The word "stalemate" is meant to describe a situation in which no single political or social force has been able to impose its direction on the state apparatus, or to impose policy directives in accordance with a coherent ideology. The result has been not the "politics of modernization" or the "politics of development," but what might more appropriately be called the "politics of accommodation": There has been remarkably little concern with the elimination of "power contenders," but greater concern with their accommodation.[48]

This generalization need not conflict with the data we have already presented concerning the agricultural, industrial, or banking sectors. Nor need it conflict with the undeniable fact that some have benefitted considerably more than others from the operation of the system. The situations described with regard to agriculture or industry, for example, are actually manifestations of the fact that since no single force was able to impose its direction on the state, a number of the forces carved up individual spheres within which private interests ruled. We have emphasized the agricultural and industrial sectors because these are crucial in the ideology's attitude about economic stagnation. A more complete description of Chilean political patterns would entail discus-

[47] Hart (fn. 34).

[48] The phrase "power contenders" is taken from Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," in Peter G. Snow, ed., *Government and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1967), 230-46.

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sions of the labor sector, the public educational system, the social security administration, the state bureaucracy, and the entire electoral process; this, in turn, would serve to demonstrate how other political forces, chiefly the middle sectors and unionized labor, have contributed to the relative equilibrium of political forces.

The major power contenders in Chile between 1925 and 1970 have been three: the working-class conglomerate, including the important mine workers; the "middle class," a heterogeneous social aggregate whose diverse sectors have had somewhat conflicting interests; and the "upper class," represented both by the traditional landholding elite and the "liberal" commercial and industrial elite.[49] Any attempt to identify precisely the relative power of each contender is a hazardous operation. Although the principal stalemate in Chilean politics has been between an upper class that lost some of its prerogatives in the decade of the twenties and a heterogeneous middle class which has been unable completely to dislodge the traditional ruling sectors, we cannot dismiss the urban working class as a major force in the system. At times the latter prosecuted its interests independently and effectively; at other times these interests were used by middle-sector elites in order to confront the traditional upper classes with an apparent alliance of working-class and middle-sector forces. Nor can we overlook the heterogeneity of the middle sector itself—particularly the politically relevant differences between its salaried and non-salaried components.

Each of the major social forces has had institutional expression in the political system, most obviously in the country's well-developed political parties and their parliamentary representation.[50] Thus, the industrial proletariat has long been identified with the Socialist and Communist parties; the middle class with the venerable Radical party and the newer Christian Democratic party; and the upper class with the Conservative (landholders) and Liberal (industrial elite) parties. (The Conservatives and Liberals have been united in the National party since 1966.)

Other institutions of Chilean politics have served as prominent access points for the various major social and political forces. Labor's demands have been voiced through the Communist- and Socialist-dominated *Central Unica de Trabajadores* (Central Confederation of Workers). The middle class is usually considered to have the bulk of important posts in the state bureaucracy, a phenomenon in large part trace-

[49] Note that the peasantry is excluded from this assessment of the major power contenders.

[50] Again we exclude the peasantry from this generalization.

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able to the Radical presidents (1938–52). The upper class, in both its landholding and industrial variants, has exercised important power in public policy-making through its dominance of major interest groups, e.g., the *Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura* (National Agricultural Society), and the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (National Society of Manufacturers) and its aforementioned direct access to decision-making centers through its representation on important policy-making boards.[51]

The result of this play of political forces has been (with the *apparent* exception of the Christian Democratic interlude of 1964–70) a political system characterized by a bewildering variety of short-lived coalitions as the various groups coalesced and parted, re-formed and re-disbanded, in search of short-run objectives and narrowly defined goals. Throughout most of the years between 1925 and 1970, it was extremely rare for any single political force to capture more than 25 per cent of the total vote in congressional elections; it has occurred on only three occasions: the Liberals in 1925 and the Christian Democrats in 1965 and 1969. In only one Chamber of Deputies since 1925, the Chamber of Deputies from 1965 to 1969, has a single political party maintained an absolute majority of the seats (the Christian Democrats with 87 out of 150). These are some of the electoral sources of Chile's post-1925 enduring political stalemate.

The situation has not been remedied by the presidential election process. The non-coincidence of presidential and congressional elections has had at least one important effect: the presidential election is responsible for a certain reshuffling of the electorate. As a result, a Chilean president is usually elected by a social coalition different from the one that comprises the social base of any of the major political parties in other elections—whether antecedent to or following upon his election. The electoral process in Chile during the period of 1925–70 has therefore seemed to produce a built-in tension as the social coalition that elected the president disintegrated, and subsequent congressional or municipal elections yielded an essentially stable pattern of outcomes. The changes that might have seemed in some sense "mandatory" as a consequence of the presidential election (e.g., stabilization and the slowing down of inflation with Alessandri in 1958, the "revolution in liberty" with Frei in 1964) are invariably frustrated as longer-term electoral forces reassert themselves in subsequent elections. Newly elected presidents have been

[51] Concerning this pattern of direct access, see Constantine Menges, "Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile: A Preliminary Analysis," *Journal of International Affairs*, XX, No. 2 (1966), 343-65.

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unable to "break through" the stable social bases of the country's electoral politics.

It is beyond the scope of this article to trace out in detail the workings of the "accommodationist politics" elaborated as a response to the stalemate of social and political forces in Chile. Conceptualizations of the problem have been offered by both Chilean and North American observers.[52] We do, however, wish to suggest at least the following general observations concerning Chile's condition of enduring political stalemate:

(A) *Institutionalization of stalemate and the pattern of policy-making.* The stalemated condition of Chilean politics has been institutionalized. It has given rise to a characteristic style of decision-making which Kenworthy has aptly characterized as "parcelling out."[53] Parcelling out implies the existence of decision-making arenas in which powerful private interests largely control the outcomes, with the state playing only a limited role in determining the structure of outputs. Prior to the adoption of the 1967 agrarian reform statute, for instance, the National Agricultural Society played the preeminent role in policy-making for the agricultural sector. The National Society of Manufacturers played a similar role in the industrial sector. Kaufman's study of the strategy of the Chilean Right vis-à-vis agrarian reform noted that the large agriculturalists had "almost unchallenged power to block programs deemed repugnant by their leaders."[54] And Kenworthy noted that "peak business associations are voting members of agencies that are equivalent to our Federal Trade Commission or Treasury Department. They draft substantial portions of the legislation affecting their interests, and, no less important, they play a key role in the administration of those laws."[55]

What was the significance of this pattern of Chilean decision-making? Primarily, it indicated the relative lack of overall state direction in crucial spheres of decision-making. It is no great exaggeration to say

[52] Among Chilean observers, see Pinto (fn. 9), 134-35, and Clodomiro Almeyda, quoted in Ernst Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 162. (Almeyda is now the Foreign Minister in the Allende government.) Among North American observers, see Eldon Kenworthy, "Coalitions in the Political Development of Latin America," in Sven Groennings and others, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York 1970), 103-40; and Maurice Zeitlin, "The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* (Greenwich, Conn. 1968), 220-34.

[53] Kenworthy (fn. 52), 120 ff.

[54] Robert Kaufman, *The Chilean Right and Agrarian Reform: Resistance and Moderation* (Washington, D.C. 1967), 28.

[55] Kenworthy (fn. 52), 121.

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that it meant the veritable absence of a state mechanism, in the sense of the authoritative allocation of values for the society. The stalemated condition of Chilean politics and the concomitant decision-making style known as parcelling out reduced the role of the state to that of an ineffective and inefficient arbiter of the major interests in Chilean society.

(B) *"Formal" democracy.* The Chilean political stalemate has been largely maintained and indeed facilitated by those formal institutions of the Chilean polity whose existence and importance have caused the country to rank high on most scales of political development. In particular, the perennial congressional stalemate (as well as, quite possibly, the independence of the judiciary) should be noted. A history of perceived congressional "obstructionism" and of a "bourgeois" judiciary has led to the increasingly frequent distinction between "formal democracy" and "effective democracy." Anti-parliamentarism has been present as an important strand of Chilean politics since 1925.

(C) *The beneficiaries of stalemate.* The stalemate clearly worked to the advantage of some social and economic groups, and to the disadvantage of others. This raises a question to which Pinto, Zeitlin, and others have not paid sufficient attention: How does the apparently systematic discrimination against the workers and against the rural peasantry square with the characterization of the system as an equilibrium, or stalemated, system?

In the case of the peasantry, the answer is relatively clear. The exclusion of the peasantry from effective political participation has been a condition for the persistence of the stalemated system. A large-scale mobilization of the peasantry by any one of the major actors in Chilean politics would probably disrupt the workings of the "accommodationist" game.[56] The case of the workers is undoubtedly more complex. Unlike the peasantry, they *have* participated in the operation of the system. This is particularly true of the unionized workers. The workers' federation (representative of a distinct minority of the total nonagricultural work force), was captured by the Communist and Socialist parties. That Chilean workers have nevertheless come out on the short end of policy outputs is perhaps more than anything else an indictment of the Marxist elites.[57]

[56] The Frei administration was responsible for considerable peasant organization. From 1964 through June, 1970, the number of agricultural unions increased from 24 to 488. The number of members increased from 1,658 to 127,688. But the latter figures represented only about 10 per cent of the total *campesino* population. CORA (fn. 23), 26.

[57] A very small stratum of workers has fared relatively well and constitutes what

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(D) *The public policy consequences of stalemate.* The Chilean political stalemate is held responsible for a major characteristic of Chilean public policy in the period of 1925–70, a characteristic which we may summarize in terms such as "incoherence," "indecisiveness," "contradictoriness," etc. Kenworthy, for example, linked parcelling out to certain prominent characteristics of Latin American policy-making, including "immobilism in the face of redistributive issues, incoherence when viewed in toto, and a tending toward incremental adjustments often disguised by quantum leaps in rhetoric."[58] Pinto referred to "the absence of a defined and stable policy for ordering the economic process and for channelling it along new paths" and to "a veritable battery of direct expedients, occasional measures, and occasional legislative acts."[59]

(E) *Stalemate and structuralism; stalemate and dependency.* The stalemated condition of Chilean politics with its attendant policy results has increasingly come to be seen as a major cause of the sorry economic and social record we have referred to above. Analyses of the experience of inflation in Chile have increasingly centered on its political causes and consequences. More generally, the nature of structural relations in the economy, as well as economic problems allegedly stemming from Chilean dependency, were seen to have their roots in the model of stalemated or accommodationist politics. The accommodations made with the *latifundistas* prevented, for example, the required changes in land tenure. The accommodations made with the industrial entrepreneurs contributed to the concentration of industrial production under the aegis of import substitution. The indecisive, incoherent nature of the national development policy led to an increased reliance on the exterior—for instance, reliance on foreign economic missions to handle the problem of inflation, recourse to foreign "aid" and investment, foreign technical assistance, etc. More generally, the chief "power capability" of many of the "power contenders" in the stalemated system lay in their ties to foreign economic interests and in the foreign economic resources they could command. The absence of an authoritative allocator of values on the domestic scene opened up Chile to the multifaceted penetrations of foreign actors in the allocative process.

(F) *Stalemate and its comparative implications.* An awareness and elaboration of the model of stalemated politics in Chile is not without its implications for the comparative analysis of other Latin American political systems. Anderson, for example, has characterized the Latin

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Chileans call the "labor aristocracy." Its predominant element consists of the organized miners.

[58] Kenworthy (fn. 52), 124.

[59] Pinto (fn. 9), 124.

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American political process as one in which "new power contenders may be added to the system, but old ones may not be eliminated." Furthermore, he feels that "there is a marked reticence in the classic pattern of Latin American politics to define for all time who may and may not participate in the political process. . . ."[60] The Chilean model seems akin to Kenworthy's "reigning coalition" model, reigning coalitions being defined as those which "do not seem to alter more than incrementally the basic distributions of power, wealth, and prestige in society."[61]

Frequently, those concerned with Chilean politics have been told that the study of these politics contains little comparative "relevance" for the study of other Latin American countries. Reference is frequently made to phenomena that allegedly make Chilean politics vastly different from politics in other countries of the region—such as the early development of "legitimate" political institutions or the country's enviable record of political "stability." But these allegedly unique elements of Chilean politics should not obscure the fact that there are important similarities between Chilean politics and the politics of other countries in the region, and that a point of departure for the recognition of these similarities may be found in an awareness of the stalemated character of the country's politics since 1925.

As we proceed from structuralism through dependency to stalemate, we find that the policy implications of the political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment become more general and more indefinite. There is, nevertheless, a discernible policy implication of the stalemate strand of the ideology. Simply stated, it is the need for a political "breakthrough." Kirchheimer and, more recently, Jowitt have offered definitions of the process of breaking through. According to Jowitt, the process entails "the decisive alteration or destruction of values, structures, and behaviors which are perceived by a revolutionary elite as comprising or contributing to the actual or potential existence of alternative centers of political power."[62] According to Kirchheimer, a "decisive" breakthrough is one which is characterized by "the ability to extricate itself from the confining conditions of the previous period."[63]

What is interesting for our purposes, of course, is the extent to which these brief characterizations of the breakthrough process and of breakthrough politics are at sharp variance with our earlier characterizations

[60] Anderson (fn. 48), 237. [61] Kenworthy (fn. 52), 134.

[62] Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development* (Berkeley 1971), 7.

[63] Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (December 1965), 964-74.

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of the Chilean political process since 1925. The policy implication of breakthrough therefore represents as profound a break with past patterns of behavior in the political behavioral sphere as do the policy implications of structuralism and dependency in the domestic and international economic spheres respectively. The policy implication, generally stated, is nothing less than a wholesale transformation of political structures, of decision-making styles, of decision-making processes, and of the representation of political interests. This transformation would have to be more profound than previous abortive attempts at breaking through, such as the attempts of the first Popular Front (1938–41) and of the Christian Democrats (1964–70)—governments which "accommodated" more than they "broke through."

A Schematic Summary

Structuralism, dependency, stalemate: these are the major themes discernible in what we have called the political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment. The argument has been that the triumph of Allende represents the triumph of this ideology and of these particular themes as ways of conceptualizing recent and contemporary Chilean reality. The accompanying schematic presentation of the major variables in the ideology is intended to simplify and explicate the preceding discussion.

A Schematic Presentation of the Basic Strands in the Political Ideology of Chilean Underdevelopment



The variables may briefly be explained as follows:

1. Land tenure arrangements; industrial concentration; control of private banking sector; etc.
2. Outflows of payments to foreigners exceed inflows; investment decisions taken by multinational corporations without regard to Chilean

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needs; low multiplier effect of enclave investments; aping of foreigners leads to sumptuary expenditures of foreign exchange; lack of development-impelling national bourgeoisie; etc.

3. No single force is able to impose developmentalist ideology on state apparatus; the arbiting state does not authoritatively allocate values for the society; incoherence, indecisiveness, and contradictory nature of economic policy-making; inflation as an accommodationist mechanism.
4. Grossly inadequate growth of total and per capita product; sluggishness of key economic sectors.
5. Working class/non-working class differences; urban/rural differences; most organized, wealthiest groups most advantaged; socioeconomic indicators; worsening of lower-class living standards as end result of inflation; etc.
6. A process involving increased imports of foodstuffs, caused by land tenure arrangements (from structuralism to dependency); increasing foreign control of domestic industry with concomitant monopolistic effects (from dependency to structuralism); shortage of domestic credit; recourse to exterior for development credits; etc.
7. A process involving the generation of clientele social classes with power capabilities rooted in the international economic system; classes represented by certain Chilean political parties; recourse to foreign experts for resolution of problems caused by domestic stalemate; the "arbiting state" easily penetrated by foreign actors.
8. A process characterized by the decision-making style known as parcelling out.
9. From stalemate to economic stagnation, the major link is probably through the incoherence and indecisiveness of economic policy-making as well as through inflation as its most obvious expression. But there is an important link in the opposite direction as well: economic stagnation leads to a concern with the distribution of an existing "pie" rather than the development of an expanded one—one of the hallmarks of accommodationist politics.
10. This link usually emphasizes the causal nature of dependency and its (adverse) effects on economic development. But there are effects running from stagnation to dependency as well; this is the vicious circle of still greater reliance on the exterior, more loans, greater foreign debt, etc.
11. Structural characteristics of agriculture lead to stagnant agricultural production; uncompetitive nature of industrial sector retards growth of industrial production; control of private banking sector leads credit to non-developmentalist uses; etc.

The Future of the Political Ideology of Chilean Underdevelopment

With the triumph of the political movement headed by Allende and of its ideological emphases, the political ideology of Chilean underde-

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velopment moves toward the implementation stage and comes up squarely against some harsh realities. In conclusion, we attempt briefly to indicate some of the principal problems likely to be encountered with regard to each of the major strands of the ideology, and to note some criticisms to which these strands might appropriately be subjected.

(1) The structuralist strand in the ideology manifests a somewhat simpleminded faith in socialism, without considering some of the important historical and institutional variants of a socialist system.[64] With its emphasis upon the transferral of large private monopolies in the industrial sector to state direction, of greatly increased state involvement in agricultural production, and of state control of the banking system, it raises the important questions of the technical and financial competence of the Chilean state, as well as of certain enduring characteristics of Latin American state bureaucracies (e.g., the proliferation of political party interests in the Chilean bureaucracy). Whether structural transformations in the industrial sector will actually result in greater efficiency, increased production, and lower prices; whether a mammoth agrarian reform program will increase agricultural productivity and thereby lessen Chile's dependence on agricultural imports; whether neatly elaborated economic plans will have any resonance in regions remote from Santiago—these and other questions engender an air of skepticism concerning the announced structural changes in economic relations. Beyond these, there is the question of the time dimension: structural changes, by definition, will require more time for implementation than short-term palliatives.

(2) The dependency strand of the ideology is not without its severe problems either. Dependency arguments must ultimately confront the abiding realities of the contemporary international economic system. They must face the overwhelming importance of the United States in the hemisphere, an importance which will not disappear simply because the Chileans nationalize American copper holdings. In addition, the relationship between dependency and economic development is not as simple or as negative as the dependency theorists would have us believe. Appeals to sever ties with foreign imperialism can have an important psychic gratification for the nation and can no doubt contribute to efforts at national mobilization. It is possible, however, that at some point a trade-off has to be made between that gratification and the desire for economic advance. It may well be true, as the program of Unidad Popular asserts, that "Chile is a capitalist country, dependent

[64] See, for example, P. J. D. Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962).

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on imperialism, dominated by sectors of the bourgeoisie structurally linked to foreign capital. . . ."[65] The question of what we are to do with this datum remains. Ultimately we will have to confront the question of whether an undeniably important transformation in *social* relations, such as might be expected from the implementation of the Unidad Popular program, will also lead to sustained *economic* growth. This will entail a comparative analysis of other experiences of social and economic change and will not be resolved by a somewhat simpleminded invocation of arguments concerning American imperialism.

(3) Finally, the stalemate and breakthrough strands of the ideology raise important questions that add to the problematic future of the Allende experiment. In the first place, there is the lack of a systematic theory for organizing power relations under the new government. There is some evidence, for example, that the Committees of Popular Unity, intended as more than electoral organizations, have already atrophied. The proposal for a unicameral Assembly of the People is not likely to make much headway. Our impression is that the political party system is not likely to have its fundamental outlines altered. In short, Unidad Popular was an effective instrument for the *capturing* of power by electoral means. Its capabilities for *organizing* power are more open to question.

Another profound difficulty concerns the inherent contradictions of a multi-party, multi-class movement and political elite. There are some important ideological, organizational, and personal cleavages within the Unidad Popular coalition which were largely papered over for electoral purposes. In addition, the breakthrough strand of the ideology raises the obvious difficulties of attempting to establish a socialist state by operating within the confines of the *institucionalidad vigente* (i.e., the existing institutional structure). The problem of implementing socialism within the confines of the bourgeois institutional structure marks one significant difference between Allende and the members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the country's principal would-be guerrilla movement, who argue that the destruction of substantial elements of that structure is a necessary prerequisite for a revolutionary government. But in the Chilean case any significant departure from the *institucionalidad vigente* will probably better serve the interests of counterrevolutionary forces than of revolutionary ones. The threat of counterrevolution thus appears as yet another obstacle to the implementation of a wholesale breakthrough strategy. In sum, the

[65] *Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular* (Santiago 1970), 4.

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breakthrough strand in the political ideology of Chilean underdevelopment is likely to be particularly difficult to implement.

Conclusion

We conclude by again emphasizing the emergence in Chile of a national ideology of underdevelopment which interrelates important aspects of Chilean reality, and which assigns a high priority to transformations in the political sphere. In themselves, the formulated ideology and its important strands are tremendous achievements by the standards of Latin America, where much change-inducing rhetoric has been cloaked in the loose garb of populistic ideology and personalistic political parties. The triumph of the ideology is the triumph of an ideological economizing device with important policy implications. The achievements associated with the forging of this ideology and its electoral triumph must, however, be balanced against what are very likely to be the agonizing realities of the short- and medium-term Chilean and Latin American future and the somewhat halting steps that are likely to ensue as the ideology comes up against the peculiar impediments associated with the non-violent triumph of would-be revolutionaries. Nevertheless, for a long time we have been told that structural changes in the economies of the Latin American countries, changes in their dependent relations with the United States, and changes in their characteristic ways of transacting political business would make a significant difference for the future developmental possibilities of the region. The Chileans are presenting us with a case study in the triumph and implementation of these assertions. It is to be hoped that the unfolding of the Chilean case will leave us wiser but not sadder concerning the developmental possibilities for the rest of the Latin American countries.

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THE DECISION TO DEPLOY THE ABM:

Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration

By MORTON H. HALPERIN*

WHY did the Johnson Administration decide in the late 1960's to deploy a ballistic missile defense system in the United States? In attempting to answer this question we need to seek an understanding of several distinct decisions and actions.[1] The most puzzling event occurred in San Francisco on September 18, 1967, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered an address to the editors and publishers of United Press International.[2] McNamara devoted the first fourteen pages of his talk to a general discussion of the strategic arms race, emphasizing the limited utility of nuclear weapons and the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had gained any increased security from the arms race. With this as background, he turned to a specific discussion of the ABM issue:

> Now let me come to the issue that has received so much attention recently: the question of whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the Soviet nuclear threat.
>
> To begin with, this is not in any sense a new issue. We have had both the technical possibility and the strategic desirability of an American ABM deployment under constant review since the late 1950s.
>
> While we have substantially improved our technology in the field, it is important to understand that none of the systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States. Were such a shield possible, we would certainly want it—and we would certainly build it. . . .
>
> Every ABM system that is now feasible involves firing defensive missiles at incoming offensive warheads in an effort to destroy them.
>
> But what many commentators on this issue overlook is that any such system can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them.

* An earlier version of this paper was prepared for delivery at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8-12, 1970. I have benefited from comments from a number of readers of previous drafts, including Graham Allison, William Capron, Leslie Gelb, Arnold Kanter, Herbert Kaufman, and Jerome Kahan.

[1] The framework of analysis used here is drawn from the author's ongoing study of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.

[2] Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," *Department of State Bulletin*, October 9, 1967, 443-51.

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And this is the whole crux of the nuclear action-reaction phenomenon.

Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system throughout the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage.

It is futile for each of us to spend $4 billion, $40 billion, or $400 billion —and at the end of all the spending, and at the end of all the deployment, and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are now. . . .

If we in turn opt for heavy ABM deployment—at whatever price—we can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain.

Many listeners undoubtedly expected the speech to end with the Secretary of Defense committing the United States firmly against an ABM deployment. Instead, McNamara immediately turned to another tack:

Having said that, it is important to distinguish between an ABM system designed to protect against a Soviet attack on our cities, and ABM systems which have other objectives.

One of the other uses of an ABM system which we should seriously consider is the greater protection of our strategic offensive forces.

Another is in relation to the emerging nuclear capability of Communist China.

There is evidence that the Chinese are devoting very substantial resources to the development of both nuclear warheads, and missile delivery systems. As I stated last January, indications are that they will have medium-range ballistic missiles within a year or so, an initial intercontinental ballistic missile capability in the early 1970s, and a modest force in the mid-70s.

Up to now, the lead-time factor has allowed us to postpone a decision on whether or not a light ABM deployment might be advantageous as a countermeasure to Communist China's nuclear development.

But the time will shortly be right for us to initiate production if we desire such a system. . . .

Is there any possibility, then, that by the mid-1970s China might become so incautious as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States or our allies.

It would be insane and suicidal for her to do so, but one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate. We wish to reduce such possibilities to a minimum.

And since, as I have noted, our strategic planning must always be conservative, and take into consideration even the possible irrational behavior of potential adversaries, there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. ABMs against this possibility is prudent.

The system would be relatively inexpensive—preliminary estimates place the cost at about $5 billion—and would have a much higher de-

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gree of reliability against a Chinese attack, than the much more massive and complicated system that some have recommended against a possible Soviet attack. . . .

After a detailed review of all these considerations, we have decided to go forward with this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment, and we will begin actual production of such a system at the end of this year.

Before concluding, the Secretary of Defense returned to his earlier theme and warned of the danger in the deployment he had just announced:

There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry. If a weapon system works—and works well—there is strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required.

The danger in deploying this relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system.

We must resist that temptation firmly—not because we can for a moment afford to relax our vigilance against a possible Soviet first-strike—but precisely because our greatest deterrent against such a strike is not a massive, costly, but highly penetrable ABM shield, but rather a fully credible offensive assured destruction capability.

The so-called heavy ABM shield—at the present state of technology—would in effect be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces. That, as I have pointed out, would make it necessary for us to respond in turn—and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side.[3]

The apparent contradictions in the speech were a puzzlement to the audience. Some speculated that McNamara had planned to give an anti-ABM speech and was instructed by the President at the last minute to add a deployment decision. However, an examination of the following questions will show us that the speech was planned from the first as it was delivered.

1. Why, in January 1967, did President Johnson ask Congress to appropriate the funds to deploy an ABM, but state that he would defer a decision to initiate the deployment pending an effort to get the Soviet Union to engage in talks on limiting the arms race?[4]

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1968, January 24, 1967," *Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1967: Book I* (Washington 1968), 48. "In 1968, we will: continue intensive development of Nike-X but take no action now to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate discussions with the Soviet Union on the limitation of ABM deployments; in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful, we will reconsider our deployment decisions. To provide for actions that may be required at that time, approximately $375 million has

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2. Why was the decision to deploy an ABM announced at the end of a speech whose whole structure and purpose was to explain why an ABM defense against the Soviet Union was impossible?

3. Why did the Secretary of Defense describe the system as being directed against China, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their congressional allies described it as a first step toward a full-scale defense against the Soviet Union?

4. Why was the system that was finally authorized for deployment one which was designed and deployed as if its purpose was to protect American cities against a large Soviet attack?

Having stated the questions, we must postpone attempting to provide the answers until we have examined in some detail the nature of the process by which the decisions were made. We must ask who the participants in the process were. We must examine the personal and organizational interests that defined their stakes in the ABM debate. We must determine the constraints operating on the process in terms of the decision-makers' shared images of the world, the rules of the game by which decisions were made, and the participation of large organizations. We must also ask what arguments were advanced on each side to secure the outcome desired, and what the consequences were. After thus analyzing the process we will be better prepared to find answers to our puzzling questions.

In seeking to understand why the United States Government makes a particular decision or takes a particular action, we can make no greater mistake than to assume that all the participants in the process looked at the issue in the same way and agreed on what should be done. The reality is quite different.

When individuals in the American government consider a proposed change in American foreign policy, they often see and emphasize quite different things and reach different conclusions. A proposal to withdraw American troops from Europe, for example, is to the Army a threat to its budget and size; to Budget Bureau examiners a way to save money; to the Treasury Department a gain in balance of payments; to the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs a threat to good relations with NATO; and to the President's congressional advisers an opportunity to remove a major irritant in the President's relations with the Hill.

The differences stem from the differing faces of the issue which they

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been included in the 1968 budget for the production of Nike-X for such purposes as defense of our offensive weapons systems."

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see; they depend in part on whether their interests lead them to perceive a threat or an opportunity.

What determines which face an individual sees? What accounts for his stand?

Participants in the process of national security policy in the American government believe that they should take stands which advance the national security of the United States. Their problem is to determine what is in fact in the interest of national security; they must seek clues and guidelines from a variety of sources. Some hold to a set of beliefs about the world (e.g., the Soviet Union is expansionist and must be stopped by American military power). Others look to authorities within the government or beyond it for guidance. For many participants, what is necessary for the nation's security comes to be defined as a set of more specific intermediate interests. For some, these may be personal (e.g., since, in general, I know how to protect the nation's security interests, whatever increases my influence is in the national interest). For others, the intermediate interests relate to domestic political interests (e.g., since a sound economy is a prerequisite to national security, I must oppose policies which threaten the economy).

Many participants define national security according to the interests of the organization to which they belong. Career officials naturally come to believe that the health of their organization is vital to the nation's security. Organizational commitments on the part of outsiders appointed to senior posts vary depending on the individual, the strength of his prior convictions, his image of his role, and the nature of the organization he heads. Some senior officials seek clues less from their organization's interests than from the interests of the President, as they define them.

The proposal to deploy an ABM was seen in different ways by different people and posed different threats and opportunities to their perception of the national interest as well as domestic, organizational, and personal interests. A look at the faces of the issue as seen by the participants, and their calculation of the stakes, is the place to begin to seek a solution to our puzzles.[5]

[5] The discussion of the interests of the participants is based in part on knowledge gained by the author as a participant in the process, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). Some of the observations are based on guesses about positions taken. Many of the same insights can be derived from a reading of congressional testimony, speeches, etc. See also Edward Randolph Jayne II, "The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security," MIT Center for International Studies, Center Paper C/69-12, 669-712. This study, based largely on interviews, confirms many of the stands described here. To be fair to the reader (and to add to his confusion), it should be noted that the present author was one of those interviewed by Jayne.

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We will start with the organizations that were exerting pressure upward on the Secretary of Defense and the President. In doing so we will oversimplify: we will talk about the Army, the Directorate for Defense Research and Engineering, etc. Just as the United States Government can be broken down into major departments, and these departments in turn into smaller components, these smaller components themselves have parts with differences of interest, objectives, and perspective. For our purposes in explaining the ABM decision, it is sufficient to go no lower than the main components of the Defense Department, such as the Army and the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering.

Organizational Stakes[6]

The Army[7]

Throughout the 1950's the Army fought for a role in the preparations for strategic nuclear war. It did so because it recognized that budget funds were moving towards strategic nuclear programs and because it believed that these programs were critical to the security interests of the United States. Most of the Army's efforts, however, were unsuccessful. It did receive partial responsibility for air defense involving warning systems and surface-to-air missiles, but it did not have the tactical fighter component of the air defense system, and it failed to get involved in strategic offensive forces. The Army did receive permission to work on the R & D for medium-range ballistic missiles, but in the end the responsibility for deployment went to the Air Force. Thus, by the late 1950's the Army realized that its role in strategic nuclear forces would be restricted to defense. Because of the limited role of anti-aircraft defenses, those in the Army who were responsible for developing, deploying, and operating air defense systems turned to missile defense. For them it was simply the next step in the same direction.

One of the most publicized aspects of the program budgeting system installed in the Pentagon by McNamara and his Comptroller Charles Hitch was the so-called program package. Under this concept, strategic forces would compete for defense funds with each other, rather than with other programs in the budget of each Service. Insofar as this procedure really affected budgets, the funds for the ballistic

[6] On Service interests, see Morton H. Halperin, "Why Bureaucrats Play Games," *Foreign Policy*, No. 2 (Spring 1971), 70-90.

[7] On the Army's interest in ABM in particular, see Herbert York, *Race to Oblivion* (New York 1970), 214.

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missile defense program would come out of the budget for strategic offensive and defensive systems and not out of the Army budget, as it would probably have in the 1950's when budgeting was explicitly done on the basis of Service shares of the budget. Some in the Army undoubtedly opposed the ABM, arguing that in fact each Service still had a limited budget which, in the case of the Army, should be used for its main purpose, viz., ground combat forces. However, this was also a period of rising defense expenditures, with the Services competing vigorously for the larger funds. Thus, the opposition within the Army to seeking a major ballistic missile defense was weakened: proponents could argue that the means would come, not from the existing Army budget, but from new funds which would otherwise go to Air Force and Navy strategic programs.

THE NAVY

In the postwar period, the United States Navy developed a broader participation in the various roles and missions of the United States Armed Forces than either the Army or the Air Force. The Navy has its own ground troops in the form of Marines, and its own air capability, both for tactical air support of Marine operations and for strategic bombing missions from carriers. In the late 1950's it staked out a major role in strategic offense missions when it got permission to proceed with Polaris submarines with their nuclear missiles. Strategic defense was the only area in which the Navy was not yet active.

The Navy's attitude towards ABM was determined in part by a search for a share in the responsibility. By the early 1960's the Navy had a program aimed at developing a ship-based ballistic missile defense. Naval officials recognized that they could not hope to get exclusive responsibility for ballistic missile defense, since the Army had primary responsibility. The Navy therefore sought to justify its system as a supplement to the Army land-based system. Consequently, the Navy recognized that the only hope of getting permission for deployment was to have the Army go forward first. The Navy, then, wished to proceed with the ABM in a way which kept open the possibility that later additions to this system would include a Navy-controlled, sea-based system.

In return for Army support of continuing development of the Navy sea-based ballistic missile system, the Navy was prepared to support an Army land-based system.

Moreover, the Navy was concerned, as was the Air Force, with main-

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taining the system of unanimous support by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Service procurement programs. This issue is discussed in detail below in considering the rules of the game.

THE AIR FORCE

The Air Force–Army rivalry in the field of defense has always been intense because of the lack of a clear division of roles in air defense. Both the Army and the Air Force have sought total control over the air defense role, the Air Force viewing it as part of the strategic mission and the Army as related to battlefield defense. In the late 1950's, when the Air Force got exclusive authority for medium-range ballistic missiles, an uneasy truce had been worked out on air defense, under which the Air Force had responsibility for tactical fighters and the Army for surface-to-air missiles. The Air Force did not, up to the end of 1968, make any effort to challenge this division by seeking a role in deploying ballistic missile defense.

Some Air Force officials, particularly those in SAC, were concerned about the proposals from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for defending Minuteman silos with the Army ballistic missile defense system. In part this was a reflex reaction, a desire not to have Air Force missiles protected by "Army" ABM's. In part there was concern that the Air Force would not be funded for a new offensive missile if billions were spent defending the Minuteman missiles with an ABM system. The Air Force clearly preferred that the funds for missile defense be used by the Air Force to develop new hard rock silos or mobile systems.

However, as long as the ABM was an area defense, competing (as the Air Force saw it) with Army funds for air defense and for civil defense, the Air Force was prepared to go along. Area defense also did not challenge any Air Force missions or appear to pose competition for funds for new strategic offensive forces.

Although each of the three Services saw a different face of the ABM issue, in the end they all were prepared to support it. There was no such unanimity within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to which the Secretary looked for advice and support on this matter. The three offices involved were the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, headed during this period by John S. Foster; the Office of Systems Analysis, headed by Alain Enthoven; and the Office of International Security Affairs, headed by John McNaughton and then by Paul Warnke. Each of these offices saw a different face of ABM and reached different conclusions.

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DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING (DDR & E)

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering is the Secretary of Defense's principal adviser on scientific and technical matters. He is also the manager of research and development programs. Foster therefore was responsible for monitoring the progress of ballistic missile defense, both in the Army and in the Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was a part of his office. He had previously been head of an AEC nuclear laboratory, and viewed his role as representing within the higher councils of the Pentagon and within the White House the perspective of the research scientist. Foster took it for granted that technology should be pushed as hard as possible, although he recognized the need to choose from the wide variety of different possible new technologies. He also believed that when technology reached the state where it was militarily effective, it should be deployed.

For Foster, the ABM issue was relatively simple and straightforward. At stake was the continued effectiveness of the weapons laboratory and the scientific research teams of American industry. Having developed an ABM system that was technically well designed, that community would expect it to be deployed. Its morale would be adversely affected by a decision not to deploy a system considered technologically "sweet." As the decision to deploy the ballistic missile defense system was delayed far beyond the time Foster thought to be justifiable on scientific and technical grounds, he began to fear that the laboratories involved would break up as the scientists became convinced that the United States would under no circumstances deploy a ballistic missile defense. He also feared that rising costs due to the delay in opening production lines would make it harder to justify a later decision to deploy. Furthermore, Foster believed that the Russians, in deploying an ABM while we did not, could develop a technologically more efficient system. As far as he was concerned, national security required that we maintain the vigor of our R & D establishment in order to maintain military superiority.[8]

Thus, Foster was for deployment of the ABM. The move from re-

[8] Industrial groups and contractors shared these concerns, as did research organizations such as the Stanford Research Institute, which worked on the ABM for the Army. However, the influence of these groups was limited to supplying arguments for ABM supporters in the administration and helping to arouse congressional concern. A T & T, the prime contractor, is much less dependent on defense contracts than the prime contractors of most large systems; nevertheless, A T & T was eager for the contract because it used its involvement in air defense and missile defense to help prevent an anti-trust suit to split Bell Labs, the research group, and Western Electric, the manufacturing unit, from the Bell system.

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search and development to deployment was more important to him than how the decision was rationalized publicly.

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (SA)

Systems analysis was perhaps McNamara's major innovation in Pentagon organization and decision-making. Organized by Enthoven in 1961, the SA office was responsible for preparing for McNamara a series of Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPM), including one on strategic offensive and defensive forces. This document laid out McNamara's rationale for procuring strategic forces and indicated his decisions on particular force posture issues.

Enthoven believed that we were spending too much on strategic forces and strongly resisted Service-proposed programs to build a new bomber, a new missile, a new submarine, or to increase expenditures vastly on strategic forces. He doubted whether strategic superiority gave the United States any significant advantage.

In deciding whether an ABM system should be deployed, Enthoven and his colleagues examined the possible role of the system as compared to other methods of accomplishing the same objectives. With regard to city defense they expressed doubts about whether the system would function effectively; they pointed out that the Russians could respond at much less cost and negate the value of any larger ABM system. Defense against China was difficult to evaluate in terms of systems analysis. SA could only calculate the cost of the system relative to the possible savings in lives in the event of a Chinese attack; it could not judge whether the cost was justified. For the defense of Minuteman silos, SA calculated the cost of ABM protection by comparing it to the cost of moving into much harder rock silos or to that of a mobile land-based missile. In terms of these comparisons, the choice of whether or not to proceed with a ballistic missile defense was always a marginal one. In the end, however, the advantage of heading off Service pressures for new strategic offensive systems tipped the balance in Enthoven's mind toward support of ABM defense for Minuteman silos.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (ISA)

ISA has no budget, no relations with outside laboratories, industry, or foreign governments, and is committed to no specific method of analysis. Hence, the approach it takes tends to be dominated by the views of the Assistant Secretary. John McNaughton and Paul Warnke brought to this position a strong commitment to arms control, both in terms of a United States–Soviet agreement on strategic forces and a nuclear non-

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proliferation treaty. Both saw American ABM deployment as a threat to these interests and opposed it.[9]

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. MC NAMARA

During the course of his seven years as Secretary of Defense, McNamara became more and more concerned with the problems of getting the strategic arms race under control. He came to believe by 1965 that, early in the Kennedy administration, the United States had bought a far larger strategic force than was necessary for deterrence of the Soviet Union, in turn stimulating a Soviet build-up which was now threatening to force the United States to step up the arms race once again. He believed that what he called the "mad momentum of the arms race" had to be brought under control in order to prevent nuclear war and to create a climate in which political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union might be improved. McNamara appears to have viewed the ABM as in some sense a symbol of the arms race. If the United States could take the decision not to deploy an ABM, then it might be possible to negotiate an agreement with the Russians or to reach a tacit understanding with them which would permit a leveling off of the strategic expenditures on both sides and, ultimately, their reduction. On the other hand, the decision to deploy the ABM—a system which McNamara, unlike Foster, believed was technologically unlikely to work—would symbolize our determination to buy whatever was available and to continue the search for a superiority which McNamara felt was unattainable and much less useful than many believed. Perhaps more than any other participant in the process, McNamara saw very high stakes for the national interest in the decision whether or not to deploy an ABM system; and he had no doubt that the correct decision, on grounds of national security, was *not* to deploy.

McNamara, as Secretary of Defense, was keenly conscious of his accounts both with the military and with the President. He believed that he could overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters about which

[9] The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, and the President's Science Advisory Committee shared many of these concerns. None of these organizations played a major role in the decisions. Cf. the comment of Herbert Scoville, who at the time was an Assistant Director of ACDA: "ACDA was at no time a participant in any of the senior-level discussions leading up to it [McNamara's speech]." Herbert Scoville, Jr., "The Politics of the ABM Debate: The View from the A.C. & D.A."; paper prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting, September 1970, 4. The rules of the game, as explained below, limited the involvement of these organizations as well as that of the Budget Bureau. Secretary of State Rusk's role involved direct and private communication with the President.

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they felt strongly on only a limited number of occasions, and he carefully chose the issues. He recognized that on such occasions the Chiefs might go directly to the President, and that they would almost certainly go to the Hill to seek to enlist their supporters in bringing pressure to bear on the President to overturn his decision. Nevertheless, he expected to get (as he did on most occasions), the President's backing, but this depended on not seeking presidential support too often and never on issues on which the President was strongly committed to the other side.

ABM was for McNamara a vital issue, and he was prepared to overrule the Chiefs and to seek the President's support. At the same time, he was not prepared to push the issue to the point of a break with the President.

WALT W. ROSTOW

Serving as the President's National Security Assistant, Walt W. Rostow was potentially in a position to play a major role. However, Rostow never had the mandate (which both Bundy and Kissinger have had) to involve himself heavily in the substance of all major foreign policy issues, particularly those pertaining to defense. Furthermore, McNamara tended to deal directly with the President, and to get involved in between on an issue concerning McNamara and Johnson would have meant a substantial cost to Rostow. Since the two apparently were in disagreement on the issue, he could only lose by stating a position. In this relationship, Rostow tended to save his own influence for Vietnam and a few other issues about which he felt very strongly.

Rostow's own stakes in the decision were not very high compared to the cost of involvement. He thus remained outside and did not play a key role, either in providing information for the President or in seeking to influence his decision directly.

CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

Under the rules of the game in the United States, military leaders have not only the right but the obligation to state their personal views on defense issues to Congress when asked by members of the Armed Services or Appropriations Committees. Thus, it was routine for Congress to be informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimously in favor of a ballistic missile defense system and to hear the arguments for such a deployment from senior military officers. In addition, there may well have been private discussions between military leaders and senior Senators and Congressmen.

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Congressmen tend to defer to expertise, and the leaders of these committees viewed the military rather than the civilians in the Pentagon as the experts on national security. They were prepared to support programs which the military believed were vital to the improvement of American military capability. In particular, they found it difficult to understand why we should not deploy something which would save American lives in the event of a war. As Richard Russell said in explaining his position, if only two human beings were to survive a nuclear war, he wanted them to be Americans: as he saw matters, an ABM would clearly increase this possibility. In general, the legislators were suspicious of Soviet motives and believed that the United States should maintain strategic superiority. Many of them also derived advantages, in terms of defense industries in their states and districts, from increased defense spending. Finally, they felt that the Secretary of Defense was seeking to substitute his judgment for that of the military, and that this was dangerous. For congressional leaders like Russell, Stennis, Jackson, and Thurmond, the stakes were the national interest as defined by the military.

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President Johnson assumed the Presidency of the United States without any strong commitments to particular foreign policy positions. His own concerns and interests were tied up mainly with domestic issues.

Johnson does not appear to have seen any major national security stakes in the decision whether or not to deploy the ABM. Because it was an issue that generated intense passion in others, he was concerned, but he did not ascribe to it any intrinsic importance in terms of his conception of American security or America's role in the world. He was apparently wary of possible Chinese irrationality, having recently received a number of reports that the Russians believed the Chinese to be dangerous. Therefore an ABM against China, while not imperative, made sense to him. As will be discussed below, Johnson was interested in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Russians, but evidently did not share McNamara's fear that an American ABM deployment would impede agreement.

The issue for Johnson tended to be defined in terms of his relations with the other participants, including the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leaders concerned with defense matters—particularly those on the Senate Armed Services, Joint Atomic Energy, and Appropriations Committees. He was also, of course, sensi-

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tive to the implications that any decision might have for the 1968 presidential election.

Johnson's relations with McNamara had become uneasy during this period because of their growing disagreements about the conduct of the Vietnam war. Though prepared to overrule McNamara on Vietnam issues, Johnson was—at least until he made the decision to move him to the World Bank—interested in keeping McNamara on board, and he recognized that this meant supporting him on a number of other issues. Johnson could have had no doubt that McNamara felt strongly that a ballistic missile defense system should not be deployed, certainly not a large area defense system against the Soviet Union.

If the Chiefs' assertion of vital interests was not enough to settle the issue, neither was it something to be dismissed out of hand. Johnson clearly viewed the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a separate entity. He did not believe that he could leave the job of managing them to the Secretary of Defense. In general, he was reluctant to overrule the military; he viewed them as a group to be bargained with, in large part because of their power and influence on the Hill. He also was not prepared totally to discount their views on issues of national security. If the Chiefs said that an ABM was vital to the security of the United States, Johnson was not prepared to dismiss that as the rhetoric of the military who always want every new system.

For Johnson, certain of his former colleagues in the Senate constituted a major reference group on national security matters. He had had a close relation with Richard Russell, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as with such men as John Stennis and Henry Jackson. Johnson did not like to challenge their positions. He also took their views on national security seriously, and knew that they all felt very strongly that the United States should deploy a ballistic missile defense designed to deal with a Soviet attack against the United States.

The domestic political stakes could not be ignored by the President. There could have been little doubt in his mind that the Republican nominee, whether he be Richard Nixon or Nelson Rockefeller, could well make defense a major issue in the campaign. At the urging of his Secretary of Defense and under intense budget pressures, Johnson had permitted the non-Vietnam portion of the defense budget to decline, at least in real terms, and he was regularly rejecting proposals from the Joint Chiefs to develop and deploy a whole array of new strategic systems (for instance, a new manned strategic bomber) and new general-

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purpose systems. Opposition to his defense program was building, particularly among leaders of the Senate and House, and the Republicans were beginning to sense the possibility of a defense issue in the next presidential election. The ABM was rapidly becoming a symbol of defense preparedness. Johnson had to recognize that, if he did not deploy an ABM, he was open to the charge that he had failed to take a step which would save American lives in the event of a war. Although political scientists may point out that issues of defense procurement rarely swing votes in an election, Presidents are not so certain. Kennedy had apparently scored effectively against Nixon in 1960 on the missile-gap issue, and Johnson was reluctant to run the risk that the "defense-gap" issue would be used effectively against him.

Thus, Johnson saw the stakes largely in terms of his relations with the Secretary of Defense, with the military, and with the senior members of the Congress concerned with defense, especially inasmuch as implications for the 1968 election were involved. As the President saw it, McNamara was strongly against a deployment (as was Secretary of State Dean Rusk), while congressional leaders and the military were strongly in favor. All claimed to be reasoning from the point of view of national security. Johnson's own instincts would have led him to search for a compromise which would minimize the damage to his relations with his advisers.

The other participants were maneuvering and putting forward arguments in an effort to alter his perception of domestic or international consequences. The way in which they struggled to define an issue for the President and to seek the outcome they desired was biased by the images that are taken for granted in the top hierarchy of the United States Government, the rules of the game, and the fact that the deployment of the ABM could be carried out only by the United States Army and only by the use of existing procedures.

Rules of the Game

The most important rule of the game which affected the nature of the ABM debate in the executive branch was the one requiring the President to make budget decisions once a year and to defend his decision publicly. This is a rule that derives from the system of government and applies to any President. Since the ABM had aroused great congressional and public interest, the President could not duck the issue in his budget messages. Instead, he had to discuss the subject and state clearly why he was for or against an ABM. This meant that the option

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of trying to keep the issue away from the President was not open to the opponents of the ABM. Because it was an annual budget issue, proponents of the deployment of an ABM system had no difficulty reaching the President, and opponents had to persuade the President not only to rule against deployment but to take a public stand. Thus, at each budget cycle McNamara had to devote considerable effort and energy to developing a rationale against deployment which the President would be prepared to accept and to embrace publicly as his own.

Other rules of the game were peculiar to the Johnson administration. The nature of the President's relationship with his Secretary of Defense affected the outcome of the ABM debate. McNamara tended to deal privately with the President on issues of major concern to him. Formal memoranda, which he would clear throughout the Defense Department and send to the President, were prepared only after he and the President had privately agreed on a position. The President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs on the budget tended to be a routine and formalistic opportunity for the Chiefs to appeal the Secretary of Defense's decisions. McNamara's annual meeting with the President's National Security Adviser, Science Adviser, and Budget Director was equally formalistic. Although this procedure eventually broke down on Vietnam, it did not do so on defense-budget issues. This meant that there was no open debate within the administration. Because of the private nature of McNamara's relation with the President, other agencies such as the State Department, ACDA, and the President's Science Adviser were not able to make inputs to the decision in an orderly way before McNamara and the President had reached tentative agreement.

The rules of the game under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff operated also influenced the outcome of the ABM question. During the 1950's the Joint Chiefs of Staff tended to split on major issues, particularly on those affecting the deployment of systems for one Service. Each Service tended to support its own deployment, and except where specific deals were made, to oppose controversial deployments for the other Services —particularly expensive ones which might upset the existing arrangement allocating shares of the defense budget. Because they did not see any threat to their autonomy from the Secretary of Defense in the 1950's, the Chiefs were prepared to deal separately with the Secretary and with the President. Robert McNamara's approach changed the procedures dramatically.

Unlike his predecessors, McNamara saw himself as a decision-maker on strategic issues and not simply as a business manager who left policy to the military. The Joint Chiefs discovered that when they split,

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McNamara would use their disagreements to reject programs supported by just one of the Services. In order to counterbalance this influence, the Joint Chiefs developed a policy of compromise—to unite in support of each Service. Thus, by 1965 the Army was able to make a strong enough case for an ABM to get the support of the other Chiefs. The Navy was apparently brought along by Army support for a development of the concept of a ship-based ABM system and some other Navy programs. The Air Force appears to have been brought along by Army support for Air Force strategic programs, and by the Army's willingness to forego ABM protection of Minuteman silos. As a result of these arrangements, the Secretary of Defense and the President were confronted by the Joint Chiefs' unanimous position that ballistic missile defense was vital to the security of the United States, even though really only the Army favored it strongly. Congress was informed that the Chiefs unanimously supported a deployment.

Shared Images

The debate within the executive branch was founded on a set of widely shared images about the role of the United States in the world and about the nature of the threats to its security. All participants in the debate accepted the notion that the Soviet Union and China were potential enemies of the United States who would engage in military threats and who might use military force, if not against the United States, at least against our allies, unless the military power of these countries was counterbalanced by that of the United States.

There was also the widespread belief that nuclear power was an important component of national power. It was widely accepted that the United States had to maintain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union and China since these countries were aggressive and expansionist and the United States was defensive and peaceful. It was also assumed that any military capability which would enhance the ability of the United States to survive a nuclear war should be procured; many believed that the United States should procure any weapons system which the Russians had.

Although McNamara began to argue against some of these beliefs beginning in the mid-1960's, they were by and large accepted by most of the participants, and the debate was carried out within these terms. McNamara was forced to construct his arguments largely within the framework of the images held by the rest of the participants. The proponents of ABM deployment found that the shared images biased the debate in their direction.

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Arguments

Within these constraints, proponents and opponents of an ABM deployment put forward arguments designed either to convince other participants or to demonstrate that a decision reached because of organizational or political interests could effectively be defended before domestic audiences.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF DEPLOYMENT[10]

1. *This will save American lives.* Supporters of the ABM argued that in the event of a nuclear war the ABM system would shoot down incoming Soviet missiles and hence would save American lives. The extreme form of this argument, as has already been mentioned, was presented by Senator Richard Russell. Others pointed out that even if 60 million Americans were killed in a nuclear attack, the expenditure on ABM would be worth saving a possible 120 million other Americans.

2. *The Russians have it.* Throughout the postwar period the United States has felt obligated to match Soviet deployments. It has been argued that if we let the Russians have something that we do not have, they would gain a psychological or political advantage in dealing with us. Similarly, if the Russians were to develop something while we did not, they would gain a technological lead. Thus, in the public debate, and even within the bureaucracy, the argument that "we need it because the Russians have it" has carried great weight.

3. *It works.* Proponents of the ABM sought to counteract technological arguments against deployment by asserting its effectiveness. They pointed to tests in which a single ABM had intercepted a single incoming warhead, and they expressed confidence that the entire system would in fact work in the event of a nuclear attack. If it worked, it should be deployed.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEPLOYMENT

It was more difficult to find clear and simple arguments against the deployment of the ABM system that would appeal to the President and be persuasive in dealing with Congress and the public. Over time, the Secretary of Defense developed a series of arguments against an ABM deployment, and specifically against a large-scale deployment directed

[10] See Senate Debates, *Congressional Record*, CXIV, Part 22, 529169-90, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.; testimony of General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., April 23, 1968.

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against the Soviet Union, which was the system that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior congressional leaders were proposing.

1. *The system is not technologically ready.* Up to 1963, McNamara was able to argue, with wide support from the technological community, that the Army-proposed Nike-Zeus system simply could not be effective against the kind of decoys and other penetration aids that the Soviets were fully capable of producing.[11] If we went ahead with a deployment, he argued, we would wind up with a second-rate system. On the other hand, if we waited, we had hopes of developing a new and more effective system. By 1963 this argument was no longer valid because a new and more technologically efficient system had been developed, and it appeared unlikely that additional breakthroughs would occur in the foreseeable future.

2. *This will bring less return than expenditures on other systems.* After 1963, the Secretary of Defense introduced arguments of cost effectiveness. He pointed out that a large ABM system designed to protect American cities would be aimed at reducing American casualties in a nuclear war. He suggested that one had to examine alternative ways of reducing casualties and determine which would be the most effective for any given sum of money. McNamara examined a number of alternative ways of reducing casualties, including air defense and civil defense. He argued that the studies made clear that the installation of a nation-wide system of fall-out shelters would produce the largest saving. Thus, if the United States were to commit itself to a "damage-limiting" program designed to save lives in the event of a nuclear war, it should build a shelter system. Only after the shelters were completed should one consider spending money on other measures, such as ballistic missile defense.[12] The civil defense argument was a complicated one. It depended on people understanding marginal utility and accepting that one should always proceed in the most efficient way. McNamara appears to have put this argument forward not to make a case for civil defense, but to make one against ballistic missile defense.

[11] Robert S. McNamara, *Testimony Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 1961, 17. For a summary of McNamara's arguments against deployment as presented to various congressional committees from 1961–1967, see Benson D. Adams, "McNamara's ABM Policy, 1961–67," *Orbis*, XII (Spring 1968), 200-225.

[12] Robert S. McNamara, *Statement of the Secretary of Defense Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Years 1965–69 Defense Program and the 1965 Defense Budget* (multilith), 42.

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3. *There will be an equal and opposite reaction negating the value of the system.* McNamara next turned to the argument of the equal and opposite reaction.[13] As he explained it to Congress, if the United States deployed a large ABM system which would cost between $20 and $40 billion, it would, against the *currently expected* Soviet threat, save a number of American lives in the event of a nuclear war. McNamara then proceeded to show that the Russians could offset our ABM deployment at substantially smaller cost, and casualties would return to the previous level. Thus, he argued, our ABM system would bring an equal and opposite reaction from the Soviet Union which would totally negate the value of the ABM system—producing the same amount of casualties at a higher expense to us. Although sophisticated critics were able to point out that there was nothing in the history of the arms race to suggest that in fact an equal and opposite reaction was inevitable or even likely, McNamara's argument was a simple and effective one. It summarized in a crude way the truth that over time the Soviets would build decoys and MIRV's if the United States built an ABM, and that in the end there would not be the savings in lives that ABM proponents suggested.

4. *We must resist the mad momentum of the arms race.* In his speech announcing that the United States would deploy a light area defense directed against China, McNamara introduced a new argument against an ABM deployment directed at a large Soviet attack. He talked about the history of the arms race and argued that the United States on a number of occasions had built a larger force than it needed for deterrence. He suggested that in turn this had stimulated the Soviets to build more. Such an interaction, which he called "the mad momentum of the arms race," was, he said, a danger to the security of the United States, and therefore the United States should take the initiative in exercising restraint.

5. *We must negotiate arms limitation with the Soviet Union.* Encouraged by Johnson's interest in strategic arms limitation talks, McNamara sought to utilize this presidential concern to delay the decision to deploy ABM. He argued that a public call for talks would serve as a reasonable rationale for delaying deployment. He also argued that an American commitment to deploy ABM's would decrease the likelihood of Soviet agreement.

[13] Robert S. McNamara, *Statement of the Secretary of Defense Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Years 1968–72 Defense Program and the 1968 Defense Budget* (multilith), 39, 40.

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Puzzles and Tentative Solutions

Having examined the stakes as the participants saw them, as well as the constraints and the arguments that were used, we can now consider in detail the questions we posed at the outset.

1. Why, in January 1967, did President Johnson ask Congress to appropriate the funds to deploy an ABM, but state that he would defer initiating the deployment pending an effort to get the Soviet Union to engage in talks on limiting the arms race?

As preparations for the budget for the fiscal year 1968 neared completion in the closing months of 1966, time appeared to be running out on McNamara's efforts to prevent deployment of a Soviet-oriented ABM system. A number of pressures seemed to be coming to a head, including the following:[14]

Technological improvement. The technology of ballistic missile defense had improved drastically in the preceding few years. Those responsible for the program in the scientific community, in DDR & E and its operating arm, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), as well as in the Army, were now arguing that an effective ABM system could be built and could ultimately be improved to handle even a large Soviet attack. In previous years, the testimony of these scientists had effectively served to offset the pressure exercised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had enabled McNamara to persuade the President and the Congress that the technology was not yet ripe for an ABM deployment. They were no longer prepared to play this role.[15]

Soviet ABM deployment. There was growing evidence that the Soviet Union was beginning to deploy an ABM system around Moscow. In the past the intelligence community had been split as to whether the so-called Tallinn system being deployed across the northern part of the Soviet Union was in fact an ABM system. (Although some military intelligence agencies were pressing the view that Tallinn was an ABM system, the majority of the intelligence community believed that it was an air defense system.) However, there was no dispute at all that the system being deployed around Moscow was an ABM. This added to pressures to begin an American deployment in order to avoid an ABM gap.

JCS pressure. In part because of the changes in technology and the Soviet ABM deployment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were no longer willing to concur in delaying ABM deployment; they were determined to

[14] The documentation for this section is drawn from Jayne (fn. 5).
[15] *Ibid.*, 309.

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go firmly on record before Congress in favor of a deployment *now*, and in particular for a deployment that would develop into a large anti-Soviet system.

Senate pressure. Pressure was also mounting from Senate leaders for initial ABM deployment. Among others, Russell, Jackson, and Thurmond had spoken out in favor of an early ABM deployment. The general expectation in the executive branch was that Congress would put great pressure on the President to agree to a deployment if he did not include it in his budget message.[16]

Republican pressure. It was also becoming evident that the Republican Party planned to make a campaign issue out of an alleged ABM gap. Governor George Romney of Michigan, then believed to be a leading Republican candidate for the presidential nomination in 1968, had, on a "Meet the Press" broadcast in November, talked of an ABM gap and made it clear that this would be an issue in the campaign. Moreover, the GOP Congressional Policy Committee led by Melvin Laird had decided to make the ABM a vehicle to challenge Lyndon Johnson's strategic policies. Senator Strom Thurmond, a leading Republican expert on defense matters, had also attacked the failure to deploy an ABM.[17]

There was no doubt that JCS demands for an immediate ABM deployment would be made known to leaders on the Hill, as would the growing evidence of a Soviet ABM deployment around Moscow. Congress had in the previous year included funds for the ABM deployment which the President had not requested; the stage was set for a confrontation should Johnson again accept the advice of his Secretary of Defense and delay an ABM deployment.

The President's choices seemed to be rather narrow. He could reject ballistic missile defense, embrace McNamara's arguments against deployment, and prepare to take his case to congressional leaders and the public. Alternatively, he could proceed with a ballistic missile defense deployment at the cost of overruling his Secretary of Defense. The odds were high that the President would proceed with the ballistic missile defense deployment being pressed on him by the Joint Chiefs and the Senate leaders. Only if he could find another option did McNamara stand any chance of again delaying a presidential commitment to ballistic missile defense.

[16] See, for example, *Baltimore Sun*, November 21, 1966 and December 3, 1966; *Washington Post*, November 24, 1966.
[17] Jayne (fn. 5), 346.

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It appears that McNamara first discussed the subject with the President at meetings held on his Texas ranch on November 3rd and 10th. These discussions were reported to focus on the ABM and the question of extending the bombing to additional targets in North Vietnam.[18]

Following the meeting with the President on November 10th, McNamara reported at a press conference that the Soviets were now believed to be deploying an ABM system around Moscow. McNamara's initiative in releasing this information made it possible for him to preempt an inevitable news leak and, at the same time, to air his view that the Soviet ABM deployment required improvements in American offensive capability rather than a matching deployment. McNamara noted that the United States was moving ahead with Minuteman III and Poseidon, and therefore was fully confident of its ability to deter this Soviet ABM. He declared that it was too early to begin deployment of an anti-Chinese system, and that no decision had been made on other possible reasons for a deployment.[19]

The decisive meeting with the President appears to have been held on December 6th. At this meeting—attended by McNamara, his Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance, all the members of the Joint Chiefs, and the President's Special Assistant Walt Rostow—the Joint Chiefs were given the opportunity to put forward their argument for what was then called Posture A, a full coverage of the United States with a system designed for defense against more than a Chinese attack. The Joint Chiefs made it clear that they intended to see that Posture A would develop into Posture B, a larger anti-Soviet system designed to reduce casualties in the United States in the event of a large Soviet attack, and that they would accept nothing less. McNamara countered by presenting the arguments against an anti-Soviet system emphasizing that the Soviets would eventually have an offensive capability which would fully offset the value of the ABM. At this point he appears to have presented the President with two possible compromises. The first, which he was ultimately able to persuade the President to accept, called for a procurement of production items requiring a long lead-time, with no specific decision as to what system, if any, would be deployed; this was to be accompanied by an effort to begin arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. The second option was to begin deployment of a small anti-Chinese system. The meeting ended with Johnson agreeing that the State Department should begin to probe the Soviets on the possibility

[18] These meetings are described by Jayne (fn. 5).
[19] *New York Times*, November 13, 1966.

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of talks, but apparently withholding any decision on ABM deployment.

The State Department thus proceeded to explore the possibilities of arms limitation talks with the Soviets. At the same time McNamara wrote up and presented to the President a Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) summarizing his arguments against an anti-Soviet system, but suggesting that an ABM defense against China might prove useful.

To demonstrate that he was not the only opponent of a large Soviet-oriented ABM system, McNamara arranged for the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet early in January 1967 with past and current Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and Directors of Defense Research and Engineering. None of the scientists present dissented from the view that an ABM to defend the American people against a Soviet missile attack was not feasible and should not be built. There was some discussion of a Chinese-oriented system and some divergence of views, but a majority was opposed to deployment.[20]

Following this meeting, McNamara was apparently able to persuade Johnson to delay any deployment, whether anti-Russian or anti-Chinese, and to pursue the option of procuring long lead-time items, and to concentrate on the effort to open arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

The proposal for such talks seemed to be a vehicle for the pursuit of a number of presidential objectives. Johnson was haunted, as all of his postwar predecessors had been, by the specter of nuclear war. He was anxious to try to do something to bring nuclear weapons under control. Moreover, here was an issue on which the President could appeal to the desire of the general public for peace, and specifically to the left wing of the Democratic Party, which was becoming increasingly disaffected on Vietnam. It was also an issue that could make history for Johnson as the man who had made the decisive move to end the nuclear arms race which threatened mankind's doom. Johnson was quick to sense these possibilities.

McNamara was able to argue that a decision to proceed with ballistic missile defense would hamper arms limitation talks with the Russians, since one of the main purposes of such talks would be to seek

[20] The scientists present were Science Advisers James R. Killian, Jr., George B. Kistiakowsky, Jerome B. Wiesner, and Donald F. Hornig; and Directors of Defense Research Herbert York, Harold Brown, and John S. Foster, Jr. The meeting is described in York (fn. 7), 194-95.

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an agreement by both sides to avoid any ballistic missile defense deployments. Further, he could argue that a dramatic act of restraint by the United States would increase the probability that the Russians would respond favorably, and that the talks would begin. In any case, a bold gesture for peace on the part of the President would undercut much of the opposition to his decision not to proceed right away with a ballistic missile defense deployment.

At the same time, by asking for funds for ballistic missile defense and implying that he would be prepared to spend them if talks did not get under way, the President was able to avoid making the argument that the United States should unilaterally forego deployment of a ballistic missile defense. Johnson would be able to tell the Joint Chiefs and the senior congressional leaders that he had certainly not ruled out a ballistic missile defense; that in fact he had taken a major step toward such a deployment, but that he was postponing the actual deployment pending an effort to get an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Though the military and congressional leaders might be somewhat uneasy about the further delay, they could not effectively mount a campaign against an effort to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, given the widespread popularity of such efforts.

Thus, the proposal to link the two issues enabled McNamara to gain a further delay, which he hoped would last indefinitely as the talks continued. The President could avoid paying any major price in his relations with McNamara, the Joint Chiefs, or the congressional leaders who favored an ABM deployment. He could put off a hard choice and open up the possibility of arms control negotiations which would substantially enhance his domestic position and solidify his prospects for a favorable place in the history books.[21]

2. Why was the decision to deploy an ABM announced at the tail end of a speech whose whole structure and purpose was to explain why an ABM defense against the Soviet Union was impossible? 3. Why did the Secretary of Defense describe the system as being directed against China, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their congressional allies described it as a first step toward a full-scale defense against the Soviet Union?

What has been said thus far should make it clear that the answers lie in the bargaining between McNamara and Johnson, with each taking account of the positions of the Joint Chiefs and the congressional leaders.

The effort to get the Soviets to agree to set a date for arms limitation

[21] On the tendency to make the minimum decision necessary, see Warner Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVI (March 1961), 24-46.

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talks was unsuccessful. When President Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, on June 23rd and 25th at a hastily arranged summit conference, there was still no Soviet agreement to talk. Johnson brought McNamara along; while the two leaders ate lunch, the Secretary of Defense gave them a lecture on nuclear strategy, previewing his San Francisco speech and emphasizing the value of an agreement to both sides. The Soviet leader was unyielding; he described ABM as defensive and unobjectionable and was not prepared to agree to talks.[22]

Following the Glassboro Conference there could be little doubt that talks would not be under way before the President's next budget message in January 1968. Almost immediately Johnson informed McNamara that some kind of ABM deployment would have to be announced by January at the latest.[23] At that time the President would have to account for the disposition of the ABM contingency funds he had requested and state whether he was seeking additional sums for deployment of an ABM system. Given his stakes as we have defined them, and given the implicit commitment that he had made in January of 1967 to go forward in the absence of arms limitation talks, the President's decision was not difficult to predict. January of 1968 would be Johnson's last chance to announce the deployment in a budget message before the presidential elections in November. To hedge again, stating that he was still seeking talks, would have seemed unconvincing since Johnson had been unable to secure Kosygin's agreement to talks at the Glassboro meeting. The intermediate options had run out. The President was determined to go ahead, even if it meant paying a price in his relations with the Secretary of Defense. Apparently, Johnson also felt that by beginning to deploy an ABM he might convince the Soviets to enter into arms limitation talks.[24]

Having decided to proceed with an ABM deployment, Johnson was obviously concerned about reducing the cost in terms of his relations with McNamara. He was willing to let the Secretary announce the deployment in any way he chose. For the sake of military and congressional acceptance, the President may have insisted that the deployment be such that others could describe it as the first step toward an anti-Soviet system.

McNamara's primary goal remained to prevent deployment of a large system directed at the Soviet Union. If the United States were to go forward with any ABM deployment, it was important to do whatever possible to create in the public mind a clear difference between

[22] Jayne (fn. 5), 366-69. [23] *Ibid.*, 372. [24] *Ibid.*, 373.

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the system being deployed and a large system, at the same time vigorously putting forward the case for not deploying a large system against the Soviet Union. It was therefore in McNamara's interest to be able to explain his view of the arms race, explain his opposition to a large anti-Soviet system, and *then* announce an ABM deployment. The apparent contradiction in the speech was designed by McNamara as a way of emphasizing that this was not a large ABM deployment against the Soviet Union. He may also have hoped that his speech would generate substantial public opposition to an ABM deployment.

McNamara had recognized several years earlier that he might lose the battle against deploying any kind of ABM system and had begun laying the groundwork for a fall-back position in the form of a small ABM system directed against China. In February 1965, he publicly raised the possibility of ABM protection against a small nuclear attack from China, but argued that even on those grounds the decision was not then needed because "the lead-time for additional nations to develop and deploy an effective ballistic missile system capable of reaching the United States is greater than we require to deploy the defense."[25] In the following year McNamara indicated that the ABM system now being developed would not be effective against a larger attack, but could deal with a small Chinese threat.[26]

Thus, in September of 1967, McNamara could announce that the lead-time for an ABM deployment was now about the same as the lead-time for the Chinese deployment of an ICBM system of significant size. Therefore, it was now prudent to proceed with this deployment which he had been discussing for several years. And McNamara appears to have been convinced that, in its own terms, ABM defense against China was, as he described it in his speech, "marginal" but nevertheless "prudent." In announcing the decision to deploy an ABM system against China, McNamara was putting forward arguments which he believed.

Even more important was the fact that McNamara's major concern was to try to prevent a large deployment directed at the Soviet Union which would force the Soviets to respond, setting off another round

[25] Robert S. McNamara, *Statement of the Secretary of Defense Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Years 1966–70 Defense Program and the 1966 Defense Budget* (multilith), 49.

[26] Robert S. McNamara, *Statement of the Secretary of Defense Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Years 1967–71 Defense Program and the 1967 Defense Budget* (multilith), 70.

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of the arms race. An anti-Chinese system could be limited more easily than a small system directed against the Soviet Union. One alternative was to describe the system as one designed for protection for Minuteman installations, although it would be difficult to justify on grounds of cost effectiveness. Moreover, a system deployed only around missile sites would have been resisted by the Joint Chiefs and the Senate leaders; it did not pave the way for a larger system against the Soviet Union and could not be described as the beginning of one. It is not clear whether McNamara himself or the President ruled out this alternative.[27]

4. Why was the system authorized for deployment one which was designed and deployed as if its purpose was to protect American cities against a large Soviet attack?

Once a presidential decision is made on a policy issue, the details of implementation must be turned over to an individual or organization. In the case of the ABM, there was no choice but to assign responsibility to the Army. Although McNamara could and did attempt to monitor how the Army would deploy the system, he was unable or unwilling to direct that the system be designed and deployed so as to minimize the possibility of growth. The Army's freedom may have been enhanced by the fact that McNamara's scientific and technical advisers themselves tended to favor keeping open the option for growth into a large ABM system. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, to whom general responsibility for much of the day-to-day administration of the Pentagon fell as McNamara devoted more and more of his time to Vietnam, also tended to favor keeping open the option for a large system.

But there was a more fundamental problem. Once the decision had been made to proceed with a ballistic missile defense directed against China, there was strong pressure to move forward quickly. The President could not admit at that point that we had no hardware for such a system and that three or four years of research and development would be necessary before deployment would begin: one had to start

[27] In his San Francisco speech McNamara stated, with regard to Minuteman defense, that "the Chinese-oriented ABM deployment would enable us to add—as a concurrent benefit—a further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which means that at modest cost we would in fact be adding even greater effectiveness to our offensive missile force and avoiding a much more costly expansion of that force." A short time later, in an article in *Life* (September 29, 1967, pp. 28 A-C), elaborating on the speech, he stated unequivocally that the Minuteman defense would be deployed. However, following a trip to Europe for a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, McNamara declared that no decision had been made as to whether the option to defend Minuteman sites would be exercised.

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with deploying the components that were already developed, even though they were not the optimum ones for a defense system against China that could be kept from growing into a large ABM system against the Soviet Union.

Geography also worked against a limited system. Both Russian and Chinese ICBM's approach the United States through the same corridor over the pole. The same radar could be used for an anti-Chinese system and an anti-Russian system, and long-range missile launchers would be useful against both threats.

DDR & E, which favored a large Soviet-oriented system, had no incentive for using its ingenuity to develop components that could be effective against China but had little potential for a large anti-Russian system. And, in making precise decisions about the location of radar and missile-launching sites, the Army in fact opted for sites close to cities, to permit the eventual deployment of a large anti-Russian system.

McNamara's control over the implementation of this decision was simply not great enough to prevent these developments. His attention was increasingly absorbed by Vietnam and he was clearly on his way out. He did not have the support of the President in seeking to limit the system. His principal assistant did not share his desire to reduce the possibility of growth, and the Army, charged with deployment, favored a large anti-Soviet system. Thus, despite McNamara's efforts in his statements to distinguish sharply between an anti-Chinese and an anti-Russian system, the Army was able to tell the Congress that actual deployment was not different in any significant way from the projected first stages of an anti-Russian system, and that the system being deployed was expected to grow.

Conclusions

The decision of the Johnson administration to deploy an ABM system, the way in which it was announced, and the preparations for deployment which followed illustrate the pulling and hauling of many different players with different interests that is characteristic of the foreign policy process in the United States. No single player's views, including those of the President, of what should be done, dominated, although the President's views played a major role in shaping the general direction in which American actions moved.

Two independent decisions were involved, with different actors influencing the course of each. The first decision was simply whether or not to deploy the ABM at all. This was necessarily a presidential

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decision; there was no end run around him. As the ABM decision illustrates, the President is qualitatively different—not simply a very powerful player among less powerful players.

The second decision related to the timing, substance, and shape of deployment, given the previous decision that there was to be an ABM of some kind. In this latter decision the President played a much less central role, and other players were somewhat more influential. Johnson was both less interested and less in control.

The decision to announce some sort of deployment by January of 1968 can thus best be explained by exploring the multiple constituencies and interests that the President had to balance. The foreign policy interests of all postwar Presidents have come to focus on relations with the Soviet Union as they affect the nuclear balance and the need to avoid nuclear war. These concerns, while from time to time stimulating interest in arms control, have mainly led to support for defense efforts. At the same time, the Presidents have all been concerned with their image in history and have developed a desire to go down as men who contributed to a peaceful international environment. All of them felt, as Johnson did, the responsibility to avoid a nuclear holocaust that would destroy civilization.

Moreover, no President can ignore the pressures exerted by the bureaucracy, especially the military and the senior cabinet officers, or by senior congressional leaders and the public, when a presidential campaign is around the corner. All of these pressures came to bear on Lyndon Johnson as he faced the ABM decisions during the course of 1967. Johnson appears here in the characteristic presidential role of conciliator: a man who attempts to give as much as he can to each of a number of his principal subordinates and the permanent bureaucracies while seeking a position that avoids any conflict between his own various interests and constituencies beyond the government. The limited ABM which Johnson ultimately directed be deployed could be described by Robert McNamara as anti-Chinese and therefore not a danger to Soviet-American relations in general or future arms talks in particular. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs and Senate leaders had their own payoffs. Despite McNamara's statement, they could describe it as a first step towards an anti-Soviet system. Moreover, the small anti-Chinese system which Johnson approved was much larger than the system the Soviet Union was deploying around Moscow. Given these ambiguities and the simplified nature with which the public views such questions, the Republican Party had effectively been deprived of a missile gap issue. That was the President's payoff.

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Johnson was also able to reconcile his own concern, to seek an end to the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, with the need to maintain American military strength. Early in 1967 he was prepared to go along with McNamara's proposal that arms talks with the Soviet Union be sought before a firm final decision was made to proceed with an ABM deployment. After talking with Kosygin, he concluded that the Soviets would not enter talks under the current circumstances. He believed that perhaps the pressure that would be put upon the Soviet leaders by the beginnings of an American deployment would constitute a leverage on the Russians to agree to talks. In ordering the deployment, Johnson was not abandoning his efforts for arms talks and an arms agreement with the Soviet Union; rather, he was structuring the issue, making an American ABM deployment a way to get the very talks that both he and McNamara desired.

If the decision to order a deployment can be most clearly understood in terms of the conflicting pressures on the President, the precise nature of the deployment can be understood largely in terms of pressures within the bureaucracy below the President, constrained by the operating procedures of the Army and of the Pentagon as a whole. Although McNamara himself favored no deployment or a limited deployment, the staffs on which he had to depend to monitor and implement the President's decision were unanimous in their belief that an ABM system should be built that could grow into a large anti-Soviet system. His science adviser, John S. Foster, who would have to have the major role in monitoring both the research on the ABM system and its development and production, believed strongly that the option for a large system should be left open, as did Paul Nitze, McNamara's Deputy Secretary of Defense (following the departure of Cyrus Vance who more closely shared McNamara's views). The Army itself favored a big system. No imaginative thought had gone into the design of components for a specifically anti-Chinese system. In fact, the implementers were straining as hard as they could to design and deploy a system that could be expanded as far as possible. McNamara's power, as suggested above, was weak in this game; he lacked strong presidential directive as well as strong staff support to keep the system small. His primary attention was focused on Vietnam, and his days as Secretary of Defense were obviously numbered.

One of the truisms of bureaucracy is that it resists change. Innovation, when it occurs, must generally be explained. The history of the ABM appears to be an anomaly. McNamara, the defender of the status quo, had to take the initiative to prevent an ABM deployment, since

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the system seemed to be grinding inevitably towards it. The explanation for this lies in the fact that the system was heavily biased toward the deployment of new weapons systems under certain conditions; ABM deployment was not seen as change. A number of components of the rules of the game, the shared images, and the organizational procedures of the American government produced a situation from the time of the Korean War through the end of the 1960's in which the procurement of new systems was part of the routine.

As has already been noted, the budgetary process itself creates a unique set of pressures. The fact that ABM decisions had to be recorded in the budget meant that the issue would reach the President without any effort on the part of its proponents. This was particularly true because of the rule giving the JCS the right to appeal to the President any decision of the Secretary of Defense or the Budget Director. No other career service enjoys this right. Moreover, the President had to make a decision and announce it publicly, in keeping with a deadline brought about by the budget. To urge him to delay was equivalent to urging him to take a public stand against an ABM deployment at that time.

The operating rules of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as their access to congressional leaders and congressional committees, also produced a bias towards deployment of weapons systems that were favored strongly by one of the Services. Given strong Army support for an ABM, and given the judgment of scientists that it was technically feasible, unanimous JCS support for the system was forthcoming under the logrolling rules which the Chiefs had begun to use in the McNamara period. The fact that they would report their views to the Congress when asked meant that the President could not keep differences hidden and, in order to prevent a deployment, would have to challenge the JCS in public.

The sequence of the private decision-making process involving negotiations of the President and the Secretary of Defense with the Joint Chiefs also biased decisions toward deployment: the normal desires of the Budget Bureau to avoid expensive weapons systems, the skepticism of the scientists on the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the opposition of some parts of the State Department to a deployment could not be brought into play early enough in the process to affect presidential decisions.

Shared images which, according to official belief, dominated American society also biased the system towards an ABM deployment. There was a widely accepted view that the United States needed to have

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strategic superiority over the Soviet Union and that the United States needed to match any system the Soviets deployed. The general view was that the United States should deploy any strategic system which worked well and which appeared to have the prospect of reducing damage if war should occur. The existence of these shared views made it difficult to put forward arguments within the bureaucracy against an ABM deployment, and even more difficult to shape arguments which the President would consider to be effective with the Congress and with the public. Given this situation, the President had to be concerned with the domestic political effects—particularly on his prospects of re-election in 1968—if he appeared to be opening an ABM gap, failing to match the Soviet system, and giving up American nuclear superiority.

The organizational procedures of the Pentagon also tended to bias toward a decision to deploy. Research, both in the Army and in the Advanced Research Projects Agency, was dominated by scientists who believed that any feasible system should be deployed. Moreover, the focus tended to be on the greatest conceivable threat, and hence on designing a system against a large Soviet attack. In addition, the desire to make an effective case for deployment led to underestimates of cost and overestimates of feasibility.

McNamara seemed to recognize that, because of the constraints within the system, success was unlikely. Thus his effort had to be directed as much toward changing the long-standing strategic nuclear biases as toward devising a delaying action against deployment. Although he lost the short-run battle to prevent deployment or to deploy a system that could not grow into a large anti-Soviet system, his efforts to change the terms of the debate within the bureaucracy, with the Congress, and with the public were considerably more successful.

By 1969, President Nixon accepted nuclear sufficiency rather than superiority as the American goal. He also embraced, as his own, McNamara's arguments against an anti-Soviet system. He announced that the United States had no intention of deploying such a system, not only because it was technically infeasible, but also because such a system would threaten the Soviet deterrent. While he proceeded with a system that was against China and in defense of Minuteman sites, Nixon directed that it be designed so that it could not grow—nor appear to the Soviets that it could grow—into a large anti-Russian system. In part as a result of the arguments McNamara had made in his speech announcing the deployment, as well as of his posture statements, the attitude of the Senate changed dramatically on this range of issues.

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Perhaps the most successful conversion was that of the Russians. Kosygin had argued at Glassboro that ABM's were purely defensive weapons and that the American effort to prevent their deployment was immoral. However, by 1971 the Russians were pressing for an agreement at the strategic arms talks simply to limit ABM's. Even the fact that the talks were under way at all can be attributed to McNamara's efforts to prevent an ABM deployment.

Changes in the rules of the game and the shared images of the bureaucracy, the Congress, and the public have altered the biases of the system. However, the actions of the Nixon Administration can only be explained by considering the new set of players and their interests. It is a new tale, but one not unaffected by this one.

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Research Note

INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE VERSUS ROLE-CONSTRAINT IN POLICY-MAKING:

Senatorial Response to Secretaries Acheson and Dulles

By GLEN H. STASSEN*

FREQUENTLY debated, infrequently resolved, but crucial to the study of international relations is the issue of the relative influence of personal factors and role factors in decision-making. Are national decision-makers so constrained by their roles that they have little individual freedom? Or, conversely, are their policies shaped in major ways by their own individual preferences?[1]

The Rosenau Model

An obvious difficulty in dealing with these questions is the dearth of empirical tests. Where can one find comparable data about large numbers of foreign policy decision-makers in situations that are controlled for extraneous variables? Fortunately, an answer has been suggested by James Rosenau.[2] For his representative decision-makers, he selects United States Senators who are vocal on foreign policy; the Senators are fruitful subjects for research because they share similar contexts

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[1] See Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or The Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1968), xiii ff. and *passim*; Hoffmann, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, xci (Fall 1962), 668ff.; J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, xiv (October 1961), 77-92; Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics," *American Political Science Review*, lxi (September 1967), 629-41.

[2] James Rosenau, "Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behavior of U. S. Senators," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1968), 17-50.

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and roles, and because data about their decisions are readily accessible.

The period Rosenau studies is 1949 to 1956—the period of the early growth of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the cold war; the period of the Hungarian and Suez crises, the Korean war, and the decision not to fight in Vietnam (in 1954). During this period, the Senate was influential in shaping the tenor and domestic context of policy-making. Indeed, the period got its name from a Senator—Joe McCarthy. As the administrations shaped new policies toward Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, they were sensitive to senatorial attitudes.

Rosenau has made a content analysis of the Senators' comments concerning the Secretary of State, as recorded in the *Congressional Record*. The Senators were obligingly loquacious, and he obtains a large statistical base: the content analysis covers six thousand senatorial comments about Secretaries Acheson and Dulles. These comments are a measure of three variables for each Senator: (1) his support for the Secretary, measured by the percentage of favorable comments minus the percentage of unfavorable ones; (2) his activism, measured by the number of comments per month; and (3) his "indiscriminateness," measured by the percentage of *ad hominem* rather than policy-oriented comments.

Rosenau has an objective and easily comparable empirical measure of three dependent variables, or outcomes. The proposition he wishes to test is whether each of these outcomes can be explained better by the Senators' individual qualities or by their roles. His answer is unequivocal: party and committee roles determine what the Senators say. The party role of a Senator determines whether he supports or opposes Acheson: if he is a Democrat, he will support him; if a Republican, he will oppose him. Likewise, the Senator's party role determines his degree of activism, measured by the number of times he makes comments about the Secretary in his speeches. Members of the opposition party are more vociferous in opposing the Secretary than members of the administration party are in supporting him. Finally, the role of member of the Foreign Relations Committee gives a Senator greater responsibility, fuller information, and more contact with the Secretary. The result is that committee members support the Secretary more than do non-members. Thus it is clear that at each point the outcome is determined by the Senator's role and not by his individual qualities or preferences. For simplicity, we can postpone Rosenau's treatment of the third dependent variable, indiscriminate remarks.

Because of his intriguing use of empirical methods to move the role-

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versus-individual question beyond ideology toward objectivity, Rosenau's study is receiving well-deserved notice as, for example, "one of the few systematic studies which sheds light on questions of this type."[3] The study, however, suffers from an important omission. Although the title, the argumentation, and the conclusion all announce that the point is to compare potency of role and individual variables, *no comparison is made.* The essay attempts to explain as much as possible concerning the Senators' references to the Secretary in terms of the role variables. The effort is difficult: three or four key hypotheses are negated; others are weak. In spite of these deficiencies in his role variables, however, Rosenau does not define an operational individual variable and then compare its power with the power of the role variables.

The omission is partly due to Rosenau's conclusion that the role model predicts outcomes so well that no individual variable is likely to approach its power. He is aware of the Senators' personal policy beliefs, as he shows in his discussion of their *ad hominem* remarks. A comparison, nevertheless, is still missing. The basis for the conclusion that roles are more powerful than preferences is lacking. It is the intention of the present study to complete the comparison and to test the alternative hypothesis.[4] In order to do that, we shall develop and test a rival cognitive processing model for individual variables.

An Individual Belief-Set Model

One reason for Rosenau's omission may be that the method for making individual variables operational is not well developed. We could gather biographical data; or we could try to determine personality types; or we could seek to determine attitudes on various issues. But which level—biographical, personality, or attitudinal—will be most promising? Will the necessary information be available? And what

[3] Ole Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* III (March 1970), 157n. See also Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review,* LXV (September 1971), 690-91; Lijphart singles out Rosenau's study as "a particularly instructive example. . . . It is one of very many ways in which an imaginative investigator can devise fruitful applications of the comparative method."

[4] Too seldom does one researcher respond to another's work on the same issue and with the same ground rules so that the research meets head-on. That is the goal I am seeking. It may be of interest that Rosenau has responded with full open-mindedness and in friendly fashion, writing that the effort "excites me considerably, as that is how the game of science ought to be played and so rarely is." I agree. Moreover, he has gone the second mile, lending his original data and encouraging my dissent.

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method is likely to develop a typology comparable to Rosenau's role typology?

Help may be on the way. Recent research by Steinbruner, Jervis, Holsti, George, McLellan, Deutsch, and others transfers widely accepted and experimentally based cognitive dissonance theory from psychology to international relations.[5] The theory suggests that cognitive images are important for all men, and especially for foreign policy decision-makers. In foreign policy situations that are typically fraught with uncertainty, statesmen are bombarded with conflicting evidence, must cope with gaps in information, and are required to make most decisions rapidly. They must depend on pre-set cognitive images to process information, to order, understand, remember, and interpret it, and to reach judgments quickly. The cognitive images they bring to the situation shape the order and relationships that they perceive, the orientation toward the environment that they assume, and the expectations, perceptions, and values that guide their behavior.

According to cognitive theory, the *strongest* images have several identifiable characteristics: (1) They are learned in the early period of a decision-maker's political or professional career. (2) They are confirmed and strengthened by repeated use in making sense of events: strong belief-sets apply to many events. (3) Usually they are organized around a physical image or a historical analogy, like the dumbbell picture of Atlantic partnership, the entanglement picture of isolationism, or the Munich and Kremlin images of hard-liners. (4) They are not merely private and idiosyncratic; they center in images and events that are public and widely shared. Furthermore, decision-makers seek repeated confirmation of their beliefs by association with like-minded decision-makers. They group together and influence one another's perceptions. Therefore, it should be possible to cluster decision-makers into groups or types with similar inference patterns and to develop a typology.

But the types are likely to be more sophisticated than merely liberal and conservative. "Liberalism" does not name a physical or historical image at the center of a belief-set. There are liberals and conservatives of many different sorts. *Isolationism*, however, does fit the four cogni-

[5] John Steinbruner, draft of forthcoming book tentatively titled *Decision Processes Under Complexity*; Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 454-79; chap. 2, by Ole Holsti, in Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago 1967); and Karl Deutsch, *Nerves of Government* (New York 1966), chaps. 1, 5, 6, 13, and 14. See also the operational code studies of George, Holsti, and McLellan discussed below.

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tive processing criteria. It centers on an image of a United States "disentangled" from European power politics. Its opposite is *alliance-support*, which is similarly rooted in a concrete image and in a history of controversial events. The controversy over isolationism was the central foreign policy issue during the early career of many of the Senators selected by Rosenau, and it continued to provide the framework for interpreting subsequent events. Another central belief-set for these Senators was the cold war. Certainly by the time of the Truman Doctrine, Senators were perceiving many events either from a hard-line *cold-warrior* perspective, or from a more *moderate* perspective. Hard-line cold-warriors have no lack of concrete images.

Therefore a promising way to classify Senators by individual cognitive belief-sets is to measure their attitudes on these two dimensions —isolationism and the cold war. This can be done with Guttman scales of their roll call votes in the 82nd Congress—the final two years of Acheson's tenure as Secretary of State.[6] The results of this procedure indicate that the Senators do cluster into a few fairly like-minded types, as cognitive theory would predict. The distribution of the Senators who were "articulates," i.e., who made at least ten remarks about the Secretary in four years, is represented in Table 1, and listed in Tables 2 and

[6] The Guttman procedure is described by George Belknap and Charles Farris in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe 1959), 388-413.

The following votes scaled on the cold-war dimension:
(1) Oppose new draft law with deferrals for most students and eighteen-year-olds, *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (1951), 314, vote No. 4.
(2) Oppose merging military and economic aid under Mutual Security Administration, *ibid.* (1951), 265, vote No. 8.
(3) Cut MSA funds by $1 billion, *ibid.* (1952), 182, vote No. 8.
(4) Terminate aid to any country shipping to Soviet bloc, *ibid.* (1951), 266, vote No. 3.
(5) Oppose Act making termination of aid discretionary, *ibid.* (1951), 266, vote No. 2.
(6) Cut MSA funds by $500 million, *ibid.* (1952), 183, vote No. 1.
(7) Cut MSA funds by $200 million, *ibid.* (1952), 183, vote No. 6.
(8) Terminate aid to any country shipping to Soviet bloc, *ibid.* (1952), 183, vote No. 7.
(9) No MSA funds may be used for publicity in the U.S., *ibid.* (1952), 183, vote No. 5.

The following votes scaled on the isolationism dimension:
(1) Oppose convention on relations with West Germany, *ibid.* (1952), 182, vote No. 4.
(2) Oppose security pact with Japan, *ibid.* (1952), 182, vote No. 2.
(3-6) Oppose peace treaty with Japan favoring the United Nations and limiting U.S. sovereignty over its foreign policy, *ibid.* (1952), 177, votes No. 1, 5, 6, 7.
(7) Cut European economic aid by $500 million, *ibid.* (1951), 264, vote No. 1.
(8) Cut European economic aid by $250 million, *ibid.* (1951), 264, vote No. 4.
(9) Oppose sending troops to Europe without congressional approval, *ibid.* (1951), 63, vote No. 1.
(10) Require all aid to India be a loan, not grant, and require India to provide strategic materials for the U.S., *ibid.* (1951), 259, vote No. 5.
(11) Oppose restoring foreign aid to full $8.5 billion requested by President, *ibid.* (1951), 264, vote No. 2.

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4, in the "Individual Preference Variable" column.[7] For simplicity, we shall refer to the types as IC (Isolationist Cold-warriors), C (Cold-warriors who were ambivalent on isolationism), AM (Alliance-supporters who were Moderate on the cold war), etc.

TABLE 1

TYPOLOGY OF ARTICULATE SENATORS, COMBINING ISOLATIONISM AND COLD-WAR SCALES

	I *Isolationist*	*Ambivalent*	A *Alliance-supporter*
C *Cold-warrior*	IC Bricker, R Capehart, R Dirksen, R Jenner, R Kem, R Langer, R Malone, R J. McCarthy, R Welker, R Wherry, R	C Bridges, R Cain, R Ferguson, R Hickenlooper, R Mundt, R Taft, R Watkins, R	AC Knowland, R Thye, R (Vandenberg?), R
M *Moderate on the cold war*	IM McCarran, D	M Brewster, R	AM Benton, D Connally, D Cooper, R Douglas, D Fulbright, D Gillette, D Humphrey, D Kefauver, D Lehman, D Mansfield, D McMahon, D Morse, R-D O'Mahoney, D Smith (NJ), R Sparkman, D Vandenberg, R Wiley, R

R = Republican
D = Democrat

That the Guttman scales do tap the Senators' belief-sets is predicated on the following factors:

1) The Guttman scale technique is an objective test of unidimensionality. Good one-dimensional legislative scales usually achieve a

[7] Senators Cooper, Mansfield, Vandenberg, and Richard Neuberger were not in the 82nd Congress, and therefore could not be ranked by their votes. However, the positions of Senators Cooper and Mansfield were well known. They already had deep commitments to a moderate and alliance-supporting policy. Therefore they could be ranked with some confidence as alliance-supporting moderates before John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State. Senator Vandenberg was clearly an alliance-supporter. His cold-war attitudes were sometimes moderate and sometimes rigid. Senator Neuberger's earlier foreign policy views were less well known; he is therefore left unranked. He contributed fewer references to the Secretary than any other articulate Senator, and thus should not skew the distribution. An independent test, using informed observers, was made as described below. The observers unanimously ranked Senators Cooper, Mansfield, and Neuberger as alliance-supporting moderates in 1952.

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reproducibility coefficient above .95, and .90 is considered acceptable. The maximum possible is 1.0. High levels of reproducibility indicate that the votes do measure a single, consistent attitude dimension, because a conflicting mixture of different constituency, coalition, and attitude pressures would move in tangential directions, causing more non-scale votes and lower reproducibility. In the present case, we achieve a remarkably high reproducibility of .994 and .997. More significant than reproducibility is the measure of scalability. Scalability of .5 and .6 would be acceptable; the maximum is 1.0. We achieve .985 and .992. We have, therefore, an unusually strong indication that each scale does measure a single attitude dimension. Moreover, numerous other studies in other time periods confirm that an isolationism dimension[8] and a cold-war dimension[9] are scalable, consistent, and durable over time.

2) According to cognitive processing theory, these two issue-areas are the sort that should call belief-sets into operation. Furthermore, the observed clustering of Senators into two or three like-minded groups confirms the prediction that belief-sets would not vary at random but would cluster into types.

3) Miller and Stokes have shown that there is "no discernible agreement . . . whatever" between constituency attitudes and Congressmen's votes on foreign policy issues (in contrast to issues of civil rights and social welfare).[10] Instead there was striking agreement between Con-

[8] See Farris's contribution to Wahlke and Eulau (fn. 6); Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (March 1963), 48-49; Leroy Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939–1958," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (September 1964), 577-88; Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1958), 232-37; Lee F. Anderson, "Variability in Unidimensionality of Legislative Voting," *Journal of Politics*, XXVI (August 1964), 568-85; H. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different?" in Polsby, Dentler, and Smith, eds., *Politics and Social Life* (Boston 1963), 751-56; Charles H. Gray, "A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson, and Goldwater, 1957–1960," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (September 1965), 615 and 620.

[9] Gray, *ibid.*, 615 and 619; Stephen A. Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy in the House of Representatives," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII (September 1959), 360-61; and Stephen J. Cimbala, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: A Roll Call Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (March 1969), 148-56.

[10] Miller and Stokes (fn. 8). Nevertheless, one may still suspect that organized groups (if not popular attitudes) in a Senator's constituency, as well as his party membership, are among the influences that help him shape his attitudes, which in turn guide his foreign policy voting. Compare George Robert Boynton, "Southern Conservatism: Constituency Opinion and Congressional Voting," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIX (Summer 1965), 259-69; Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," *American Political Science Review*, LX (March 1966), 69-70, and the responses, *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1968), 1258-64 and 1269-71; Rieselbach (fn. 8); Cobb (fn. 9), 358-69.

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gressmen's voting and the attitudes of the Congressmen themselves, as determined by confidential interviews. If this is true of Representatives, it is even more likely to be true of Senators, who specialize more in foreign policy and less in constituency relations.

4) An informal and low-cost method for estimating belief-set types is to ask informed observers, particularly if they are themselves participants in the decision-making process. I asked five participant-observers, who are widely acknowledged as being perceptive and informed, to rate the personal beliefs of the twenty-six articulate Senators who continued into the Dulles period. The consensus of the informed observers agreed with the scalogram in every case but two: Thye and McCarran. There the disagreement was only partial. Three observers rated Thye as an isolationist, and four rated McCarran as a cold-warrior.

5) Finally, we can test whether or not the scales measure individual belief-sets or merely party loyalties by referring to the evidence after 1953. As we shall see, the scales continue to predict the behavior of the Senators after the administration changes from Democrat to Republican. This means they tap something durable (central belief-sets) rather than something that reverses when administrations change (party-support).

We now have an individual preference typology that classifies the Senators by attitudes. Therefore we can propose a cognitive model, as pictured in Figure 1. The model's first hypothesis is that the Senator's belief-set will determine whether he supports or opposes the Secretary. For example, Senators Humphrey and Wiley are both alliance-supporting moderates (AM). They will perceive Acheson as an alliance-supporting moderate; this will agree with their belief-sets, and they will both support him, in spite of Wiley's being a Republican. A second hypothesis is that cross-pressure between belief-set and party role will cause Senators to decrease their activity. Cross-pressure creates dissonance, and cognitive theory predicts that people will avoid dissonance by avoiding the issue that creates it. For example, by belief-set Senator Wiley agrees with Acheson; but by party he disagrees. Because of this conflict, he will comment on Acheson less often than will Jenner, whose party and belief-set both point in the same direction. A third hypothesis is that indiscriminate remarks follow the same pattern as activism, for reasons to be noted later.

Here, then, is a cognitive processing model whose accuracy in predicting or explaining senatorial response to the Secretaries of State can be compared at each point with Rosenau's role model. In the role

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FIGURE 1

THE COGNITIVE OR BELIEF-SET MODEL



model, four major propositions are developed: (1) party role and support for the Secretary; (2) Foreign Relations Committee Membership and support for the Secretary; (3) activism; and (4) indiscriminate or *ad hominem* remarks. We shall compare the rival models against the data on each proposition in turn.

THE TWO MODELS COMPARED

I. BELIEF-SET VERSUS PARTY ROLE AND SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY

The first individual preference proposition is that belief-set determines whether a Senator supports or opposes the Secretary of State. In order to test this, we need to classify Secretary Acheson on the belief-set dimensions. Fortunately, David S. McLellan has already done

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TABLE 2

THE ARTICULATES IN THE ACHESON ERA (1949–1952)

Senator	*Party*	*Individual Preference Variable*	*% Favorable References Minus % Unfavorable*	*References Per Month*	*% Indiscriminate References*
		THE SUPPORTING ARTICULATES			
McMahon*	D	AM	75.0	1.2	42.4
Benton	D	AM	73.4	3.8	21.6
Pepper	D	(not in 82nd)	71.4	0.7	60.0
Lehman	D	AM	68.5	2.1	32.4
Vandenberg*	R	AM	69.2	1.8	53.3
Humphrey	D	AM	66.1	1.7	46.3
Connally*	D	AM	54.1	4.1	43.0
Wiley*	R	AM	49.0	1.4	28.0
Lucas	D	(not in 82nd)	46.5	2.8	4.0
Fulbright*	D	AM	22.9	1.6	39.1
Hickenlooper*	R	C	7.4	1.5	84.2
Kefauver	D	AM	6.2	0.9	—
Smith (NJ)*	R	AM	6.2	1.3	30.0
		THE OPPOSING ARTICULATES			
Donnel	R	(not in 82nd)	—34.0	2.4	—
McCarran	D	IM	—34.2	1.0	7.7
Morse	R	AM	—35.4	2.8	2.2
Watkins	R	C	—42.4	2.2	2.9
Knowland	R	AC	—46.9	3.6	4.2
Ferguson	R	C	—47.1	1.9	3.1
Langer	R	IC	—49.0	1.4	12.9
Cain	R	C	—52.8	3.5	8.1
Brewster	R	M	—60.2	2.4	8.2
Mundt	R	C	—67.3	1.6	17.5
Bricker	R	IC	—75.0	0.8	23.8
Capehart	R	IC	—77.6	1.6	20.0
Kem	R	IC	—78.5	4.1	23.1
Wherry	R	IC	—78.7	8.8	16.3
Bridges	R	C	—83.5	2.2	34.9
Taft	R	C	—84.1	2.3	14.5
Dirksen	R	IC	—84.6	1.6	22.7
Malone	R	IC	—90.8	9.6	12.4
J. McCarthy	R	IC	—95.4	9.0	38.9
Jenner	R	IC	—96.2	5.8	20.3
Welker	R	IC	—100	1.0	43.7

* Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
D = Democrat; R = Republican.
I = Isolationist; A = Alliance-supporter.
C = Cold-warrior; M = Moderate on cold war.
Indiscriminate references are remarks that refer to the Secretary's personal qualities rather than to his policies or performance.
References per month, % favorable and unfavorable, and % indiscriminate, are from Rosenau's data (fn. 2), 34, 35, and 41. I have subtracted the unfavorable percentage from the favorable, and have ranked the Senators by this index of support.

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this in his study of Acheson's operational code.[11] Acheson's first priority was building a strong and united European alliance. In terms of our definition of belief-sets, this is what isolationists abhorred and alliance-supporters supported. Therefore isolationists should oppose Acheson, and alliance-supporters should support him. McLellan also indicates that Acheson ranged from mixed to moderate on cold-war issues, at least at that time, and in relation to the Senate of that day. He had an antagonistic view of the Soviet Union, but saw the antagonism more as a power politics rivalry than as a moral crusade. His central concern was to build up Western Europe's unity and military strength, but he did not advocate a rollback in Eastern Europe, or massive retaliation. He favored coexistence. Moreover, he opposed last-ditch attempts to bolster Chiang Kai-shek's failing regime and renounced American intentions to defend South Korea. Therefore the belief-set hypothesis is straightforward: Acheson should receive opposition from cold-war Senators and mixed support from moderates.

These hypotheses are confirmed by Rosenau's data. Acheson was supported by alliance-supporting moderates (AM) ten to one. They averaged 27.3 more favorable than unfavorable references per Senator. If we apply the t test for statistical significance, we find that $p < .025$; $t = 2.47$, $df = 10$. (That is, the probability is less than .025 that this result was merely a statistical accident; the t test variable was computed to be 2.47 and the number of degrees of freedom [df] was 10. See footnote 12 for further information.) We would expect Acheson to be opposed by cold-warriors (C) and by isolationists (IM and IC). He was, eighteen to one. They averaged 43.3 and 128 more unfavorable than favorable remarks ($p < .005$ in each case). Knowland (AC) and McCarran (IM) would be expected to be somewhat ambivalent, and they were, opposing Acheson less consistently than the cold-warriors or the isolationists. Thus each prediction is correct. In each case the result is well beyond the usually accepted .05 level of statistical significance. And the percentage of variance explained (w^2) is high: 24 per cent, 50 per cent, and 42 per cent.[12]

Our model proposes that, because isolationists formed their beliefs

[11] McLellan, "Comparative 'Operational Codes' of Recent U.S. Secretaries of State: Dean Acheson," paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-6, 1969.

[12] For comparisons between two means, one can compensate for the permissiveness of the t test by estimated w^2, the amount of variance accounted for by the independent variable. Here we have a highly satisfactory 24%, 50%, and 42% of the variance explained. See William Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York 1963), 323-29.

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TABLE 3

BELIEF-SET PREDICTS SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION FOR ACHESON

Hypothesis	*Mean Number of Favorable Minus Unfavorable Remarks*	$p <$	t	*df (Degrees of Freedom)*	ω^2 *(Variance Accounted for)*
AM Senators support Acheson	27.3	.025	2.47	10	
IM and AC ambivalent	—36.5	.20	1.49	1	
C oppose Acheson	—43.3	.005	4.33	6	
IC oppose Acheson	—128.0	.005	3.35	9	
IM and AC oppose Acheson more than AM	53.8	.025	2.27	11	.24
C oppose Acheson more than AM	70.6	.0005	4.40	16	.50
IC oppose Acheson more than AM	155.3	.0005	4.06	19	.42

early in their professional careers, isolationism should be a particularly strong belief. The absolute and fervent opposition expressed toward Acheson by isolationists is remarkable: They made seven cordial remarks and 1,286 hostile ones. Even Senator McCarran, who, like Acheson, was a Democrat and a moderate, was nevertheless an isolationist; he opposed Acheson thirteen to one.

If we now turn to Rosenau's party-role proposition, we find that it, too, shows some success in predicting. If party is the determinative factor, Democrats can be expected to have supported Acheson. Nine of them did. But these nine should also have supported Acheson if belief-set is the determinative factor; they were all alliance-supporting moderates, as Acheson was. Only one Democrat had a belief-set that diverged from Acheson's: McCarran, an isolationist moderate. Belief-set prevailed over his Democratic party role; he opposed Acheson. Party role would also predict that Republican Senators should oppose Acheson. Twenty did. But eighteen of them were cold-warriors, and their opposition can be explained by belief-set as well. There were four Republicans whose belief-set (AM) agreed with Acheson's. For three of the four Republicans, belief-set prevailed over party role; they supported the Democratic Secretary. Thus party role does achieve some success in predicting, but only in those cases where its prediction agrees with belief-set. Where it disagrees with belief-set (McCarran and the four AM Republicans), it fails, and belief-set prevails.

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Thus the belief-set model shows some advantage over the party-role model. However, in the Acheson period the belief-set and party variables converge too closely for the conclusion to be decisive. The critical

TABLE 4

THE ARTICULATES IN THE DULLES ERA (1953–1956)

Senator	*Party*	*Individual Preference Variable*	*% Favorable References Minus % Unfavorable*	*References Per Month*	*% Indiscriminate References*
		THE SUPPORTING ARTICULATES			
Thye	R	AC	88.5	0.8	17.4
Ferguson*	R	C	78.3	1.4	0.0
Hickenlooper*	R	C	75.9	0.9	18.2
Wiley*	R	AM	75.6	5.3	22.8
Knowland*	R	AC	71.5	3.6	22.1
Capehart*	R	IC	71.0	1.0	9.1
Smith (NJ)*	R	AM	70.6	7.1	12.8
Dirksen	R	IC	50.1	1.1	50.0
Neuberger	D	(not in 82nd)	36.3	0.7	0.0
Sparkman*	D	AM	35.2	1.1	12.5
Cooper	R	AM	28.5	1.2	20.0
Kefauver	D	AM	12.6	1.8	0.0
		THE OPPOSING ARTICULATES			
Langer*	R	IC	— 1.3	2.3	10.0
Bricker	R	IC	— 4.7	2.0	7.4
Mansfield*	D	AM	— 6.3	4.9	3.1
Gillette*	D	AM	—25.0	1.2	0.0
J. McCarthy	R	IC	—33.9	2.3	0.0
Lehman	D	AM	—35.8	1.7	7.1
Humphrey*	D	AM	—38.5	8.4	3.2
Douglas	D	AM	—43.0	2.3	11.6
McCarran	D	IM	—46.6	2.7	4.0
Morse*	D	AM	—54.0	4.3	14.3
Fulbright*	D	AM	—66.7	2.3	12.7
O'Mahoney	D	AM	—68.2	1.3	10.3
Malone	R	IC	—75.5	3.3	9.2
Jenner	R	IC	—91.7	1.9	16.4

* Member of the Commitee on Foreign Relations.
I = Isolationist; A = Alliance-supporter.
C = Cold-warrior; M = Moderate on cold war.
For other explanations, see Table 2.

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tests come during the Dulles period, when role and individual variables diverge.

The Acheson and Dulles periods, as Rosenau suggests, resembled each other to a remarkable extent. The cold war, the building of alliances, containment, national security, and power politics were the focus of both Secretaries. Dulles and Acheson had similar backgrounds in Ivy League colleges, eastern law schools, and large corporation law firms. Both men had strong convictions and forensic ability. Both worked in the midst of heated controversy over McCarthy and China. Both had the firm support of their Presidents.

These periods therefore bring us closer to the conditions of a controlled experiment than we usually come in history and politics. Very few major variables in foreign policy changed when the administration shifted from Democrat to Republican. One important variable that did change was the belief-set of the new Secretary: Dulles was a more rigid cold-warrior. In a companion piece to David McLellan's study of Acheson, Ole Holsti has described Dulles's operational code.[13] He points out that Dulles advocated rollback in Eastern Europe, brinkmanship, a rigid containment policy, massive nuclear retaliation, and extensive American military intervention in the Vietnam war in 1954. He was negative toward negotiations, toward efforts for arms control or tension reduction, and toward coexistence. On the alliance-support dimension, Dulles was an isolationist in the 1930's, but he changed during the war to a somewhat more internationalist position. He was energetic in maintaining NATO and in building SEATO and other cold-war alliances. In sum, Holsti describes Dulles as an alliance-supporter and a cold-warrior. The belief-set hypotheses are, therefore, that Dulles will be supported by alliance-supporters and cold-warriors, and opposed by isolationists and moderates.

The other major variable that changed, of course, was party role. Rosenau hypothesizes that Republicans should support Dulles, and Democrats should oppose him. This role prediction conflicts with the preference prediction, and several critical tests arise. Democrats did oppose Dulles, nine to three. They averaged 33.8 more unfavorable than favorable remarks ($p < .005$, $t = 4.37$, $df = 11$). As Rosenau reports, however, his expectation that Republicans would support Dulles was not upheld by the data. Republicans split nine to five. They averaged more favorable than unfavorable remarks, but the difference was significant only at $p < .10$, $t = 1.44$, $df = 13$. The reason is clear on belief-set grounds: All five Republicans who opposed Dulles were isola-

[13] Holsti (fn. 3), 129-30, 132, 145-53.

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tionists. Their beliefs overcame their roles. Those who supported him were either alliance-supporters, cold-warriors, or both.

TABLE 5

BELIEF-SET PREDICTS SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION FOR DULLES

Hypothesis	*Mean Number of Favorable Minus Unfavorable Remarks*	$p<$	t	df	w^2
C and AC support Dulles	36.5	.05	2.35	3	
AM ambivalent toward Dulles	—0.4	1.0	.02	12	
IM and IC oppose Dulles with some ambivalence	—20.0	.10	1.59	7	
AM oppose Dulles more than C and AC	36.9	.20	.098	15	0.0
IM and IC oppose Dulles more than C and AC	56.5	.025	2.69	10	.34

Predictions based on individual preference do significantly better than those based on role: All are in the expected direction. The two cold-warriors (C) and the two alliance-supporting cold-warriors (AC) all supported Dulles, a fellow AC. They gave him 146 favorable remarks and three unfavorable ones ($p < .05$, $t = 2.35$, $df = 3$). The alliance-supporting moderates were ambivalent, as predicted, ending in a virtual tie (488 favorable references to 493 unfavorable).

The Republican isolationist cold-warriors (IC) present a particularly interesting critical test. By role, as Republicans, they should support Dulles; by belief-set, they should oppose him. Our belief-set model proposes that their isolationism should be stronger than their cold-war attitudes because it was formed earlier in their careers and had been used to interpret more events. They should therefore oppose the alliance-supporting Dulles in spite of his being a fellow cold-warrior and Republican. As predicted, they opposed him, five to two. They averaged eighteen more hostile than cordial remarks per Senator; together with the Democratic isolationist, McCarran, their average was twenty ($p < .10, t = 1.59, df = 7$). Their isolationism was strong enough to sweep both their cold-war attitudes and their Republican party loyalties before it.

Furthermore, the rank order of degree of support runs exactly as would be expected on the basis of individual preferences. AC Senators have belief-sets that are fully in accord with Dulles's AC rating; they can therefore be expected to support him more strongly than do other

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Senators. They average fifty-three more favorable than unfavorable comments per Senator. Next should come the C's; they average twenty. AM Senators have a cross-pressure situation, and should be in the middle; they average —0.4. IC Senators should oppose Dulles; they average —17.9. The isolationist moderate (McCarran) disagrees with Dulles on both dimensions, and should oppose him most strongly; he averages —35.

2. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY

Rosenau's second general proposition is that the role of membership on the Foreign Relations Committee leads Senators to support the Secretary. Members have more information, more personal contact with the Secretary, and more responsibility for policy. Table 2 shows that this has strong plausibility. Every articulate Senator on the committee supported Secretary Acheson. This included four Republicans who rejected their party role to support a Democratic Secretary. Rosenau concludes that the one difference between committee members and non-members is the committee role, and that this role causes the greater support. However, this conclusion bears examining. The belief-set data for articulate Senators show that no member of the Foreign Relations Committee was an isolationist and that only one was a cold-warrior. The membership was thoroughly skewed; because the members were alliance-supporting moderates like Acheson, they should have supported him on grounds of individual preference regardless of their role, as did all other AM Senators who were not on the committee.

To penetrate through the spuriousness we need to raise a further question. How did the committee members become alliance-supporting moderates? Did their role transform their individual beliefs, or did their prior beliefs cause them to be selected for membership on the committee? From 1937 through 1952, when isolationism threatened the foreign policy of the administration, the Foreign Relations Committee members who were selected were already safe internationalists. During that period, twenty-nine new members were added to the committee. One (Nye) came from one of the six traditionally isolationist states (North Dakota).[14] Seventeen came from the Atlantic seaboard where internationalism was strongest. Furthermore, only eleven of the twenty-nine were Republicans; of these, eight came from New England, Penn-

[14] The six traditionally isolationist states in senatorial representation were North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Idaho, and Nevada, according to Ralph H. Smucker, "The Region of Isolationism," *American Political Science Review*, XLVII (June 1953), 386-401.

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sylvania and New Jersey.[15] These twenty-nine Senators were overwhelmingly weighted by region and party toward internationalism before they were selected for the committee. Indeed, they appear to have been systematically selected precisely because of their prior propensity to support internationalist policies and Secretaries of State. When they subsequently supported Secretary Acheson, we can hardly conclude that it was their role as committee members rather than their own already established preferences that worked the magic. It seems clear that their prior belief-set enabled them to obtain the role of committee member, and guided their subsequent response to the Secretary and his policies. Role did not determine belief-set; belief-set determined role.

The priority of belief-set can be confirmed further when the beliefs of the new Secretary, Dulles, diverged from the beliefs of many committee members. The committee itself also became more diverse. Five new Republicans were added to the committee: Langer, Ferguson, and Capehart from the Midwest, Knowland from California, and Aiken from Vermont. Two Democrats were added: Humphrey of Minnesota and Mansfield of Montana.

For the Dulles period, Rosenau proposes three committee-role hypotheses. The first is that members of the Foreign Relations Committee should be more cordial toward Dulles than should non-members. He reports that this hypothesis was confirmed. However, he computes cordiality by the *number* of favorable comments. And he compares the nineteen Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee with all the 102 that were not on the committee during the period, of whom only thirteen referred to the Secretary ten times or more in four years. Thus he unintentionally measures not only the cordiality, but the greater *activity* of committee members. It is a truism that members of the Foreign Relations Committee tend to make more speeches about foreign

[15] The data are from the *Congressional Record* for the years 1937–1952. There are several probable explanations for this selection process. One is self-selection: internationalists have a greater interest in foreign relations and are more likely to choose this committee rather than Armed Services or Agriculture. A second is the almost one-party character, during this period, of New England for Republicans and the Southeast for Democrats: high seniority came more easily for Senators from the eastern seaboard. Appointment to the Foreign Relations Committee requires a higher seniority than any other committee. A third explanation is leadership persuasion: Senate leaders, concerned about internationalist foreign policy, can persuade isolationists with seniority to choose other committees and, when that fails, can persuade internationalists with higher seniority to choose the committee, thus bumping the application of an isolationist. See Nelson W. Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 34n, 40, 43, and 45; Donald R. Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill 1960), 127-28. Matthews found that the Foreign Relations Committee was more like-minded on roll call votes than any other committee (*ibid.*, 168).

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policy than non-members; their greater activism on foreign policy issues is an extraneous factor, and is not what Rosenau intends to measure.

There is a way to eliminate this extraneous factor. Committee members who were articulate should be compared with non-committee members who were articulate, i.e., who made more than ten remarks about the Secretary. When we compare articulates with articulates, Rosenau's hypothesis is not confirmed. Committee members did not support Dulles significantly more than non-members. The overall tendency was in the right direction, but it was very mixed. The statistical significance was low ($p < .25$, $t = 0.8$, $df = 24$).

Rosenau's second hypothesis concerning committee members is that Democrats on the committee should be less hostile toward Dulles than Democrats not on the committee. This hypothesis fares no better than the first. Rosenau reports: "The behavior of Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee was strikingly contrary to what had been anticipated. . . . They were not less hostile toward Dulles than their fellow Democrats, but, in fact, the mean difference between their favorable and unfavorable references indicated significantly greater hostility: the mean for the nine committee members was —19.7, while that for the fifty-two non-members was —3.9 ($t = 2.73$; $df = 59$; $p < .01$)."

The reason for the failures of Rosenau's hypothesis in the Dulles period may be found in the differences of belief-set. The new Secretary's belief-set was not in agreement with the belief-sets of all the members of the committee. All the members who were cold-warriors (C and AC) supported Dulles, a fellow cold-warrior; but internationalist moderates (AM) opposed him five to three. Senators followed their belief-sets, not their roles.

The third committee-role hypothesis was confirmed. Articulate Republican committee members supported Dulles more than did articulate Republican non-members. This is readily explained by belief-set. The Republican committee members were either cold-warriors, alliance-supporters, or both. They supported Dulles, a fellow alliance-supporting cold-warrior, more than did Republican non-members; many of the non-members were isolationists and thus disagreed with Dulles by belief-set.

3. ACTIVISM

Rosenau's third proposition is that the activism of the Senators in supporting or opposing the Secretary is a function of party role. Opposition party members are more active than administration party

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members. This fits the Acheson era well. The Republicans made 2,665 references, the Democrats only 837. In the Dulles period, however, the proposition runs into trouble and fails.[16]

Our alternative proposition is that activism is an inverse function of cross-pressure between party role and individual preference. The Republicans who contributed the high degree of activity in the Acheson period were isolationist cold-warriors. For them, party and role enhanced one another. They averaged 4.4 references per month. By contrast, Republicans whose belief-set led them to support Acheson were far less active. They averaged 1.4 references per month, significantly below the average of 2.95 for other Senators.

Republican isolationists could oppose Acheson without conflict, but the same Senators had mixed loyalties toward Dulles. They wanted to support their fellow Republican, but their isolationist belief-set pulled them the other way. Their activism may therefore be expected to decrease; it does, by an average of 2.08 remarks per month.

TABLE 6

ACTIVISM DECREASES WITH CROSS-PRESSURE IN ROLE AND BELIEF-SET

Hypothesis	*Difference in Number of References Per Senator Per Month*	$p<$	t	df	w^2
Republican IC more active toward Acheson than toward Dulles.	2.08	.10	1.53	14	.08
Republican AC and Democratic IM more active toward Dulles than toward Acheson.	0.733	1.0	0.565	4	0.0
Sum: Senators without cross-pressure more active than Senators with cross-pressure.	1.70	.06	1.65	20	.07

Similarly, Democratic isolationists (IM) and Republican alliance-supporters (AC) may be expected to have experienced cross-pressure while Acheson (AM) was Secretary of State. But when Dulles became Secretary, their preferences and their party role enhanced each other. Cross-pressure was removed; they increased their activity by 0.733 remarks per month.

There are two ways to understand the source of the cross-pressure.

[16] Rosenau (fn. 2), 42.

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We have described it as conflict between roles and belief-sets, but it can be understood equally well without mentioning roles—simply as conflict between the two dimensions of the belief-sets. In each situation where we notice cross-pressure between role and belief-set, conflict is also present between the two dimensions of the belief-set itself. For example, an IC evaluating Dulles (AC) has cross-pressure purely on belief-set grounds. His belief-set cross-pressure or dissonance is removed when he judges Acheson (AM). In either case, the point is that belief-set is indispensable in explaining the Senators' activism.

4. *Ad Hominem* REMARKS

Rosenau's fourth proposition predicts which Senators will move beyond general references to the Secretary and his policies, and will refer instead to his personality. He proposes that *ad hominem* or indiscriminate remarks have their source in "personal policy beliefs . . . of high attitudinal intensity." Because he bases this proposition on personal beliefs rather than roles, there is no need for a rival proposition. The individual variable's potency is already granted. Rosenau suggests that the indiscriminate hostility toward Acheson came from Republican isolationists "whose personal policy beliefs were therefore so strongly opposed to the postwar extension of American commitments that they could not contain their discontent within the requirements of their party role."[17] Our belief-set data confirm this. We can add that Democrats (and Republicans) who were indiscriminately favorable were alliance-supporting moderates. And those with in-between belief-sets (IM, AC, M, and half of the C's) were discriminate.

We may develop the point further by hypothesizing that cross-pressure reduces intensity and therefore reduces *ad hominem* remarks, just as it reduces activism. The same Senators whose activism is reduced by dissonance or cross-pressure should show a similar reduction in indiscriminateness. This is confirmed by the data. The average reduction is 20.2 per cent, which is significant at $p < .05$ and $\omega^2 = 10$ per cent.

To recapitulate: We have seen that the cognitive model was consistently more potent than the role model. There were several critical tests. Every time the predictions diverged, the role model failed and belief-set succeeded. Role succeeded only when its predictions coincided with belief-set predictions. Belief-set predicted every outcome correctly. This was particularly clear when the two models diverged decisively, during the Dulles period: (1) For the party-support proposition, one hypothesis succeeded and the other failed. By contrast, all four cog-

[17] *Ibid.*, 38-39.

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TABLE 7

INDISCRIMINATE REMARKS DECREASE WITH DISSONANCE IN ROLE AND BELIEF-SET

Hypothesis	*Difference in % Indiscriminate References Per Senator*	$p<$	t	df	w^2
IC Senators more indiscriminate toward Acheson than toward Dulles.	24.75	.10	1.67	14	.10
AC and IM Senators more indiscriminate toward Dulles than toward Acheson.	8.0	.20	1.05	4	.02
Sum: Senators without dissonance more indiscriminate than Senators with dissonance.	20.18	.05	1.82	20	.10

nitive hypotheses succeeded. They were able to predict support, ambivalence, opposition, and the relative degree of support or opposition. (2) For the committee-role proposition, two hypotheses failed and one succeeded. The spurious correlation we noticed in the Acheson period became obvious in the Dulles period: the new Secretary being a cold-warrior, and new members being added to the committee, caused the variables to arrive at contradictory predictions. When the variables diverged, the Senators followed their belief-sets rather than their roles. (3) In predicting indiscriminate or *ad hominem* remarks, the role model conceded that belief-set is determinative. Our test confirmed this significantly.

If we extrapolate forward to the Johnson-Nixon era, beyond the limits of the study, we obtain an interesting result. The role theory would suggest that Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee such as Fulbright and Mansfield would support the policies of Johnson and Rusk in Vietnam, and that Senators Cooper, Aiken, and their fellow-Republicans would support Nixon and Rogers on issues like ABM and Vietnam. Predictions more wide of the mark, and senatorial foreign policy actions more significant, are not often found. By contrast, the individual preference typology predicts correctly. It shows Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, and Cooper already taking a moderate stance on the cold war by 1952; hence we should expect them to prefer the moderate, non-warrior stance on Vietnam and ABM, as they did in fact. It is difficult to refrain from concluding that the individual-preference typology is right on target.

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Conclusions

The potency of the cognitive processing model has been tested successfully. The simple individual preference typology explains what the role typology does, but more sharply; it explains what contradicts the role typology; and it explains what the role typology cannot touch.

The test to which we have subjected the cognitive model is one in which success was improbable. Rosenau selected the situation, defined the dependent variables, and found them to be role-determined. He concluded that in this situation individual variables did not make a significant contribution. That the simple cognitive model proved to be so powerful in this situation is therefore doubly significant.

The simplicity of the model's present application is obvious: we limited our test to two major categories in two dimensions—isolationism and the cold war. This is a drastic reduction of the complex belief-sets and policies of the thirty-five Senators and the two Secretaries. Yet the simple typology has strong predictive power across a period in which there was a change in party control, Secretaries of State, Presidents, and policies. How is this to be explained? First, the two dimensions were chosen on cognitive processing grounds: They were likely to be central and potent for these Senators. We hypothesized that these two dimensions would be the *operative* belief-sets—those which form the strongest resonance between the most central beliefs of the Senators and what they perceived to be the most salient actions of the Secretaries. Other policy dimensions or personal relations would not be perceived by the Senators as equally pertinent. Second, on cognitive processing grounds we hypothesized that the Senators would cluster into a small number of approximately like-minded types. Therefore a simple typology could be more accurate than one might expect. These hypotheses have been verified by the high reproducibility of the scales that resulted, by the informed observers, and by the predictive potency that we observed.[18]

Rosenau's purpose in studying Senators was to achieve results that can be generalized to other national decision-makers as well. He chose Senators as his typical policy-makers because their roles and actions share a common context, are highly comparable, are public and accessible, and provide a broad statistical base. His choice has merit. On the question of roles versus preferences, it does seem likely that Senators

[18] Rosenau, in our correspondence, has suggested that the hypothesized cognitive mechanism—the Senator's perception of Dulles as an alliance-supporting cold-warrior—would be an interesting point for further testing by examining the Senators' remarks to determine whether they do speak of him in those categories. My unsystematic impression is that they do, but a more scientific examination might be fruitful.

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are fairly typical of high-level decision-makers. Like executive decision-makers, they have numerous roles and constraints, many constituency pressures, and, if they violate too many role expectations, their positions are vulnerable. Furthermore, recent studies of decision-making seem to be reaching the consensus that the higher executive levels share legislative characteristics. Top-level executives are not under tight hierarchical constraint, but are in situations of conflict and independence. Like Senators, they must be persuaded and bargained with rather than simply commanded. They have comparable latitude.[19] Therefore preferences and belief-sets are likely to be important for top-level executive decision-makers, as we have seen them to be for Senators.

In general, roles and individual belief-sets are both likely to play a significant part in shaping most foreign policy decisions. Roles are especially determinative for lower-level decision-makers and for routine decisions. They are likely to dominate those decision-makers whose organizations perceive the salient issue in a decision as clear defeat or advancement for their organization vis-à-vis a rival organization. Individual cognitive belief-sets, preferences, and perceptual propensities are likely to be especially important in situations where the stakes are high enough to kick the decision up to top executive levels, or where disagreement between organizations requires a higher-level decision, or where issues are new or ambiguous enough not to be well covered by automatic routines. A leader's cognitive beliefs are likely to be especially important when he develops new doctrines, heads a new department, faces a new situation, or is a member of a leadership team that is relatively new to its role.[20] Hence, in order to study crises, surprises, innovations, top-level decisions, internal conflicts, and new administrations, one should pay attention to the cognitive beliefs of leaders.

Beyond this, roles and beliefs interact. Roles do influence beliefs; but roles are not fixed: they are perceived differently by different incumbents, and they are shaped by beliefs. A Charles Wilson and a Robert McNamara perceive their role as Secretary of Defense so differently that it may not be the same role.

[19] Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York and London 1961), 123-96; Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York 1968), 3ff., and his articles footnoted therein; Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York 1960), chap. 3 and *passim*; Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 687-718; and Theodore Sorenson, *Decision-Making in the White House* (New York 1962), 25-26, 81.

[20] See Greenstein (fn. 1); James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York 1958), 137-41, 148ff., 173-89; Arnold Kantor, "Presidential Power and Bureaucratic Compliance," paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (September 7-11, 1971), 39-41.

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The results of our empirical test indicate that cognitive processing elements—perception patterns, expectations, evaluations, and belief-sets—deserve a much larger part of the credit or blame for foreign policy outcomes than is often recognized. To ignore cognitive elements is to create dangerous inaccuracies both in the study and in the practice of international relations. Our results should encourage further development of belief-set typologies,[21] operational code studies,[22] and other efforts to understand the various cognitive processing patterns of significant national decision-makers.

[21] See Farris's contribution to Wahlke and Eulau (fn. 6), for an interesting scalogram confirmation of the usefulness of a belief-set typology for large numbers of legislators across different issue-dimensions.

[22] J. David Singer warns of the danger of the operational code method. The danger lies in confusing official ideology with actual operational code. The danger increases "as the time lag since the articulation or revision of the official ideology increases." Singer, "Man and World Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968), 145. The first attempt at a code probably succumbed to this danger. But, like ideologies, the method has changed with time. A link in its evolution is Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code,'" *International Studies Quarterly*, XIII (June 1969), 192-222. Both McLellan and Holsti used interviews, the Secretaries' decisions, and other data to check their understanding of the speeches or writings. The method is likely to continue to improve as it is tested in application.

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Review Articles

THEORY SÍ, DATA NO!

A Decade of Cross-National Political Research

By ROBERT BURROWES

John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold, eds., *Macro-Quantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development, and Democratization*. Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1971, 576 pp., $12.50; $6.00 paper.

MACRO-QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, edited by John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold, should be welcomed by students of cross-national empirical theory and research. It places important reference materials at the fingertips of the analyst, and should stimulate him to take stock of the state of his art. Moreover, it should prove a boon to teaching. I find it hard to conceive of an undergraduate or graduate course on cross-national theory and research which would not benefit from this volume.

This essay consists of two parts. Part I describes and evaluates the editorial efforts of Gillespie and Nesvold. Part II attempts the more difficult task of describing and evaluating the distinctive research style of which the materials in this volume are a part.

I

In *Macro-Quantitative Analysis*, Gillespie and Nesvold have brought together twenty-one studies which apply statistical techniques to cross-national data in order to discover and test "empirical generalizations about whole political systems" (p. 14). This volume, unlike Richard Merritt's and Stein Rokkan's *Comparing Nations*, is not a collection of methodological essays and prolegomena on cross-national research. The emphasis is upon the reporting of the results of specific attempts at such research. In the process, however, a wide variety of analytical routines and data-making procedures are described and demonstrated.

Included among these studies are many of the best fruits of the first decade of extensive cross-national research by political scientists. Begun in the early 1960's, these studies were first reported at professional meetings and in the journals between 1963 and 1969. Journal articles that will be familiar to many are those by Rudolph Rummel, Raymond

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Tanter, Douglas Bwy, the Feierabends, Ted Gurr, Arthur Banks, Russell Fitzgibbon, and Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde. Perhaps less familiar will be articles by Phillips Cutright, Betty Nesvold, Peter Snow, Roger Benjamin and John Kautsky, and Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. The four selections appearing in print for the first time are a paper by F. Gerald Kline, Kurt Kent, and Dennis Davis, a paper by the Feierabends, and two papers by William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman.

Gillespie and Nesvold have organized these studies under three substantive headings: domestic conflict, political development, and democratization. Nine of the studies are grouped under conflict; seven and five studies, respectively, are to be found under democratization and political development. Gillespie has written a general introduction to the volume and an introduction to the section on democratization, and Nesvold has provided introductions to the sections on conflict and on development.

While not without merits, the general introduction by Gillespie does not adequately prepare the beginning student for "the potentiality and excitement of this new approach to comparative political analysis" (p. 25). What is needed for this purpose is a brief intellectual history or sociology of knowledge which would place the materials in this volume in their proper context. An essay of this sort would link the intellectual ferment and questioning in comparative politics in the 1950's to the emergence of cross-national aggregate data analysis in the 1960's; it would describe and explain this movement as a response to the widely felt need for a general theory, a truly comparative methodology, and a research design that would breach the long-standing gap between theory and data in the study of politics. This exciting and rapidly unfolding story would have been relatively easy to tell, and telling it would have gone a long way toward preparing the student for the research reported in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis*.

Gillespie's abstract and ahistorical treatment of the distinction between the configurative and the cross-national approaches to comparative politics is not an adequate substitute for such an essay. Moreover, the distinction he makes is quite confusing. Gillespie seems to equate the configurative approach with both area studies and the functional approach of Gabriel Almond and the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, and then to contrast this general approach with the cross-national approach of Karl Deutsch and the Yale Political Data Program. Such a reading of history does not square with the facts. In the late 1950's, the battle lines were drawn

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between the configurative approach of Gunnar Heckscher on the one hand, and the "new" comparative approach(es) of David Easton, Roy Macridis, Karl Deutsch, and Gabriel Almond on the other hand. Gabriel Almond and the SSRC's Committee on Comparative Politics were very much a part of the assault upon the "old" configurative single-nation case study; indeed, it was Almond who issued the call and offered a framework for a "probabilistic theory of the polity."[1] Interestingly enough, Almond's framework has done little to foster statistical analyses of cross-national data, whereas Deutsch's thought and example has nurtured this style of analysis. This important feature of the recent evolution of comparative political studies is lost in the attempt by Gillespie to embrace Almond's functionalism in the configurative approach.[2]

The introductions to the three sections of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* admirably point out the theoretical and methodological concerns that unify and distinguish the studies which follow; the strengths and weaknesses of each study are specified in some detail. However, these introductions do not relate the studies included in each section to those that were excluded. For example, the essays on political development and democracy make no reference to the earlier works of Seymour Martin Lipset or Daniel Lerner; the essay on conflict makes no reference to Rummel's more recent work on a "social field theory of conflict."

Gillespie and Nesvold have used good judgment in the selection and editing of materials for their volume. They wisely resisted the temptation to include a larger number of severely abridged studies. Only three of the twenty-one selections are abridged. Two of these—Bwy's

[1] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 58.

[2] Gillespie's presentations of the configurative point of view also contains gestaltist elements which were not central to the original argument. The argument of Hechscher and others was based more upon the uniqueness of each political system than upon the complex interrelatedness of the various aspects of a political system. Moreover, a further confusion inheres in Gillespie's attempt to equate the configurative and cross-national approaches with "emergentist" and "reductionist" explanations respectively. Gillespie is stretching the meanings of these two kinds of explanation well beyond those intended by May Brodbeck and other philosophers of the social sciences who have used these terms in the debate over the connection between psychology and the "group sciences" (for example, sociology, economics, and political science). Neither "methodological individualism" (with its descriptive and explanatory reductionism) nor "metaphysical holism" (with its descriptive and explanatory emergentism) is properly linked solely with either the cross-national approach or the configurative approach. Both approaches offer many examples of each of these two philosophical starting points. See May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York 1969), Part IV.

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study of political instability in Latin America and Gurr's study, with Ruttenberg, of civil strife—unfortunately suffer as a result.[3]

Most of the articles and papers selected by Gillespie and Nesvold belong here by almost any appropriate criterion of inclusion. My one major disappointment has to do with the sections on political development and democratization. These sections do not convey the sense of cumulativeness or closure which is clearly apparent in the Rummel-Bwy-Feierabend-Gurr sequence in the section on conflict. This is largely due to the exclusion of materials that, if included, would have revealed the progressive nature of these two related areas of research. As I see it, the core sequence in the macro-quantitative study of democratization (and/or development) is Lerner[4]-Lipset[5]-Cutright[6]-Neubauer.[7] Taken together, these studies make up one of the most stimulating and informative packages of training materials in the entire literature of modern political science, one with which every new student of cross-national research should be forced to come to terms. Lerner, Lipset, Cutright, and Neubauer address themselves to a common concern and to one another; in the process, they dramatically expose the conceptual and data-making strengths and weaknesses of macro-quantitative analysis as does no other comparable sequence of studies. What makes the absence of these materials all the more unfortunate is the degree to which many of the studies chosen for inclusion were written in the shadow of the earlier works by Lerner, Lipset, and Cutright. The intellectual debts of the contributors to this collection are everywhere in evidence and often acknowledged. Variations of the Lerner communications model of development are the object of empirical testing in the studies by Kline, Kent, and Davis, and by McCrone and Cnudde. The variables in McCrone's and Cnudde's causal analysis of democratic political development are "conceptualized in

[3] I am not familiar with the third abridgment, a previously unpublished paper by the Feierabends. Although the length of Gurr's study with Ruttenberg necessitated abridgment, the various fragments strung together in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* do not do justice to the original. The portions deleted include much of Gurr's admirable theoretical explication and all of Ruttenberg's operationalizations of the independent and intervening variables.

[4] Daniel Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, II (October 1957), 266-75; See also Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York 1958), Part I.

[5] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (March 1959), 69-105.

[6] Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (April 1963), 253-64.

[7] Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 1002-09.

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Lipset's terms and measured by Cutright's procedures" (p. 501); indeed, they use the data collected by Cutright for his earlier study of political development in their attempt to test the Lerner model. Cutright himself, in the two more recent studies which were included in this volume, relies heavily upon the very careful explication of concepts, data, and techniques in his earlier study.

These important papers may have been excluded because they are readily available elsewhere,[8] or because the constraints of space prevented their inclusion except at the price of excluding something else. The first reason does not change the fact that this volume suffers from their absence. As to the second, this volume does contain material which could easily have given way to these studies. It is my feeling that Fitzgibbon's "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America" should have been excluded simply on its own demerits. My major objection is neither to the use of judge-based scales in general nor to the fact that Fitzgibbon's naively conceived scale does not measure what it purports to measure. What disturbs me is the degree to which the pointlessness of this exercise violates the norms of scientific inquiry. Fitzgibbon's attempt to generate scores on "democratic attainment" seems to be an end in itself; it appears that he conducted this—the fifth in a series of quinquennial surveys—because he had done it four times before. By contrast, the attempts at scaling by Nesvold and Snow were undertaken for the expressed purpose of generating measures for use in subsequent substantive studies.

There are other selections which I would have deleted, but with greater reluctance. Tanter's analysis of domestic and external conflict was probably included because it is a rare—perhaps unique—example of replication in cross-national research. As important as replication is, the lesson to be learned from Tanter could have been conveyed through a discussion of his study in the introductory essay on conflict. Space could also have been made available by excluding the Feierabends' paper on the relationship of political coercion to systemic frustration and political instability. The techniques used in this study are adequately demonstrated in their earlier article, which is included, and its substance is for the most part covered by Gurr and Bwy. Finally, one of the two related articles by Cutright could have been deleted. Despite the special merits of each, I would have chosen to delete one of them for the purpose of including the earlier Cutright article to which other studies of democratization and development owe so much.

[8] For example, see Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., *Empirical Democratic Theory* (Chicago 1969).

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II

These differences notwithstanding, the contents of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* seem to be fairly representative of a decade of sustained and intensive effort. The appearance of this volume therefore affords a good opportunity to describe this style of research in terms of what its users have actually attempted to do. It also affords opportunities to evaluate the results of this decade of effort and to assess the prospects for the immediate future.

THE MOVEMENT DESCRIBED

Macro-Quantitative Analysis reveals the rather sharply focused profile of this style of research. The typical practitioner has attempted to study the ecology of politics through the application of multivariate statistical techniques to cross sections of aggregate data drawn from a nearly total sample of the universe of nations. These several traits, roughly in descending order of their generality, are:

1. *Cross-sectional design.* Virtually all macro-quantitative analysis has been performed on political attributes and their conditions as observed in a large number of political systems at more or less the same time. Longitudinal designs, which measure co-occurrence or covariation among variables over time, are virtually nonexistent in cross-national research.[9] Eighteen of the twenty-one studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* are exclusively cross-sectional in design; the other three are more cross-sectional than they are longitudinal. Although Fitzgibbon's study focuses upon democratic change, the comparisons over time which he makes are based on only five cross sections drawn at five-year intervals. Flanigan and Fogelman, in the second of their two studies of political change between 1800 and 1960, do engage in some time-series analysis, and do present some fascinating comparisons of the different results yielded by cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of the same data. Nevertheless, most of their analyses are "concerned with the degree of association among several variables in given decades, without attempting to observe the relationships among these variables through successive decades in given countries" (p. 489).

The absence of longitudinal designs can be explained largely in

[9] For a discussion of this point, see Robert Burrowes, "Multiple Time-Series Analysis of Nation-Level Data," *Comparative Political Studies*, II (January 1970), 467. A notable exception to this is the recent work of Arthur Banks. See Arthur Banks, "Modernization and Political Change: The Latin American and Amer-European Nations," *Comparative Political Studies*, II (January 1970), 405; see also Arthur Banks, *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

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terms of the difficulties involved in collecting and analyzing time-series data.[10] However, the ability of cross-sectional designs to preempt the field so completely can also be traced in part to "the postwar coincidence of a remarkable increase in the number of independent states and the twin calls for an empirical general theory and a truly comparative study of politics. . . . The cross-sectional analysis of nation-level aggregate data seemed a practical and appropriate research strategy to many students who were committed to empirical general theory and frustrated by the problem of empirical verification in comparative . . . politics."[11]

2. *Total sample of the universe.* Most analysts using macro-quantitative techniques attempt to encompass the entire universe of national political systems in their analyses. This tendency can be explained in terms of both the desire to generalize about *the* political system and the need to secure a sufficient number of observations for statistical purposes. Only three of the eighteen wholly cross-sectional studies included in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* define their universe in terms that do not encompass all nations on which data are available. Two of the three, those by Bwy and Snow, are limited to the twenty nations of Latin America; the third, by Adelman and Morris, is limited only slightly to "74 less-developed countries." The statistical "battle of the *N*'s" is plainly evident in the remaining fifteen studies. The number of nations in each study ranges between fifty-two and one hundred and thirty-five; the mean and mode are approximately ninety-five and eighty-two, respectively. Only in a few of these fifteen studies are extensive analyses also performed on subsets of nations. In the most ambitious attempt to compare the results in different subsets, Gurr groups nations according to technological level, size, type of political system, and sociocultural characteristics. Cutright, and Adelman and Morris, perform separate analyses on nations grouped according to level of GNP and geographical region, respectively.

3. *Aggregate data analysis.* Most macro-quantitative analysis is performed upon either event- or census-type aggregate data. Nearly half of the studies in this volume rely wholly upon data which were originally drawn from statistical yearbooks, newspaper indexes, and chronologies; all of the others rely in part upon this sort of data. This is true even of the three studies which rest primarily upon Banks' and Textor's *A Cross-Polity Survey*, since many of the nominally- or ordi-

[10] See Paul Smoker, "A Time Series Study of Sino-Indian Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII, No. 2 (1969), 172-191; see also Burrowes (fn. 9), 467 and 475.
[11] *Ibid.*, 467.

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nally-scaled political attributes in the Cross-Polity Data Bank were derived from aggregate statistics. By contrast, none of the studies reported in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* make use of survey, poll, or content-analytic data. These kinds of data are simply not readily available for most political systems.

4. *Multivariate interval-scale measures.* Scholars who use macro-quantitative analysis have a strong preference for multivariate interval-scale measures over bivariate interval-, ordinal-, or nominal-scale measures. Powerful multivariate statistical routines are used in thirteen of the nineteen relational studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis.* Multiple correlation, multiple regression, and factor analysis are the most widely used techniques; Simon-Blalock causal analysis and path analysis are also used. By contrast, only four studies extensively use bivariate interval-scale techniques (Pearson's *r* and *eta*) or ordinal-scale techniques (analysis of contingency); the two studies by Flanigan and Fogelman rely primarily upon simple descriptive statistics (averages and percentages).

Given this preference, practitioners of macro-quantitative analysis have been forced to interpret their data as numerical and continuous. The data are treated as nominal or ordinal only in three of the nineteen relational studies—the two by the Feierabends and the one by Benjamin and Kautsky. In all other instances, interval-scales are created, or ordinal- and nominal-scales are interpreted as interval-scales. In short, moves up the scale of measurement are more frequent than retreats down that scale.

5. *The ecology of politics.* Analysis using macro-quantitative techniques have focused less upon relationships within the political domain than upon relationships between elements in that domain and their social and economic environment. Only four of the nineteen relational studies—one each by Rummel and Tanter, and two by Banks and Gregg —focus exclusively on relationships within the political domain. Most of the other studies are primarily concerned with relating a single aspect of politics to features of its social and economic environment. In a few cases, a second or third political aspect is treated as intervening between the dependent political aspect and its non-political environment, or a second political aspect is included with the non-political features in the set of independent variables.

This focus upon the ecology of politics is partly explained in terms of the history of macro-quantitative analysis and the personal preferences of its practitioners. Karl Deutsch did much to give the movement definition and has greatly influenced the priorities of those who

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have followed his lead. For this reason, macro-quantitative analysis has been closer to the ecological concerns of Deutsch than to the more exclusively political concerns of Almond and the SSRC's Committee on Comparative Politics. Nesvold finds a more practical but equally important explanation in the fact that the analyst is faced with "a dearth of quantified material on political variables" (p. 177). The greater abundance of "hard data" on important social and economic variables than on important political variables seems partly due to the nature of the concepts and theories by means of which students of politics have attempted to comprehend the political domain. It also seems partly traceable to the fact that, in the past, political scientists did not pay as much attention as did economists and sociologists to the need to translate important verbal constructs into quantitative data. Flanigan and Fogelman rightly lament the fact that the leading "typologists . . . [have shown] little inclination toward quantitative measurement" (p. 444).

THE MOVEMENT EVALUATED

Macro-quantitative analysis, like other styles of research, will add to the body of empirically verified knowledge only through the ingenious linking of appropriate theory, data, and techniques. That body will grow only if thoughtful and imaginative explication of concepts and relationships among concepts is paralleled by equally thoughtful and imaginative data making and data analysis. The available data and techniques of analysis place constraints upon each other and upon the theories that we can reasonably hope to subject to empirical testing; in turn, the state of our concepts and theory imposes constraints of its own upon the uses that can be made of the available data and techniques. The analyst is not free to ignore any of these constraints. Instead, his task is to work within these constraints, and—in the process—to push them back as far as possible.

Have the contributors to *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* adequately met these requirements, and—in so doing—demonstrated that this relatively new style of analysis deserves a place of prominence among the approaches to a science of politics? Do the studies which they report bear out the enthusiasm of Michael Haas who, in 1962, declared that "it has become clear that 'global' comparison is coming of age?"[12] Unfortunately, it is still too early to speak with much certainty. To judge the contents of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* primarily in terms of their

[12] Michael Haas, "Comparative Analysis," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (June 1962).

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contributions to a cumulative body of empirically verified knowledge would be premature. This volume is for the most part a collection of beginnings; the results which it reports are, in the words of Adelman and Morris, little more than "semi-quantitative insights" (p. 332). Moreover, many of the contributions are primarily attempts to display data-making and data-analysis techniques, and only secondarily attempts to report substantive findings. Snow explicitly states that the purpose of his paper is "to explain how the scalogram can be used in the study of the process of political development" (p. 322); Kline, Kent, and Davis describe their attempt at missing-data estimation as "a methodological and a pedagogical device" (p. 251).

Macro-Quantitative Analysis is an impressive collection of beginnings and demonstrations. The contributors have in most instances addressed themselves to important problems in political theory, and have applied to these questions a broad array of new data and analytical techniques. These problems—for example, the causes and conditions of civil strife, the relationship between legitimacy and stability, or the socioeconomic setting and policy consequences of democratization or political development—are questions that have long preoccupied students of politics, both quantitative and non-quantitative. The attempt to collect and process large amounts of various kinds of event- and census-type aggregate data systematically for most national polities has permanently broadened and enriched the data base of political science. Moreover, the users of macro-quantitative analysis have helped to introduce to political science techniques of data making and data analysis that have been developed in the other social sciences. Rummel's study of the dimensions of conflict within and between nations involves the first use by a political scientist of either factor analysis or cross-national event data. McCrone's and Cnudde's attempt to test the Lerner model of political development, and Gurr's attempt to test the frustration-aggression hypothesis, are among the first uses of causal modeling in comparative politics. These techniques are likely to find a permanent place in political science. Merely their use in macro-quantitative analysis represents a step forward.

Problems of Theory

These reasons for cautious optimism or deferred judgment notwithstanding, there is much in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* to raise doubts as to whether the claims made in the early 1960's for this style of research can ever be met. The research reported in this volume, executed

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in that era of high hopes, does not reflect the criticism of macro-quantitative analysis which has been mounting since the end of the decade. Some critics have focused on shortcomings in data making and measurement; others have raised questions about the use or misuse of particular analytical routines. However, most of the criticism has turned on the judgment that macro-quantitative analysis is essentially an atheoretical approach to the development of theory. Those who call for a deductive approach and formal modeling have been the most severe critics of this style of analysis. For example, Robert Holt and John Richardson, Jr. have charged that it is both without a paradigm of its own and uninformed by the paradigms which exist in comparative politics; without theoretical direction, research in this style is "a form of twentieth-century Baconianism."[13] Holt and Richardson reserve their harshest judgments for what they regard as the mindless use of factor analysis. In this regard, they are echoing Oran Young's even less temperate charge that the user of factor analysis is often no more than an "industrious tailor to a naked emperor."[14]

These criticisms in their extreme form are simply false, and based upon a caricature of macro-quantitative analysis. None of the relational studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* can fairly be described as examples of "barefoot empiricism"; they are not mindless attempts to run "everything against everything." In the few cases of wide-ranging empirical exploration, such as the attempt by Adelman and Morris to determine the sociocultural and political correlates of economic development, the selection of variables has been guided by current theories. Even Banks' and Gregg's factor analyses of *A Cross-Polity Survey* are based primarily upon political attribute data which were inspired by the theoretical frameworks of Almond and Easton.

Some of the studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* are highly theoretical in character and give ample evidence of theoretical concern and competence. Gurr's theory of civil strife is probably one of the finest examples of theory explication in contemporary political science. His effort at data analysis grows directly out of a rigorous and carefully detailed elucidation of concepts and the relationships among those concepts.[15] Lerner's model of democratic political development, tested

[13] Robert Holt and John Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Robert Holt and John Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York 1970), 58.

[14] Oran Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), 486.

[15] This becomes especially apparent with a reading of Gurr's theoretical article, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 245-78.

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in this volume by McCrone and Cnudde, also is an explicit and parsimonious theoretical construct. Somewhat less systematic, but no less thoughtful, are the formulations regarding the conditions and consequences of democratic political development which are presented in the two articles by Cutright and the two articles by Flanigan and Fogelman; the same can be said of some of the work by the Feierabends on the relationships between systemic frustration and instability. Furthermore, some of these studies indicate forward movement in theory building. The more recent of the studies by Gurr, Cutright, and Flanigan and Fogelman build upon and extend their previous efforts with considerable success.[16]

Nevertheless, *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* does reveal some serious deficiencies in theory. As Holt and Richardson suggest, work in this style of research has not been guided by one or more explicit paradigms. The theoretical frameworks which have dominated comparative politics for the past fifteen years—the functionalism of Almond and the systems theory of Easton—have not provided the foundation or inspiration for much of the research reported in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis.* That inspiration has been provided primarily by Karl Deutsch. However, it is Deutsch's style of analysis and not his theoretical framework that has guided the research of his students and of others. The cybernetics model in *Nationalism and Social Communications* and *Nerves of Government* is not the paradigmatic basis upon which much of this work has proceeded. Whatever the reasons, the failure of this framework and those of Almond and Easton to inform cross-national research has left this new style of analysis without an explicit, overarching theoretical—and, hence, methodological—guide.

In the absence of a paradigm, the analysts have had to work on various isolated "islands of theory" which may one day be embraced by a more general theory. This is true of the studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* by Gurr, Cutright, the Feierabends, and Flanigan and Fogelman. In some of the other studies, however, the level of theoretical explication does not merit description as an island of theory. In these instances, tests of co-occurrence or covariation do not seem to grow out of much more than the hunch that X_1 may "go with" X_2, X_3, and/or X_4. This would seem to be the case, for example, in the attempts

[16] For example, Gurr has elaborated his model of civil strife to include the concept of "legitimacy." Cutright has moved on to the policy-output side of his model of political development in his studies of national differences in income distribution and social security systems. The more recent of the two papers by Flanigan and Fogelman focuses on the conditions of successful democratization, a problem which is barely touched upon in their earlier article.

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by Rummel and Tanter to determine the relationships between domestic and external conflict, and the attempts by Bwy and Nesvold to discover the correlates of political instability.

A considerable portion of the theoretical explication in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* is also marred by *ad hoc* attempts to explain the empirical results that emerge in the course of analysis. This is as true of the work of Flanigan and Fogelman as it is of the work of Bwy and Nesvold; interesting though they may be, many of the insights which the former draw from their historical studies are of the "seat-of-the-pants" variety. The *ad hoc* attempt to make sense out of ambiguous results is particularly evident in those studies in this volume that rely upon factor analysis. Quite apart from the technical questions which these applications of factor analysis raise, the attempt to read conceptual and theoretical meaning into rather murky factor-analytic results often leads to very strained interpretations; in some instances, factor analysis seems to be an invitation less to mindlessness than to fancifulness. This is particularly true of the interpretations which Banks and Gregg give to some of their factors in their *R*- and *Q*-technique analyses of *A Cross-Polity Survey*. It is also true to some degree in the more convincing efforts of Rummel, Tanter, and Adelman and Morris.

Finally, much of even the best theoretical work in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* is crude and coarse-grained. Inherently complex constructs and relationships are reduced to simple constructs and relationships. The users of complex terms such as "legitimacy," "systemic discontent," or "political stability" generally agree that these terms contain conceptually distinguishable components. Nevertheless, an attempt is rarely made in these studies to distinguish between the components and then to operationalize and use these distinctions in the subsequent analysis. For example, no attempt is made to distinguish between the various types of legitimacy or discontent (frustration). Similarly, the several studies of frustration-derived conflict regard this aspect of political life as enmeshed in a complex set of relationships; with the exception of Gurr's study, however, no attempt is made to capture that complexity in a multivariate design. The result in the case of each of these two types of simplification is coarse- rather than fine-grained theory building. Finally, virtually all of the studies in this volume implicitly or explicitly assume linear relationships. Notions of thresholds and changing relationships, and the statistical techniques appropriate to these notions, are noticeably absent.

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Data Problems

The underdeveloped state of concepts and theory in much cross-national research is one cause of the apparent failure of this style of analysis to live up to expectations. However, a close reading of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* suggests that the absence of theoretical refinement is more often than not the effect of deficiencies in data making. Virtually all of the studies in this volume reveal serious shortcomings in the attempt to operationalize and measure theoretically relevant concepts. Moreover, these shortcomings are often less the result of thoughtless and unimaginative operationalization or careless measurement than of the sheer inadequacy of the available data. Many of the simplifications of theory, flabby conceptualizations, strained operationalizations, and questionable applications of technique that mar these studies are effects of the need to work within severe data constraints. Closer attention given by analysts to the subtleties of theory or the technical niceties of data making and data analysis has often been rendered futile by the available data.

I have referred elsewhere to the difficulty that political analysts have at present in securing good data on theoretically relevant indicators across a large number of nations.[17] The raw data upon which these analysts base their data making and data analyses are sparse and generally of poor quality. The paucity of domestic political event data in the readily available global sources—for example, the *New York Times Index* or *Deadline Data*—is pronounced;[18] moreover, the data which these sources do yield are neither equally representative of the "real" universe of events in any given nation nor distributed in an unbiased way across the global set of nations.[19] Census-type data are often in-

[17] Burrowes (fn. 9), 468.

[18] The Feierabends' Cross-National Data Bank, which includes virtually all kinds of domestic political events, contains only approximately 4.0 events per nation/per year (or .13 events per nation/per year/per each of thirty categories). The event data upon which Gurr, Rummel, and Tanter have based their analysis are similarly sparse.

For a discussion of the paucity of domestic data relative to external data, see Robert Burrowes with Bert Spector, "I Dreamt I was Coding Event Data in My Matrix-Form Brain," a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Pittsburgh, April, 1970.

[19] For differences between the Feierabend data and data drawn from the *Hispanic American Reports*, see Charles F. Doran and others, "A Test of Data Reliability: Global versus Regional Sources," Rice University, October 1971 (mimeo). For source comparison studies of external event data, see Robert Burrowes, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall . . . : A Source Comparison Study of Inter-Nation Event Data," in James Rosenau, ed., *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy* (forthcoming 1973); and Gary Hoggard, "Differential Source Coverage and the Analysis of International Interaction Data," University of Southern California, January 1971 (mimeo).

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complete or of poor quality in those relatively rare instances when they are available on the indicators desired. Finally, in the case of judgmental measures, there is often very little information upon which informed judgments can be based. As a consequence, "measurement problems" in cross-national research are both more elementary and more serious than the literature suggests; as a practical matter, they rarely get beyond the attempt to secure politically relevant data worthy of even the crudest measurement.

Part of the problem can be traced to the fact that the aggregate-data analyst, unlike the survey-research analyst, rarely generates his own raw data; instead, he processes, as best he can, data he has "found" in statistical yearbooks and chronologies. In the case of event data, he is actually re-coding data previously abstracted and coded from "reality" by someone else; whatever else he may be, the original recorder of events is rarely a close student of Deutsch or Almond. As a consequence, the sources from which event data are drawn are not compiled with the theoretical interests of the student of comparative politics in mind.

Census-type data pose the same problem in slightly different form. Unlike event data, the statistics which the United Nations and national governments publish are usually gathered with specific policy or research purposes in mind. With rare exceptions, however, the theoretical interests and practical needs of the political scientist have informed this process far less than those of the economist and the sociologist. As a result, the political analyst is forced to use data which have evolved by trial and error to meet the needs of other disciplines. Whether these data also meet his needs is largely a matter of chance.

An additional cause of the thinness of relevant cross-national data is the desire of most analysts to approximate a total sample of the universe of nations. A principal tension in data making exists between this desire and the need to secure data of high quality. Unfortunately, the decision to secure measures on several variables for ninety-five nations—the mean N in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis*—usually involves the analyst in a chain of subsequent data-making decisions which seriously compromise the validity, reliability, comparability, and sensitivity of most of these measures; in the case of composite measures, the problem is multiplied by the number of indicators that make up those measures. In general, the larger the number of nations and measures taken on those nations, the lower will be the common denominator in the available data.

The effect of this tension between quality and quantity is particu-

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larly apparent in those studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* which attempt to use available numerical or interval-level data to measure political concepts. Faced with both the fact of missing data and the desire to secure as large an *N* as possible, the analyst is forced either to choose the less relevant but more complete of two indicators or to use techniques for estimating missing data in the more relevant indicator. For example, Benjamin and Kautsky probably chose an unstandardized measure of Communist Party strength in their study of communism and economic development because it yielded more observations than any of a number of standardized measures; Nesvold probably chose the percentage of the population voting in national elections over other measures of political development for the same reason. The attempt to use interpolative techniques to estimate missing data appears in extreme form in the paper by Kline, Kent, and Davis. In this case, an *N* of 135 was achieved by using the available data to estimate an extraordinarily large number of values on the several indicators used in the study; for example, approximately 55 of the 135 political instability scores were estimated in this manner. This exercise is made more dubious by the fact that these 55 cases of missing data were not randomly distributed among the categories into which the universe of nations was distributed. The data on which estimates for new and less developed nations were based are clearly less complete and accurate than the data on old and more developed nations.

The political domain is the one area in which the cross-national analyst has been compelled by the dearth of quantified materials to generate much of his own data.[20] In most instances—for example, Adelman's and Morris's linear scales of leading political development characteristics and the Feierabends' six-point ordinal scale of "permissiveness-coerciveness"—the measures are highly judgmental and very crudely categorized. Moreover, the information upon which these categorical judgments are based is often impressionistic, noncomparable, and of marginal relevance. In some instances, nations have been categorized on the basis of published statistics which are very indirectly related to the concept being measured. In other cases, reliance has been placed upon narrative and historical materials, or

[20] The dilemma facing the scholar who uses macro-quantitative analysis is seen in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* and *A Cross-Polity Survey*. Its title notwithstanding, most of the numeric measures in the former are conspicuously nonpolitical; those that are political, moreover, are riddled with missing data and are often of only peripheral theoretical relevance. The latter, by contrast, is addressed to many of the concepts considered most important by students of comparative politics; unfortunately, the nominal and ordinal scales which measure these concepts are extremely insensitive and of dubious reliability.

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upon the solicited judgments of nation or area experts. For example, the Feierabends consulted "approximately five separate works on each nation" (p. 424), and Adelman and Morris consulted published studies and "A.I.D. and other country experts" (p. 334).

Warren S. Torgerson has pointed out that the link between verbal constructs and empirical reality is extremely tenuous in most social science research.[21] Maintenance of this link inevitably involves concessions in both the theoretical and the empirical domains. In the end, however, concept and theory should gain the upper hand over data and their measurement. Unfortunately, the former often seem to lose out when confronted with event- or census-type data. One of the most unsettling facts about cross-national research is the degree to which the readily available data are permitted to dictate concepts or the subsequent operationalization and measurement of concepts. In some cases, the analyst adjusts his concepts and even his theoretical interests drastically to what the available data can reasonably bear; more often, he clings to important concepts only by stretching the link between them and the available data to the breaking point.

The problems of attenuated inference and indirect measurement are particularly acute in those studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* that attempt to use some version of frustration-aggression theory to explain civil strife or political instability. Given the available cross-national data, the choice of this psychological model requires that the analyst infer "states of mind" from ecological, behavioral, or attribute data. The confounding effect of this requirement is evident in the Feierabends' operationalization of the concepts "modernity" (a condition of society), and "systemic frustration" (a state of mind). They operationalize both of these complex constructs in terms of slightly different combinations of the same eight ecological variables (GNP + urbanization + literacy rate . . . etc.). Their Modernity Index consists of the mean of the summed standard scores of these eight indicators; their Systemic Frustration Index is defined as the ratio of social want satisfaction to social want formation, and is measured by dividing the mean of the summed standard scores of six of these same indicators by the standard score of the higher of the two remaining indicators. However plausible it may be to conceive of frustration as a ratio of want satisfaction to want formation, it is doubtful whether the Feierabends' Systemic Frustration Index either measures that state of mind or distinguishes between it and the cluster of societal conditions associated with modernity. Their rather unexpected empirical results,

[21] Warren S. Torgerson, *Theory and Methods of Scaling* (New York 1958), chap. 1.

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in which political instability is found to be more strongly related to modernity than to systemic frustration, would seem to support this doubt.

Bwy's attempt to measure legitimacy in his study of the correlates of political instability in Latin America is an example of indirect measurement carried to the extreme. Bwy defines legitimacy as the amount of popular positive affect toward the political system and government. He discusses at length the need to operationalize this term in such a way as to allow for the fact that subject and parochial cultures will legitimate different structures than will participant cultures. Contrary to this injunction, Bwy then proceeds to equate "popular positive affect" with the "openness" of a political system, and to operationalize changing degrees of openness in terms of quinquennial changes on Fitzgibbon's "democratic attainment" scale. In other words, Bwy infers the legitimacy accorded to Latin American governments by their publics from scores that are based upon the questionnaire responses of North American specialists on Latin America. These responses are not even responses to questions on legitimacy; indeed, there is considerable doubt as to whether some of the questions asked by Fitzgibbon even pertain to "openness" or "democratic attainment." The relationship between the scores on this scale and legitimacy is not at all apparent.

The need to make inferential leaps across the gap between concepts and data is not limited to attempts to use aggregate data to measure states of mind. The problem is only slightly less severe in instances in which patterns of political behavior and political system characteristics are inferred from such data. For example, Gurr cautions against inferring political instability from data on civil strife, and offers examples of stability in the presence of strife and instability in the absence of strife; nevertheless, the Feierabends, Nesvold, Bwy, and Kline *et al.* have chosen to operationalize political instability in terms of the incidence of events of civil strife.

Finally, some of the data problems in cross-national research are of a more technical or practical nature. The readily available data make it extremely difficult for the analyst to pay close attention to a proper temporal ordering of the variables used in his analysis. He is fortunate if the data on his independent variables precede or at least occur simultaneously with those on his dependent variable. When it is possible to lag in the right direction, the magnitude of the lag is usually dictated by the available data rather than by the theory. For example, it was probably the paucity of the event data and not some compelling theoretical consideration that led Tanter to regress external data for 1958–

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60 on domestic data for 1955–57. If a time-lag relationship exists in this case, it seems unlikely that it would be captured in data aggregated on a three-year basis; however, units of shorter duration would have yielded a data matrix full of zero entries, and would have posed serious problems for statistical analysis.

The desire to apply powerful analytical routines has forced analysts to interpret their data as numeric even in the case of crudely categorized judgmental variables; many of these measures appear to be too soft to support the assumptions upon which an interval-scale of measurement depends. The use of powerful techniques also poses problems when applied to numerical data that are prone to error; as Kline, Kent, and Davis point out, some of these techniques seem particularly sensitive to "fallibly measured data" (p. 255).[22] Another problem stems from the fact that most of the distributions based upon published statistics and event data are highly skewed. Distributions with a few extremely high values and a large number of cases at or near zero often produce results which are unstable and artificial even after the data have been subjected to logarithmic or other transformations. Furthermore, analysts who transform their data rarely attempt to justify the transformations they use in theoretical terms; indeed, the transformed data often defy meaningful interpretation. As a consequence, it is often difficult to interpret the relationship between one transformed variable and a second variable, transformed or untransformed.

Many of these data problems are especially severe in those studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* which recognize their seriousness and attempt to solve them through ambitious data-making procedures. Some of the difficulties faced by the Feierabends and by Adelman and Morris have been mentioned. These same problems mar the even more ambitious efforts of Gurr, Cutright, and Flanigan and Fogelman. Gurr has brought considerable thought, imagination, and effort to what may be the most impressive attempt at data making in this volume. The more recent of his two articles attests to his concern for "devising indices that represent the theoretical variables more closely than the readily available aggregate indices often used in quantitative cross-national research" (p. 217). The several composite indices which he has created to measure his independent and intervening variables seem to

[22] This point is debatable. Mosteller and Bush have noted in passing that poor data may require the most powerful techniques. However, my guess is that political analysts and social psychologists are thinking in terms of different orders of magnitude when they talk about "measurement error." See Frederick Mosteller and Robert R. Bush, "Selected Quantitative Techniques," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology: Vol. I, Theory and Method* (Cambridge, Mass. 1954), 331.

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constitute a marked advance over the twenty-seven simple indicators used in his earlier study with Ruttenberg. Nevertheless, the new composite measures raise as many questions as they answer. Some of these questions are related to the use of aggregate data to measure feelings of relative deprivation and other "states of mind." These measures are extremely indirect and often susceptible to alternative interpretations. For example, Gurr and the Feierabends infer the opposite psychological meaning from data on literacy. For Gurr, the higher the rate of literacy, the lower the sense of deprivation (literacy = a highly valued thing → a sense of want fulfillment); for the Feierabends, the higher the rate of literacy, the higher the want formation (literacy → exposure to modernity → rising expectations). Each of these inferences regarding the psychological effects of literacy unfortunately seems equally plausible and equally farfetched.

Many of the questions raised by Gurr's attempt to operationalize and measure his variables are not related to the problem of psychological inference, however. The number of practical and technical decisions he was forced to make in the course of constructing his composite indices is staggering. Most of these decisions—regarding scaling procedures, indicator weights, transformation rules, and missing-data estimation—involved the attempt to represent complex mental constructs by a single numerical term. For example, in the case of persisting deprivation, each of six measures was designed to measure simultaneously the duration, pervasiveness, and intensity of a different form of deprivation; the six measures were then "weighted to bring their means into approximate correspondence, and each polity's scores added and then averaged . . ." (p. 226). Missing data persistently forced difficult decisions upon Gurr. In the case of his complex scoring of events of civil strife, he required his coders to use their "considered judgment to supply values for missing data" (p. 200); in the case of indices based upon census-type data, he frequently had to resort to equally questionable techniques to estimate or circumvent missing data.

Other decisions were of a more substantive nature. For example, Gurr chose to use the size of non-ruling Communist Parties as an indicator of social facilitation, and to treat factionalized and/or illegal Communist Parties as more facilitative of civil strife than unified and/or legal Communist Parties. As in the case of literacy, this indicator seems equally susceptible to the opposite interpretation.

The complex decisional pyramid upon which Gurr's data making is based does not stand up well under close inspection. Too many of the decisions seem arbitrary or based upon dubious assumptions. However,

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most of these decisions were forced upon Gurr by the paucity of the available data. For this reason, it is impossible to accept his assertion that "the data are adequate for the purposes to which they are put" (p. 222).

Flanigan's and Fogelman's ingenious studies of the relationships among political development, democratization, and socioeconomic conditions illustrate the severity of the constraints imposed by the available political data. The fact that the authors are engaged in building a historical archive, and have devoted a great deal of thought and effort to the task of adequate data making, makes the crudeness of their data and the tenuousness of the links between their concepts and those data all the more discouraging. Flanigan and Fogelman took as one of their tasks the creation of a measure of political development that could be applied to many nations at ten-year intervals between 1800 and 1960. In order to distinguish between political development and democratization, they defined the former as the capacity to make and administer complex policies. Reasoning that this capacity was directly dependent upon access to information, they decided to operationalize it in terms of "an index of governmental publications based on the volume and kinds of policy-relevant information that is published by the agencies of governments" (p. 444). Since the constraints of time and money precluded their using a government's own sources to determine the quantity of its publications, they relied for data upon compilations of the holdings of such publications in libraries in the United States and Britain. For similar reasons, no qualitative judgments of these government publications were made; indeed, judgments were only crudely quantitative since no distinction was made between a series of thin pamphlets and one of weighty volumes. Finally, the set of scores on the volume of government publications was partitioned into the four-point scale of political development which was used in the subsequent analysis.

Despite the skill and imagination evident in this effort, the fact remains that Flanigan and Fogelman were forced to make a sweeping inference from a very crudely measured indicator in their attempt to tap an important political concept. The same is true to a lesser degree in the case of their measures of democratization and socioeconomic conditions. The result is extremely coarse-grained data making and coarse-grained data analysis. Of course, it could be argued that Flanigan and Fogelman are making crude first attempts at measurement in an area previously devoid of measurement. Although this is true, the question remains whether it is likely that much more refined measures

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of political development and democratization, taken on a large number of nations for the period since 1800, are ever likely to be forthcoming.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The contents of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* seem to indicate the inability of analysts to acquire and process data that are adequate to even the current modest level of theoretical development in the discipline. If this is the case, then one consequence of more rigorous explication at this stage would be a widening of the gap between theory and data. The same is true in the case of techniques. Technical advancement by itself will only result in the application of even more sophisticated data-making procedures and analytical routines to raw data that are of questionable value.

The ability of macro-quantitative analysis to realize its promise as an approach to empirical theory building would seem to depend primarily on the solution to data problems. Many of these problems may prove to be insoluble or only partly soluble. Many of the data we need may be inherently crude, and many of the concepts we would like to measure may continue to defy precise measurement. If this proves to be the case, then analysts using macro-quantitative techniques may have to redefine their mission in more modest terms. It may be that cross-national research will prove useful primarily for mapping the empirical and theoretical terrain on which other quantitative and non-quantitative techniques can be used in more finely grained analyses. At the very least, users of macro-quantitative methods will have to be more discriminating in the selection of topics for their own fine-grained analyses.

There appears to be room for improvement over the present state of affairs even if many of these data-making problems persist. However, the *sine qua non* to a solution to some of them is the recognition of their existence. The contents of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* give the impression that questions of data have been overridden by questions of technique and, to a lesser extent, theory. Few analysts have squarely addressed themselves to the severity of the constraints that the currently available data impose upon theory and technique; few seem to have asked explicitly whether their data can bear the heavy theoretical and technical burdens that they are placing upon them. Where concern over problems of data making is expressed, it is usually coupled implicitly or explicitly with the idea that these problems have been or will be solved with relative ease.

Once the problems are recognized, a determined effort must be made

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to solve them. Individual researchers and the discipline as a whole will have to devote greater thought and imagination to the practical and technical questions involved in securing adequate cross-national political data. The problems of validity, sensitivity, comparability, and reliability will not be solved until they are more precisely identified. The solution to these problems will require a great deal of hard and tedious work. Answers will come only by trial and error, as many analysts attempt to generate and process data sets that are designed both to meet their particular needs and to overcome the weaknesses of existing sets. In this regard, the advent of data repositories and the ethic of data as a part of the public domain are not unmixed blessings at this stage in the evolution of macro-quantitative analysis. One of the disturbing features of *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* is the extent to which the contributors have relied upon other people's data. Only slightly more than half of the studies involved the collection of any new data. Many analysts, eager to get on with theory building, or anxious to apply new analytical routines, have not been willing to bear the burden of collecting their own data; what is more serious, many who use the data collected by others have not been inclined to subject those data to close scrutiny. Bwy's study of instability in Latin America illustrates how total reliance upon the data of others can lead to data making which is woefully inadequate to the task at hand. Similarly, the study by Kline, Kent, and Davis suggests that attempts to demonstrate techniques will be self-defeating if available data sets are used indiscriminately.

Priority should be given to the effort to secure "hard" data on institutional characteristics and patterns of behavior in the political domain. As noted above, the softness of most nation-level political data may partly be explained by the fact that the political scientist has not thought as long or hard as have other social scientists about the problem of quantifying key concepts. Moreover, the political scientist is at some point also going to have to devise more direct measures of "state-of-mind" variables. Perhaps greater emphasis will have to be placed upon securing crude poll data or elementary content-analytic data over a large number of nations.

Some of the more pressing data-making problems would be eased by a moratorium on the quest for a total sample of the universe of nations. The analysis of theoretically defined subsets of nations would lessen somewhat the ill effects of having to seek the lowest common denominator among the data on one hundred or more nations. The particularistic data strengths and needs of different subsets of nations

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could be emphasized; data-rich subsets could receive the more complex analysis and greater emphasis that the amount of available information would make possible. Sounder analyses should result; they would seem to be ample compensation for the inability to generalize, and for the relative neglect of data-poor subsets of nations. Moreover, the analysis of regional or other subsets of nations might yield research benefits that are independent of the quality of the data. Those studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* which attempt to analyze subsets of nations—for example, Gurr, Cutright, and Adelman and Morris—suggest that the small percentage of total variance that is usually explained in analyses of a total sample of the universe may be traced in part to important relational differences among subsets of nations.

Another fruitful strategy would seem to lie in greater emphasis on longitudinal designs. The potential and the limits of time-series analysis can only be determined through its use. However, if longitudinal analysis is to ease current problems, it will have to be defined differently than Gillespie and others define it. Gillespie states that "in the longitudinal design, the same political system is analyzed through time, and then the longitudinal analysis is compared across national boundaries" (p. 23). In effect, he is defining the longitudinal alternative to a cross-sectional design as statistical analysis across both time and nations. Such a definition places almost impossible demands upon the analyst. It is one thing to collect data on a few nations for a statistically sufficient number of time periods; it is quite another thing to collect data on a statistically sufficient number of nations as well as time periods. The difficulties which Flanigan and Fogelman had in gathering very crude data on forty-five nations for sixteen time periods certainly confirm this fact. If longitudinal designs are to ease some of our data problems, they will probably do so through the analysis of relatively small subsets of data-rich nations.

Finally, analysts using macro-qualitative methods must pay closer attention to the data requirements of the techniques they employ in data making and data analysis. Specifically, greater efforts should be made to work within the distributional and measurement requirements of these techniques. Only in this fashion will the analyst be able to distinguish between results that are artifacts of their techniques and those that accurately reflect the nature of things. Analysts probably should also give greater consideration to the use of less powerful statistical techniques. The marriage between macro-quantitative analysis and multivariate interval-scale measures is largely a matter of coincidence and not one of necessity. Techniques such as rank-order correla-

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tion and analysis of contingency have not been attempted often.[23] The analyses by the Feierabends and by Flanigan and Fogelman suggest that they can be fruitfully applied.

CONCLUSION

It is much too early, in the case of macro-quantitative analysis, to write an "epitaph for a monument to a successful protest."[24] The fruits of the first decade have revealed serious problems as well as some promise. Whether this new style of analysis moves beyond its impressive first starts and suggestive results, and makes a sustained contribution to a science of politics, will depend on the ability of its practitioners to make some of the problems that are apparent in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* less intractable. If success does come, a small share of the credit should go to Gillespie and Nesvold for having made it so easy, for us and our students, to take stock of the state of the art.

[23] As noted above, only two studies in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* extensively use ordinal-scale techniques. For whatever reason, these techniques have been more widely used by students of international politics. See J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1968).

[24] Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961).

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SOCIAL SCIENCES AND STATISTICS

By GUDMUND R. IVERSEN

Audrey Haber, Richard P. Runyon, and Pietro Badia, eds., *Readings in Statistics*. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1970, 254 pp., $5.95.
Bernhardt Lieberman, ed., *Contemporary Problems in Statistics. A Book of Readings for the Behavioral Sciences*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1971, 446 pp., $5.50.
Dennis J. Palumbo, *Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science*. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1969, 395 pp., $10.45.
Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1970, 449 pp., $6.95.

STATISTICS is the one discipline in which people have concentrated almost exclusively on how to collect and analyze data. Statisticians have been doing this as a goal in itself without having to be encumbered by substantive issues arising from some other discipline. Most of their work can be broken into components that fall in one of three categories: data gathering, data reduction (descriptive statistics), and statistical inference.

It has been natural for scholars in the empirically oriented social sciences to have relied on statistics in their research. Statistical methods have been found useful for solving the many problems that lie in the way of having facts contribute to social theory. The task of data gathering in observational studies has benefited from statistical sampling theory, and today's sample surveys owe their existence to this theory. Similarly, experimental studies have been made possible because of the theoretical developments within that part of statistical theory known as experimental design. Data reduction has served to discover regularities in data sets which, without statistics, would have remained a chaotic collection of unrelated numbers. In particular, statistical data reduction has allowed the use of computers to do multivariate analysis in the social sciences. The study of relationships between variables is an essential part of social science research, and the existence of statistical methods has made it possible to study relationships, be it through least-squares methods like regression analysis, methods for rank-order correlation, or the study of contingency tables. Many of the results arrived at by the application of these methods have been important to the social sciences, and some areas of the body of knowledge developed by them would not exist at all if it were not for statistics. Finally, methods of statistical inference have enabled social scientists to look

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beyond the sample data to properties of larger populations. Hypothesis testing has enabled us to investigate whether or not a particular data configuration could have resulted from mechanisms of chance alone; and confidence intervals have made it possible to get some notion of how much uncertainty should be attached to a sample estimate of the corresponding population parameter.

But the relationship between statistics and the social sciences is not without problems. The statistical profession, or perhaps more precisely the academic branch of the profession, has too often placed itself within a limited framework and become a branch of mathematics. From that niche it has frequently imposed mathematical theorems of restricted value on the social sciences. The theoretical results are seen by statisticians as interesting in themselves and were perhaps never intended to be applied. But, where they have been, the statistical profession has taken little responsibility for the maintenance and none for the uses of the methods. The confidence interval is an example of a statistical feature which perhaps should never have been released to an audience of innocent social scientists. The notion of a confidence interval is an intriguing theoretical idea with a solid foundation in statistical distribution theory. But its misuses have been many, and occur even in Palumbo's book; because the concept is so contrived, it is almost embarrassing to explain it to those who need to know about estimation in their empirical work.

This lack of concern for the needs of the empirical sciences shows up in different ways. For instance, statistics courses that deal with application are taught in departments of political science, sociology, psychology, economics, etc., rather than in departments of statistics. In some disciplines the pressures for statistical solutions to empirical problems have been great enough to bring about the development of branches of statistics within the disciplines themselves. Noticeable among these is the boundary discipline that has been established linking the biological sciences and statistics, creating the field of bio-statistics. Among the social sciences only economics has been able to tie in with statistics in any significant way. So far, no one has ever heard of a socio-statistician, not to speak of a polit-statistician or a psycho-statistician.

Thus, statistics has been useful to the social sciences, but it has not been useful enough. I do not see that there are any immediate remedies for the tensions that are created by this less-than-satisfactory relationship. Eventually, however, the social sciences may have to follow the path of economics and the biological sciences and establish their own

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branches of statistics. That way, social scientists would have a greater chance to get good training in the aspects of statistics that are relevant to them, and statistical methods could be developed that would be more responsive to the needs of the social sciences.

Ordinarily, there is little room within the confines of current university departmental structures for people on the boundaries of the social sciences and statistics. There are not many reasons for a statistics department to hire a sociologist interested and knowledgeable in statistics, just as there are few reasons for a political science department to hire a statistician interested and knowledgeable in political science. However, the four books discussed here demonstrate that there are people who see themselves as being on the boundaries—people who can teach statistics and develop statistical methods that social scientists find useful. There is important work to be done on these boundaries that will benefit both the social sciences and statistics.

One way to gain further insight into the relationship between the social sciences and statistics would be to ask what contributions could be expected from a discipline of social statistics. (We would not expect all of today's statistical methods to be discarded, even though in certain areas it is possible to foresee major changes.) The question is hypothetical, but it may help us gain an understanding of what ideas are important, statistically, and what ideas are not. It may also point the way towards things that are to come. Of the three categories of statistical activity, methods of data gathering would probably be seen as the most developed and in need of the smallest amount of attention, while the methods for statistical inference would need the largest amount of attention.

The notion of hypothesis testing would probably be discarded. Considerable unease exists about hypothesis testing and the lack of relevance it has for the social sciences. Hardly ever does social research reach the point where any particular action is dependent on the outcome of a statistical test, and that eliminates the need for having to rely on the dichotomy, significant versus not significant. Significance is much more a matter of degree, and it would be one step in the right direction to report the sample statistic with its p-value and leave it at that. This preserves the important notion of the sampling distribution and a particular value of the underlying parameter, but it is done without raising the question of rejection or lack thereof. With large data sets, all the sample statistics are always significant, anyway. But since we have been told not to confuse statistical significance with substantive significance, there is no reason to be excited by the results. We can test the

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statistical null hypothesis that, for example, a correlation coefficient is zero in the population, but no finite human population has two variables with a correlation of exactly zero. Thus, the null hypothesis is wrong to start with, and the data will tell us just that if we have a large enough sample. If anything, what we want is a null hypothesis that says the population correlation is small and therefore uninteresting. It is ironic that, in a sense, we do better in this situation with fewer data. In such a case we are only able to reject the null hypothesis if the population correlation coefficient is quite far from zero; only in that case do we have a relationship of substantive interest.

While this discussion takes a simplified point of view, it leads to the larger question of the role of statistical models in social research. Current models are often not very appropriate. At best, they hold only approximately, and the more data we have, the less appropriate they often become. As the discussion of hypothesis testing shows, the data overwhelm the statistical model, and we might actually have been better off with fewer observations.

Eliminating hypothesis testing would also eliminate, in one stroke, the controversy surrounding the question of whether a one-tail or a two-tail test should be performed. The theoretical possibility almost always exists for making a one-tail rather than a two-tail test, and this places an unfair burden on most investigators. The choice of test is not dictated by statistical considerations, and since a one-tail test can be rejected with a test statistic closer to zero than a two-tail test can be rejected, it becomes tempting to make the test one-tail. Eliminating this controversy would eliminate eleven papers in Lieberman's book. As it is, the papers give a good representation of the many problems people have faced in arguing for one-tail or two-tail tests.

Alternative ways of arriving at statistical inference do exist, but they are underdeveloped as of now, and a statistical profession sensitive to the problems and needs of social research would find no lack of work in bringing these methods to the social sciences. Instead of classical statistical inference with its hypothesis testing and confidence intervals, attention might be given to Bayesian statistical inference. Bayesian statistics is well enough developed by now to permit us to see that this way of thinking lies much closer to the central core of what inference is all about. It takes as its point of departure the fundamental notion that we are uncertain about the values of the population parameters that characterize the statistical model we are working with—the proportion of a population with a certain characteristic or a set of regression

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coefficients, or any other type of parameter. Information about a parameter is available from two sources—past knowledge about the parameter and new knowledge from sample data currently being collected. But, even after merging these two, we are uncertain about the value of the population parameter, since we only have data from a sample of observations. Bayesian statistics permits us to express the prior information and the information from the new data in probability terms to capture this uncertainty. By bringing the two sets of information together we are left with less uncertainty about the parameter value. New data will continually update our information and reduce our uncertainty. The end product of a Bayesian analysis is a probability distribution for the unknown parameter, which is something unheard of in classical inference. With both classical and Bayesian inference we are uncertain about the true value of a parameter, but only Bayesian inference permits the use of probability theory to express this uncertainty. This means, for example, that Bayesian probability intervals can be interpreted the way we so often mistakenly interpret the classical confidence intervals. With Bayesian inference it becomes possible to say that the probability equals 0.95 that a particular population proportion lies between two numbers like 0.57 and 0.60. In spite of the fact that this is the type of statement any researcher would want to make about an unknown proportion, Bayesian statistics has been slow in entering the social sciences.

Classical statistical inference has been discussed above as an example of a statistical theory that social research perhaps never should have borrowed. One can find other examples in the area of data reduction of statistical theories that have had an uncritical reception by social scientists. Regression analysis can be taken as an example of such a theory. These days, a regression analysis with many explanatory variables is only a spin of a computer tape away. But there are some doubts as to whether the regression model is ready for such heavy use. For one thing, the common model was designed for the case in which the explanatory variables are non-random variables and only the dependent variable is a random variable. Most of the time this distinction is glossed over because the variables do not sort themselves neatly into these two categories. But the fact remains that both estimates and tests in regression analysis are based on the minimization of the residuals parallel to the Y-axis. It may be that the substantive results would not be greatly affected if there were models in which the explanatory variables were as random as the dependent variable. But, as it is now, the statistical profession does not seem to be alerting the users of these models much

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to problems of this kind, and the social science professions do not seem to be asking whether what they are using is correct, or whether something better could be developed.

Statistics has forced social scientists into certain ways of thinking. With regression analysis, for example, the squared multiple correlation coefficient is used to measure the explanatory power of the model. It turns out that most R^2's are small in social research, but the research reports are written anyway because the coefficients are still significant. One senses a feeling of guilt because a small number, when squared, becomes even smaller, and therefore not much of the variation is explained. But it may be that this guilt is misplaced, and that not enough attention has been given to the basic question of whether R^2 is an appropriate measure of the fit of the model for the substantive question under investigation. As with statistical inference, methods of data reduction force us back to the fundamental question of how appropriate the statistical models are for the purposes for which they are used. Current statistical models are useful up to a certain point, but it may be that they do not hold well enough to be pushed beyond that point. And it seems that we are not always aware of when the critical point has been reached.

We have seen that there are many difficulties associated with the use of statistics in the social sciences. Still, social scientists are going to continue to use statistics in their work because of all that it has to offer. The quality of such use depends directly on the quality of the instruction which social scientists receive in statistics.

It is therefore with considerable interest that one turns to the textbook by Palumbo. Here is a book that could have become one of the major introductory works in statistics for political science, but it does not make the grade. The many mistakes in the book help make it a good example of the hazards that can occur along the boundaries of the social sciences and statistics. When even a quick glance reveals errors in the accompanying errata sheet, as well as errors in the book that did not make it to the errata sheet, one is left with a feeling that something went wrong somewhere.

The mistakes run from the trivial to the serious. To cite some examples: Aside from the fact that probably only very few political science students understand the last equation on page 37, the notation is unfortunate: the letter i is used both as a subscript for the summation and as the width of the class interval. The probability density on page 77 is the first one I have seen that integrates to more than 1.00. The statement that "a Z score of —2.01 has a probability of 2.22 percent"

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(p. 119) is wrong as well as misleading. Aside from the fact that the Z score of —2.01 has a probability of zero, the quoted sentence does not convey how hypothesis testing involves a comparison of the observed statistic and the hypothesized parameter. This comparison is relative to the actual sample statistic and other hypothetical and more extreme results that could have occurred but did not. It is not without reason that the borrowing of statistical inference has been beset with so many problems in the social sciences.

Admittedly, inequalities are difficult to deal with, but there are just too many in this book that point in the wrong direction. Moreover, the style is sometimes not conducive to easy understanding. Take, for example, the sentence, "If the two variables are independent, we shall expect to find in this cell that proportion of those cities classified as Democratic which those classified as having much interest in elections comprise of the whole sample" (p. 153). It refers to a contingency table relating political milieu and interest in elections, describing the cell with much interest and in a Democratic milieu. One wonders how many students know what independence is after reading this. Little things like the line on page 184 that does not correspond very well to the given equation are confusing, at best. Electronic computers have had a great impact on tables for statistical distributions; but the table for the normal distribution in this book dates from 1917 and contains surprisingly many errors.

Perhaps it is easier to spot where a political scientist makes statistical mistakes than where a statistician makes a mistake in political science. Either way, both professions need each other and therefore have an obligation to train people well enough to eliminate the obvious errors. We are left with a need for a profession of social science statistics that can provide better training in statistics.

In the three readers, the emphasis differs. The ones edited by Haber, Runyon, and Badia, and by Lieberman contain papers that are, on the average, more technical than the papers in the book edited by Tufte. The nineteen papers included by Haber, Runyon, and Badia are arranged in three blocks, with the first on scales of measurement problems, the second on aspects of hypothesis testing and the third dealing mainly with nonparametric statistical techniques. The book contains some classic papers that are well worth reading by new generations of social scientists. Stevens' paper on measurement scales is included, as is Student's paper introducing the t distribution and Helen Walker's on degrees of freedom. There are also good review papers on nonparametric statistics by Moses and Gaito. Most of the forty-five papers se-

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lected by Lieberman are also of a purely statistical nature. But the scope is wider, and several of the papers are quite polemic. For example, the section on the use and misuse of chi square starts with a paper by Lewis and Burke and is followed by a reply by Peters, some comments by Pastore, a discussion of the special case of 2x2 tables by Edwards, a further discussion by Lewis and Burke, and a letter to the editor by Burke, commenting on the reply by Peters. This makes for fascinating reading that can be put to good use in a more advanced statistics course. There is a similar string of papers on the one-tail versus two-tail controversy. The other sections are on measurement and scales, inference and null-hypothesis testing, Bayesian statistics, violations of assumptions, and on current interpretations.

All of the volumes contain much of what is both good and bad in the relationship between the social sciences and statistics. The dissatisfaction with statistical inference is apparent, and inadequacies of current methods of data reduction are noticeable as well. What is not as evident is the larger question we have raised concerning the appropriateness of statistical models for social science research.

The books give considerable attention to the area of statistical inference, and both Palumbo and Lieberman have sections on Bayesian statistics. Still, even when taken together, they do not give a complete picture of current Bayesian statistical theory. When they are combined with the references that are given, however, one can get a good impression of the strengths and weaknesses of the Bayesian way of approaching the problem of statistical inference. The main strengths are philosophical; the main weaknesses are due to the lack of more complete technical developments. The other selections within the area of statistical inference are all well chosen, but they deal with hypothesis testing and related topics, and they do not address themselves to the fundamental question of whether one should do this kind of analysis in the first place.

In the volume edited by Tufte, many of the nineteen papers put a substantive issue first and then make extensive use of statistics to solve it. Most of the papers are complex enough to prohibit their use as devices for teaching a particular method to students. But for those with some knowledge of statistical methods, the papers provide illustrations of how good statistical analysis can be done. The book opens with the evaluation of the Kinsey report by Cochran, Mosteller, and Tukey, and continues with three other papers on statistical criticism. The more substantively oriented papers are contained in sections on experimental work, analysis of aggregate data, and analysis of survey data. The pa-

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pers in the last section have a more technical flavor, and include discussions of the problem of using ordinal-level variables as interval-level variables, and of the problem of multicollinearity.

Because most of the papers deal with actual applications of statistics, Tufte's book is the one most relevant to the discussion of how successful the social sciences have been in borrowing from statistics. The papers are all examples of the best uses of statistics, and they show how it can be used to reach conclusions which would otherwise have been unobtainable. Typically, the crucial contributions are provided by the data-reduction and descriptive aspects of the analyses, rather than by the statistical inference.

Still, the innovative uses of standard statistical methods are not very common in these articles. One of the exceptions is found in the paper by Stokes (Tufte, pp. 352-68), where, for substantive reasons, he is led to the computation of a quantity that equals the product of a regression coefficient and the difference between the observed mean of the corresponding explanatory variable and a theoretical neutral point (equation 3, p. 366). This in itself is a very simple idea, but it is not something that is taught in a course on regression analysis. It shows, however, that even with small adaptations the present models can be made much more responsive to substantive needs.

These books enable us to look to the future and to see what statistics could contribute. The trend in statistical inference is toward Bayesian statistics; in data reduction there is a trend toward what is becoming known as data analysis. Briefly, it consists of analyzing data without being confined by formal statistical theory. We have seen that in most cases the formal models do not fit exactly and can easily be strained by too much information or for other reasons. One solution to this problem is a decreased reliance on formal models.

Only one paper pursues this point in a major fashion and gives indications of what the future holds. This is the paper entitled "Data Analysis and Statistics: Techniques and Approaches" by J. W. Tukey and M. B. Wilk (Tufte, pp. 370-90). The authors list four major influences that act on data analysis: formal theory of statistics, developments in computers and display devices, the challenges of more and ever larger bodies of data, and the accelerating emphasis on quantification in more and more disciplines. Data are usually analyzed by fitting a model that provides a set of residuals which can be analyzed further. Tukey and Wilk go on to say that, in addition, three of the main strategies of data analysis are graphical presentation, provision of flexibility in viewpoint and in facilities, and intensive search for parsimony

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and simplicity, including careful reformation of variables and bending the data to fit simple techniques.

One does not usually hear statisticians talk this way. The main reason is that such statements do not easily translate into mathematical models that can be examined and manipulated. Even social scientists have been conditioned not to think along such lines, however much they may have wanted to. But Tukey and Wilk provide a fresh look at the process a researcher goes through from the time the data have been collected to the time the final report is written. The paper is too short to be of help to those who want to learn how to do a particular aspect of data analysis, but it contains a wealth of stimulating ideas and viewpoints on how data should be analyzed, and perhaps will be analyzed in the future.

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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN SPAIN

By STANLEY G. PAYNE

Charles W. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System*. Madison, Wis., The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, 282 pp., $12.50.

Albert Balcells, *El problema agrari a Catalunya (1890–1936): La qüestió rabassaire*. Barcelona, Editorial Nova Terra, 1968, 297 pp.

Albert Pérez Baró, *Trenta mesos de collectivisme a Catalunya (1936–1939)*. Barcelona, Ediciones Ariel, 1970, 242 pp., 250 ptas.

Josep Ma. Bricall, *Política econòmica de la Generalitat (1936–1939)*. Vol. 1: *Evolució i formes de la producció industrial*. Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1970, 359 pp., 550 ptas.

Edward E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970, 469 pp., $15.00.

Richard A. H. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and Revolution, 1931–1936*. Pittsburgh, Pa., The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, 475 pp., $9.95.

IN his magisterial general history, *Spain 1808–1939*, Raymond Carr concluded that the failure of modern constitutional liberalism in Spain was above all "a political failure," that is, more the consequence of political culture, status cleavages, and ideological divergence than the inevitable result of unadapted economic structures that could not support the formal political system.[1] American reviewers such as Richard Herr and Gabriel Jackson were quick to take issue, arguing that political conflict in modern Spain had not been positively resolved because the economic structure had been too backward to permit it. They were obviously correct that the backwardness of the Spanish economy greatly hampered the civic processes of modern Spain—a point that Carr readily admitted in general. It is nonetheless largely true that modern Spanish politics have more often than not focused on issues of status and ideology rather than on specific conflicts over concrete economic issues.

One of the more notable characteristics of modern representative politics in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Spain, when compared with more modernized Western countries, was the dominant influence of ideology and status rivalry and the relative weakness of

[1] Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808–1939* (Oxford 1966), vi.

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the representation of concrete interests, particularly in economics. It may be argued that this was due to the feeble development of modern economic interests in Spain, which provided little worth representing; yet that argument is not fully satisfactory. The politics of the United States in the 1780's spoke for objective interests much more effectively than did those of Spain in a comparable period of national development such as the 1830's. The difference would seem to be more effectively accounted for by cultural and social psychological explanations than by the nature of the economic structure, which was, after all, not completely dissimilar to that of other Western countries during corresponding phases of development.

Modern Spanish representative politics were introduced in a somewhat artificial situation during a time of crisis in the War of Independence against Napoleon. The vehicle was a middle-class provincial political intelligentsia much more attuned to ideas and personal employment than to national economic development and the representation of a "bourgeoisie," which, in the proper sense of the term, did not exist in early nineteenth-century Spain. Thus when normal conditions returned liberalism quickly collapsed. It only managed to achieve solidity, albeit still somewhat precariously, by identifying itself with the opening up of a modern capitalist market agriculture, between 1836 and 1860, through the sale of church and common lands to a new rural upper middle class. The economic basis of nineteenth-century Spanish politics was consequently the new land tenure system of a large market agriculture in parts of central and southern Spain, partially balanced by a small-holding and/or stable renting peasantry in the north and north center.

Although the political system of advanced suffrage and parliamentary constitutionalism was modern in form, the economic structure of Spanish society was still that of an eighteenth-century agricultural society. On such a base the middle-class political intelligentsia persistently endeavored to establish advanced norms of political representation (indirect universal suffrage from 1810 to 1814, the broadest franchise in continental Europe from 1837 to 1843, direct universal male suffrage from 1869 to 1874 and again from 1889 to 1923) which always broke down in practice. The political superstructure was too advanced for the economy and the society; in such a situation it is ingenuous to argue that the former ought to have been able to pull the latter up to its own level immediately.

Nonetheless, the political leadership of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Spain, composed to a great degree of middle-class lawyers

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(and, secondarily, of journalists, writers, and other rhetoricians), never conceived of any clear form of national economic development policy. The few politicians who attempted to do so, such as Santiago Alba in his new financial program of 1916, were almost entirely thwarted by vested interests, both in the countryside and in the small industrial nuclei. The latter as much as the former were reluctant to lose their highly privileged elite position even though this meant the continuing backwardness of Spain as a whole. This reluctance is important in understanding the separate regionalist political movement in Catalonia which did so much to undermine Spain's national political development.

One of the major gaps in modern Spanish historiography is the almost complete absence of study of the economic and industrial elite, the "national bourgeoisie," that began to develop in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. During most of the nineteenth century, Spain had a virtually colonial economy, subordinate to foreign investment, commerce, and industrial imports. This situation began to change rather slowly but quite perceptibly in the early twentieth century when the beginning of an independent modern industrial economy started to emerge in parts of northern Spain. Yet we know little about this process and its relationship to state policy and political affairs, due to the lack of scholarly investigation.

The first national economic development program of any kind in modern Spain was vaguely sketched out during the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–30). This in itself seems paradoxical: Primo personally understood even less about economics than the professional civilian politicians whom he had ousted. The dictatorship had emerged originally in response to the neocolonial crisis in Morocco and had lacked ideological substance. When Primo de Rivera made his fumbling effort to institutionalize it during the second phase (1926–30), his ambition was to build a sort of development dictatorship; a minor portion of his inspiration was drawn from the concurrent Fascist effort in Italy. Thanks in part to favorable international conditions and in part to the regime's own policies, Spain enjoyed a prosperity in the middle and late 1920's that was not to be equaled again until the early 1950's. However, some of the regime's achievements contributed to its own undoing. For example, the tax reforms instituted by its finance minister, Calvo Sotelo, which have turned out to be the only notable tax reforms in the entire history of twentieth-century Spain, roused the hostility of the opulent and lessened the enthusiasm of the propertied classes for authoritarian government.

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Since the fall of the dictatorship (1930) and the subsequent collapse of the monarchy (1931), controversy over economic policy has become much more important; indeed, for three years—during the Civil War—it assumed murderous proportions. Until recently, the poorly developed state of Spanish historiography, with its paucity of systematic monographic studies, has made it difficult to discuss precisely the nexus between political conflict and economic issues, but several major studies of the past two years now throw light on important aspects of this area.

The whole issue of industrialization in modern Spain has for long been secondary, as a social and economic issue, to the overwhelming problems of agriculture and the peasantry in what remained until the 1950's basically an agrarian country. Edward E. Malefakis' recent study, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*, accomplishes two important tasks: it provides the first thorough study of land tenure conditions in southern and central Spain, and it gives a detailed account of the politics of agrarian reform and peasant revolution under the second Spanish Republic of 1931–36. This analysis of agrarian structure is based on probing research of land records, particularly the 254-volume Property Register of the Institute of Agrarian Reform itself. On this basis Malefakis is able to dissect the property structure of the agrarian society in the southern two-thirds of Spain. In the process, he destroys a number of myths widely held by commentators both in Spain and abroad since the 1930's, for he demonstrates the extreme variety of tenure and social conditions even in the southern provinces, and invalidates most broad generalizations about Spanish agrarian society as a whole. Although conditions in the latifundist regions are shown to have been almost as bad as they have usually been described, Malefakis shows that such regions were not typical of most of Spain. Only in a minority of provinces did alienated, oppressed déclassé elements form a majority of the population; hence the notion of the "seething peasant mass" ready to explode during the 1930's has had to be considerably revised.[2] Most Spanish peasants were

[2] Malefakis shrewdly notes that in Mexico, for example, there were nearly 10,000 properties of more than 1,000 hectares each in 1940—an entire generation after the Mexican Revolution. These properties amounted to 61.9 per cent of total land surface, whereas in Spain (as of 1959) holdings of that size amounted to only 5 per cent of the total land. During the 1930's, land distribution ratios in the worst "feudal," "reactionary" latifundist provinces of Spain were slightly more equitable than the average at that time in "progressive," "democratic," "revolutionary" Mexico, staunch supporter of the leftist Republic. Even worse conditions have ostensibly prevailed in Brazil, whose society seems unable to generate any kind of severe tension as measured by the standards of twentieth-century radicalism. So much for the myth of the supposedly uniquely inhuman, inevitably and spontaneously revolutionary conditions in the Spanish countryside, at least as measured by the pattern of land distribution (p. 72).

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indeed quite poor, and nearly all of them were engaged in rather backward forms of premodern agriculture. Nonetheless, for most it was a stable and endurable poverty, based on reasonably dependable property relationships and social bonds. In this area of Spanish society, Carr's thesis would seem to be validated: economic conditions alone were not such as naturally or inevitably to fuel extremist politics.

The main part of Malefakis' book treats the Republican agrarian reform and the growth of revolutionary activity among the southern peasantry by the organized anarchosyndicalist and Socialist movements. During the first phase of the Republic (1931–33), leadership fell into the hands of Manuel Azaña and the middle-class "Republican Left," which represented the latest wave of the doctrinaire middle-class political intelligentsia that had instituted most of the new ultra-liberal experiments in Spain's public affairs for more than a century. As in preceding generations, this group concentrated on issues of ideology and state institutions to the general exclusion of concrete social and economic problems. The establishment of Catalan autonomy in 1932 seemed to settle one of the more burning political issues, yet only two years were required to show that even that was not to be the case. Moreover, an autonomous Catalonia that aspired toward virtual independence merely rendered the dispersal of economic resources more extreme and delayed the possibility of integrated economic development.

It was not surprising that the middle-class Left had little direct interest in, or preparation for, the specific problem of agrarian reform. The main pressure from within the governmental coalition came from the Socialists, whose own position was at great variance with that of the middle-class Left which was still oriented toward private property. The result, as one of the most original and valuable sections of Malefakis' study shows in detail, was an agrarian reform project of uncertain structure and muddled priorities. Three-fourths of the eighty thousand property owners subject to its provisions were not large but medium and small-to-medium holders. The attack on medium as well as large properties raised a serious question as to ultimate goals and greatly stiffened the resistance to reform. The terms were all the more objectionable since their highly complicated provisions enabled certain categories of large holders to retain the great bulk of their properties.

At the same time there occurred a new growth of anarchosyndicalism among some sectors of the southern peasantry, but this was overshadowed by the development of a mass following, among the poor peasants of the southwest, for Socialist trade unionism for the first time

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in the history of Spanish socialism. To some extent this shifted the base of the Socialist movement from the literate skilled and semiskilled workers of the north to the backward peasants of the south. Equally important—though Malefakis lacked data on this point at the time his book was published—was the fact that the growth of Socialist party membership in the agrarian southwest was proportionately even greater than the growth of trade union membership in that region. This resulted once more in greater influence for radical, ideologically motivated elements of the provincial white-collar group and intelligentsia, complementing and accelerating the radicalization of Spanish socialism as a whole between 1933 and 1936. The actual term used by the Socialists themselves was "bolshevization," though they were in fact vague as to the real nature of bolshevism. Economic conditions for the poor peasantry of southern Spain during the depression years were extremely harsh, but the ideological-economic conflicts imposed by the organized revolutionary movements were more explosive. The issue of economic development was rarely raised; what was at stake was a revolutionary alternative of political and institutional domination. However, the southern-based revolutionary movements could never win a rural revolution in Spain as a whole, because, as Malefakis' analysis convincingly demonstrates, the majority of the agrarian population of Spain identified itself with the existing structure. On the other hand, a positive program of agrarian development could have drawn much broader support.

The predominance of politics is further demonstrated by the fact that the one region of Spain where the issue of agrarian reform managed to carry the day was Catalonia, where tenure conditions were much better, and agrarian income and productivity much higher, than in the south. The social struggle of the *Rabassaires*—long-term vineyard leasers—to become outright owners lay at the root of the Catalan regional government's revolt against the Republican constitutional system in 1934. An excellent recent study by Albert Balcells, *El problema agrari a Catalunya (1890–1936): La qüestió rabassaire*, explains the background and development of the agrarian problem in Catalonia, and shows the real nature of *Rabassaire* grievances, and the relative moderation of the Catalan proposal for reform.[3] It also demonstrates that the agrarian problem in Catalonia was well on the way to finding a constructive legal solution when it was seized upon by radical elements of the doctrinaire Catalanist political leadership as the spark

[3] Further background on this problem will be found in J. de Camps i Arboix's recent *Història de l'agricultura catalana* (Barcelona 1969).

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to ignite a revolutionary reformulation of institutional relations with the Spanish government.

Altogether, Malefakis' book, which deals with the major aspects of the broader Spanish agrarian problem, constitutes a nearly definitive study of one of the major predicaments of the Spanish Republic. I must question, however, the justification for the subtitle of the book, "Origins of the Civil War," since that implies that the agrarian problem was the main issue at the root of the conflict. Such a proposition is doubtful. It is certainly correct to say that the revolutionary movements played a major role in provoking the Civil War, but after mid-1934 their real weight lay in the industrial north, not in the agrarian south: it was only the industrial and urban workers who had the power to generate the main polarizing tensions. What really split the Spanish polity was the revolutionary insurrection of 1934 which was centered in the industrial and mining region of Asturias and was almost completely ignored by the southern peasantry. Finally, the proof of the pudding was in the eating. When the Civil War broke out, the nominally "revolutionary" peasants of the latifundist districts offered comparatively meager resistance, due to their poor organization, low level of ability and training, and their general confusion. The leftist effort was based primarily on the urban and industrial districts of northern, eastern, and central Spain.

In his concluding chapter, Malefakis feels called upon to search for a utopian formula that would have achieved a "humanistic" peasant reform of drastic dimensions and could somehow still have avoided revolutionary violence. Not surprisingly, he is unable to come up with such a prescription. The peasant problem of southern Spain in the 1930's was not merely insoluble within a democratic constitutional context of individual property rights and due process of law, it was also insoluble in terms of the level of technological development in Spain at that time. A division of land would perhaps have increased production and living standards slightly, but in general would merely have led to a redistribution of poverty. The 24-month utopia sought by the revolutionary Left could never have been achieved.

In reviewing the frenetic political debates that occurred in Spain under the Republic, it is striking to note how rare were the spokesmen who emphasized the root of the social problem—the need for economic modernization. Representatives of nearly all groups preferred to speak in terms of ideological doctrines, property titles, and institutional changes *per se*, rather than of transformation of productive techniques. Curiously, it was the "reactionary" General Franco, in one of his first

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press interviews after the beginning of the Civil War, who defined the solution of the agrarian problem in terms of a 25-year technological transformation, that would increase efficiency by dividing the large estates into smaller cultivation units. Though this prognosis has proven overly optimistic, it did point out the ultimate direction taken by the very slow modernization of Spanish agriculture.

If the Left showed little aptitude for coming to grips with the concrete problems of the Spanish economy under the Republic, the Right showed even less concern, on the face of it. The rightist groups had been organized on doctrinaire grounds between 1931 and 1933, in reaction to the Left, and largely in the defense of specific institutions, with reactive rather than initiatory programs. Richard A. H. Robinson's recent *Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and Revolution, 1931–1936* has provided us with the first general and comparative treatment of all the rightist groups under the Republic. This broad account provides a perspective that could not have been achieved by narrow monographic study, for all the rightist parties were directly conditioned by their interactive pressures and rivalries. The main single source used by Robinson was the press of the period. He has perhaps become more proficient in this area than any other living scholar, having systematically read the major contemporary organs of leftist as well as rightist groups. Though the structure of the book is essentially chronological and narrative, it is far from a mere chronicle, for it offers shrewd evaluation and analysis at each step of the way.

Robinson's account inevitably centers on the Spanish Catholic party, the CEDA, which was not merely the leading force of Spanish conservatism but the largest single political party in the country during the years 1933–36. The origins of the CEDA lay in a doctrinaire defensive reaction against the constitutional assault on the church by the Left in 1931; hence, the CEDA was originally no more based on any clear representation of economic interests than were its leftist counterparts. One of the merits of Robinson's treatment of the CEDA is that he makes clearer the precise aims and goals of the CEDA leader, Gil Robles, than did Gil Robles' own extensive and highly informative memoir, *No fue posible la paz*.[4] The controversy over the real "nature" and "intentions" of the CEDA poisoned Spanish politics during the middle years of the Republic. Robinson shows conclusively that Gil Robles and the key CEDA leadership were genuinely committed to "legal methods," that is, to the tactics of the electoral system and constitutional parliamentary politics; once having gained power by these

[4] Barcelona 1968.

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means, however, they planned to introduce alterations that would produce a partially corporative and more authoritarian system. Thus the term "Christian democrat," used by some recent commentators (including Robinson) to describe the CEDA, does not really fit.

The irony of the political situation of the Spanish Republic was that Left and Right were essentially correct in their negative judgments about each other, but mistaken in their own positive self-evaluations. That is, the Left correctly perceived that the Right was not going to accept unaltered the existing constitutional structure of a moderate left Republic and could not, in that sense, become the object of cooperation; the Right was absolutely correct in its judgment that the Left would never grant an equal voice in a representative system to the Right, no matter how fairly elected. But the Left was obviously wrong in its self-identification with the "people" and "liberty." It could not mobilize a clear-cut majority and was determined to impose domination rather than equality on the Right. The Right was mistaken in equating itself with truth and justice unqualified—even by its own definition—since, when the chips were down, it subordinated its ideological principles to the defense of property interests. When the CEDA had a chance at power in 1934–35, the majority of its members paid more direct attention to implementing a policy of economic reaction than to the restoration of Catholic rights that had been the party's major *raison d'être*. Thus, Spanish conservatism quickly evolved toward a narrow and ill-conceived interest group that proved as doctrinaire and shortsighted as the doctrinaire ideological politicians of the Left.

Another major contribution of Robinson's work is the clarification of the relations and differences between the radical Right (Carlists, monarchists, Falangists, and proto-Fascist groups) and the moderate, constitutional Right. It helps to elucidate some of the option limitations of the CEDA, and also explains the shifting of ground by various elements in their search for an authoritarian alternative to the parliamentary system.

In general, the analysis of economic factors is secondary in Robinson's book; but it contains some enlightening observations about the relation between economic and political problems under the center-right government of 1935, as well as an interesting appendix on the social backgrounds of the deputies of the moderate conservative parties. The leaders of the most radical of the new groups, the Falange, had no precise or penetrating solutions to economic problems in a technical sense, for they were as ignorant of most of these issues as the leaders of the majority of other parties. Unlike most other groups, however, the

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Falangists did place a strong, if vague and uninstrumentalized, stress upon industrialization and economic modernization. Spanish fascism in its pristine phase insisted upon the economic development of the country on behalf of which distinct political and social sacrifices were to be made; however, it was quite uncertain as to just how to go about this.

The most lucid mind on the radical Right belonged not to a Falangist or orthodox monarchist leader but to José Calvo Sotelo, the former finance minister of Primo de Rivera. After several years of exile in France, where he was exposed to the ideas of Action Française and to the influence of certain strands of French and Italian fascism, Calvo, at the end of 1934, founded a new "National Bloc" in Spain to try to combine traditional *rechtsstaatlich* conservative monarchism with a radical new proto-Fascist dynamism and the establishment of a "totalitarian" state. The National Bloc never achieved any importance whatever, but as the Spanish political system began to fall apart in the spring of 1936, Calvo Sotelo began to overshadow both the moderate Gil Robles and the Falangist chief, José Antonio, as the real leader of a new authoritarian Spanish Right. In the last analysis, this was due to his intellectual power and to the coincidence of the crystallization of his authoritarian program at the moment of a national political breakdown.

Though willing to accept loosely the new term of "Fascist," Calvo Sotelo was not a genuine Fascist, but the formulator of a modernizing authoritarianism that he was trying to tailor to Spanish circumstances. More than the constantly eulogized José Antonio, he was the real prophet of the Franco state. He thought in terms of an authoritarian system with a corporative assembly and a corporative or nationalist syndicalist labor organization. He rejected the purely vitalistic aspects of fascism and emphasized that the new state must rest upon a series of constitutional principles based on traditional values. Calvo Sotelo's new system was meant to produce economic modernization by means of state-directed economic planning. His model, however, was Roosevelt's New Deal as much as Mussolini's Italy; at least he made as much reference to the former. He proposed a sort of prior *dirigisme* of state controls, planning, and incentives, and also direct state entrepreneurial activities in new forms of public utilities and industry. This sketch, though admittedly vague, was a much more exact forecast of the eventual form and policies of the Franco regime than was the national syndicalist program of the Falange. This helps to explain why Calvo's murder by elements of the revolutionary Left in July 1936 became the symbolic signal for the start of the Spanish Civil War.

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Since 1936, two different programs of economic modernization have been undertaken by governments in Spain. One was the short-lived series of experiments in a revolutionary mixed economy that occurred in the Republican zone during 1936–38, and the other is the Franquist system of partially state-regulated but largely private development that has finally turned the corner on the industrialization of Spain. The economic policies adopted in various parts of the Republican zone differed greatly, depending on local politics and economic structure; the most interesting and ambitious was the new system of industrial collectivization imposed on most of the urban economy of Catalonia. This has been studied for the first time in two new works in Catalan by Albert Pérez Baró and Josep Ma. Bricall.

Bricall's *Política econòmica de la Generalitat (1936–1939): Evolució i formes de la producció industrial* is a general study of the Catalan economy during the Spanish Civil War. It devotes major attention to structural changes in the economy, the principal new problems that developed, and the new economic policies of the wartime Catalan regional government. Finally, it presents a separate exposition of the ideologies and economic programs of the diverse leftist parties and movements in Catalonia during that period. The result is by far the most thorough description and analysis of any aspect of the Spanish industrial economy during those years. Having been trained as an economist, Bricall brings to his task superior skills of economic analysis. He has been able to work up soundly researched time series on gross production, prices, and other major indices. He obviously regards the wartime revolutionary experiment with a mixed but largely collectivist economy with great interest, not to say sympathy; yet his account is written in precise technical language and with objective restraint. His two special contributions are an exact account of just what went on in the new Catalan system on the technical economic level and an explanation of the articulation of the new economic policies developed by the political elements who controlled the Catalan government and formulated the collectivization program.

Trenta mesos de collectivisme a Catalunya (*1936–1939*), by Pérez Baró, is of a different and somewhat more limited character. It provides a fairly detailed description of the development and functioning of collectivized and/or worker-controlled industry in Catalonia between the start of the Civil War and the collapse of Catalonia at the beginning of 1939. The author is a former anarchosyndicalist leader and was secretary of the commission originally encharged, in the autumn of 1936, with applying the new collectivization decree. His ac-

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count, written soon after the Civil War ended, is based on firsthand experience and also on a certain amount of direct documentation that he was able to preserve. Thus he is able to provide a more extended description of the functioning of the various organs of collectivization and reorganization than does Bricall, although he lacks the latter's perspective of the overall economy and the politics of wartime industrial revolution. The book is the work of a determined defender of the merits of decentralized economic collectivization who nonetheless does not fail to point out the numerous deficiencies—caused not only by political opposition and lack of training and skill, but also by revolutionary irresponsibility and egotism—that plagued the Catalan collectivization.

In recent years there has been renewed interest in the Catalan experience of 1936–39 in the light of superficially similar steps, on the part of Tito in Yugoslavia, toward a decentralized collectivized economy partially resting on direct worker control. Not much can be made of this, however, for two reasons. First, no major lessons or conclusions of a purely economic nature can be deduced from collectivism during the Spanish Civil War because of the highly abnormal conditions under which it functioned and because of the very limited time period of its existence. Second, comparisons with Yugoslavia can easily be exaggerated. The wartime Spanish People's Republic was a genuinely pluralistic leftist regime both economically and politically, and did not institute economic changes under a monolithic totalitarian political system.

The defeat of the Spanish Left in 1939 placed the future of Spanish development in the hands of the victorious Nationalist regime of Franco. Unlike most of its liberal predecessors, the Franquist regime had a strategy of development. This was not dissimilar to that of Fascist Italy in the 1930's, and might for convenience's sake be labeled "Falangist autarchy." It involved elaborate state controls on exports and imports, a program of import substitution, investment in a new system of strategic industrial enterprise by the state, and stimulation of domestic expansion. During the 1940's achievements were limited, due to the weakness of state resources in all areas except for the maintenance of controls. Little was invested in state enterprises and development was dependent on private expansion, even though private industrial enterprise in Spain was much weaker than in Italy.

It was common to point with horror at the relative stagnation of the Spanish economy during much of the 1940's, yet in view of the disruption and destruction of the Civil War, the shortages imposed by the

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second World War, and the continuing privation resulting from the postwar policy of ostracism by the victorious powers, it is in retrospect not at all clear how a rapid recovery was to have been achieved. Ten years were required to return to the level of 1935, yet in perspective this may not have been so anomalous. After the only other major revolutionary civil war in twentieth-century Europe, it took the nascent Soviet Union about six years to return to the 1914 level of production in industry alone. The difference does not seem striking if one takes into account the generally prosperous and expansive climate of the 1920's and the greater cooperation with Communist Russia by the Western capitalist countries at that time as compared to their attitude toward Spain in the 1940's. At any rate, it would probably be a more fitting analogy to say that Spain in 1950 was at a level of development reached by Italy about twenty years earlier, midway in the Fascist period.[5] During the 1950's development was more rapid, but was plagued by accelerating inflation and a steadily worsening balance of payments. By 1957 it became apparent that the twenty-year-old policy of partial Falangist autarchism was bankrupt and could not sustain further Spanish economic development.

At that point the Franco regime introduced a rather abrupt change —from partial Falangist autarchism to partial technocratic neoliberalism. This transition is the subject of Charles W. Anderson's new book, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System*. The title is inflated: it does not deal with the political economy of "modern Spain" (as we have seen, there have been a variety of different systems of political economy in modern Spain), but with that of Franquist Spain during the decade 1957–67. Anderson came to this study from a career devoted, in considerable measure, to studies of the politics of economic programming and development in contemporary Latin America. He was especially concerned to learn how and what the Spanish system had contributed to economic growth when compared with the functioning of liberal representative and more pluralistic one-party regimes in the Western Hemisphere. Since the 1959 program of stabilization and neoliberalism was a striking success —leading to an industrial growth rate of 9 per cent in the following decade—one of the specific objects of Anderson's study is to determine

[5] For an interesting attempt to analyze and compare the relationship of highly diverse twentieth-century radical ideologies and regimes to the processes of industrialization and modernization, see Ludovico Garruccio, *L'industrializzazione tra nazionalismo e rivoluzione. Le ideologie politiche dei paesi in via di sviluppo* (Bologna, 1969). Garruccio makes a stimulating (though to my thinking slightly inaccurate) effort at a comparative periodization of political and economic modernization in Spain and Italy (pp. 297-302).

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whether this occurred primarily because of or in spite of the economic leadership of the Franquist regime.

In his major conclusion he verifies the former assumption, namely that the reorientation of the economic policy of the Spanish state was of major importance in accomplishing the rapid industrial growth of the country during the 1960's. Anderson attributes this first, to Franco's flexible, partly nonideological leadership style; second, to the soundness of the policy reformulations of the new constellation of state economic administrators (whose key figures have been members of the Catholic secular institute, Opus Dei); and third, to the fact that the instrumentalization of semi-Keynesian neoliberalism in a mixed but largely private economy may be carried out in a variety of political settings. He finds that, despite fundamental differences—and major limitations—in the form of political and economic representation, the process of economic policy formulation in Spain is not so different from that in more liberal Western regimes.

The contemporary structure of Spanish economic planning consists of a program of state *dirigisme* modeled almost completely on the current French system. This demonstrates the inadequacy of the previous Spanish program and the inability of the current Franquist system to introduce any radically unique formula of its own, but it also shows the flexibility and capacity for creative pluralism—at least in the economic sphere—of the variegated Franquist system.

By the 1960's, modern Spanish political ideology had come full circle. During much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries new economic interests and programs had been subordinated to formal politics and ideology. During the last two decades in Spain, the bankruptcy of any form of ideological Falangism and the imprecise ideological definition of any such thing as "Franquism" has led to the subordination of any positive political ideology to the empirical argument of economic development. In 1958, the original 27-point Fascist program of the Falange was replaced by a generalized set of eight "Doctrines of the Movement"—patriotic, alternately conservative and progressive, vague, not oriented toward specific political mobilization, and definitely not Fascist. More recently, the official ideologists of the regime have based their political apologia not on ideological theories but on the success of the regime in achieving industrialization and technological modernization.[6] Probably no other major modern authoritarian regime has so

[6] The argument that a political regime is to be justified above all by its capacity for technological modernization has been made by Jesús Fueyo, director of the regime's ideological braintrust, the Instituto de Estudios Políticos, in his *Desarrollo político y orden constitucional* (Madrid 1964).

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thoroughly de-ideologized itself. It would of course be inaccurate to suggest that the Franco regime is trying to live purely and simply by bread alone, but the ideological residues of Franquism are played down more than those of any other notable contemporary regime. This ties the regime heavily to continued economic development and would make it difficult for the Franco government to survive the economic stagnation that can be supported by a charismatic regime such as Castro's in Cuba. It also lends greater interest to the question of the viability of a continuation of the regime after Franco's death. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Spain had a political system too advanced for its society and economy. After three decades of development dictatorship, a new industrialized Spain has an economy and a society that, measured by most normal Western political indices, are more advanced than the formal articulation of its political system.

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